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Andrea Rea, Saskia Bonjour and Dirk Jacobs  1
Judging by the results of the Eurobarometer surveys, identification with the 
European Union remains weak for large parts of the population of the EU member 
states. Perhaps this should not surprise us, as European citizenship has up till now a 
priori been regarded to be a complement and not a substitute to national citizenship 
(Martiniello, 1995). Jacobs and Maier (1998) have argued that processes of 
Europeanization have nevertheless led to the creation of new identity boundaries. The 
old distinction between nationals and foreigners seems to have transformed itself into 
a triangular logic distinguishing nationals, EU citizens and third country residents. In 
the process, the Other has increasingly become the “non-European Other” – even if it 
is still unsettled who the European We might exactly be. 
This book aims to provide a trans-disciplinary analysis of the construction of 
migration-related “Otherness” in Europe. It is the result of a midterm conference of 
the research project entitled Outsiders in Europe. The Foreigner and the “Other” in the 
Process of Changing Rules and Identities, conducted by the center for transdisciplinary 
research Migration, Asylum and Multiculturalism (MAM) of the Université Libre de 
Bruxelles. We do not pretend to be able to integrate different disciplines (law, sociology, 
political sciences, social psychology and anthropology) into one unified frame 
of analysis. Instead, MAM strives to enhance disciplinary dialogue whereby the 
differences between the disciplinary approaches are not dissolved but exploited so 
as to be able to do justice to the complexity of social reality. This trans-disciplinary 
dialogue is realised on both the theoretical and empirical levels to acknowledge the 
1 With the collaboration of Alejandra Alarcon Henriquez, Assaad Azzi, Emmanuelle 
Bribosia, Philippe De Bruycker, Nicole Grégoire, Chloé Hublet, Yves Pascouau, Pierre Petit, 
and Isabelle Rorive.
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diversity of interpretations of social reality. Within the framework of MAM we did this 
quite literally through monthly meetings in which academics of different disciplinary 
backgrounds openly discussed theories and methods of their respective disciplines, 
without fearing to go back to the basics or “ask silly questions”. This has proven to 
be a productive and enriching enterprise. This book contains contributions by ULB 
team members – partly reflecting the results of our transdisciplinary meetings – and 
contributions by non-ULB international scholars, who participated to our midterm 
conference. They all relate to the issues we have discussed within the framework 
of the MAM-project “Outsiders in Europe”, and which we will further outline in 
this introduction. The first six chapters of the book will provide a legal, political 
and sociological approach of the issue of the Others in Europe. The five remaining 
chapters offer the perspective of social psychology and anthropology. 
	 Changing	migration	flows	and	European	identity
Starting as early as the 1960s, the ways in which European immigration policies 
are implemented – (post) colonial and/or temporary labour migration mostly 
organized through bilateral agreements, etc. – have converged with relatively little 
intergovernmental dialogue. Deepening European integration has led to the creation of 
an institutional framework for a Europeanization of immigration and asylum policy. If 
regulation of foreigners’ entry, freedom of movement and right to stay in EU territory 
is the focal point of legal and political debates in European and national institutions, 
issues regarding the integration of foreigners and especially access to citizenship 
have traditionally remained within the realm of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
convergences between national policies appear in this area as well, notably in the 
generalisation of jus soli in the 1980s and 1990s. The issue of immigration and 
integration in Europe is characterised by a paradoxical process: policies in Europe are 
converging, without losing their national specificities. 
The emergence of a European Union immigration and asylum policy since 
the 1990s has been influenced by at least two new processes. The first one is the 
development of new migrations with specific characteristics. The processes of 
globalisation and growing urbanisation that characterise the 21st century are bringing 
about a new age of migrations (Castles and Miller, 2003). Mobility and freedom of 
movement are values that are pursued and are essential for social advancement. This 
contributes to increasingly complex migratory models. Indeed, the simple duality 
of labour immigration and settlement immigration is no longer operational. The 
entry of tourists or students feeds these new migration processes as much as labour 
immigration, asylum or family reunification. In addition, freedom of movement 
within Europe strengthens movements of migration. In Europe today, national origins 
and statuses of new migrants are very different from what they once were. Since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the enlargement of the European Union, many immigrants 
have come from Central and Eastern Europe. The era of dominance of the illiterate 
male immigrant from a rural area is long gone: the new migrants are more often 
women, city-dwellers and highly educated. 
The second process is the transformation of identities in Europe. The 
Europeanization underlying the creation of a European citizenship (Martiniello, 1994) 
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is also at the basis of the reframing of existing identities and the production of new 
ones. These processes contribute to the creation of new “imagined communities” 
(Anderson, 1983), as well as an “imagined European community”, pulling together 
opposite identities and pushing apart closely related identities. This affects nationals 
as well as foreigners. As a supranational identity is being created at the European level, 
European states are faced with re-emerging national and regional identities which 
may occasionally be very strong. In addition, legal tools, institutional practices, social 
interactions and representations all contribute to the metamorphosis of the image of 
the foreigner in Europe. Immigration policies used to be largely based on economic 
considerations, in particular on the demands of the labour market. Today, however, 
social tensions and political passions produced by immigration are mostly linked to 
issues of belonging and identity. The representation of the foreigner is no longer solely 
defined by his or her place on the labour market or in the social hierarchy. European 
society is increasingly questioning its “cultural and ethnic identity” as a result of its 
enlargement and immigration flows. 
The different processes of European enlargement have brought peoples 
and identities closer to each other, endlessly renewing European identity. The 
accompanying rhetoric often insists on the proximity and shared destiny of the old 
and new Member States and populations of the European Union (cf. the debates 
over references to Christianity in the European Constitution or over the accession of 
Turkey). This alleged proximity is however more of a performative speech act than a 
lived reality. Several Eurobarometer surveys and the European Social Survey indicate 
that the fear of the Other is fairly strong in Europe. This has been confirmed over 
the years by the emergence and durable presence of extreme right wing and populist 
parties that use racism as their favourite electoral argument. This fear of the Other 
targets not only new immigrants, but also descendants of old migrations, who still see 
the legitimacy of their presence in European societies called into question. They are 
often victims of what has been called a European racism (Balibar, 1992; Rea, 1998) 
or of the racialization of European society (Fassin, 2010). Old migrations, especially 
those assimilated to colonial migrations not only by former colonial powers but by the 
whole European continent, and the descendants of immigrants who claim a specific 
identity linked to Islam are now “re-colonized” (Balibar, 2001) not only within the 
national boundaries (Rex, 1973) but also within European boundaries. 
As a consequence, boundaries between internal identities within States are being 
redefined. Some non-nationals that have become nationals may remain confined to 
the status of outsider while other non-nationals, i.e. EU citizens, may be considered 
culturally similar. Legal and social categorizations are reshaping the image of the 
foreigner in Europe: this image becomes that of the Other, “the non-European 
Other”, whose legal and symbolic definition varies and wavers with different social 
situations. Thus, the European construction goes hand in hand with processes of 
identity redefinition: them/us, national/non-national, European/third country national, 
the majority recognised as homo nationalis/the minority denied recognition as homo 
nationalis, local/global. We will focus specifically on the European/non-European 
distinction, which defines majority/minority positions constructed by legal and 
institutional devices, media messages and discourse, social dynamics, mobilizations 
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and other processes of representation, which differentiate groups and individuals. 
Within the European construction, two generic origins seem to crystallize cultural 
diversity and feed fears in Europe (cultural conflicts, clash of civilizations, terrorism, 
etc.): “Sub-Saharan Africans” or “Blacks” on the one hand and “Muslims” on the 
other, two specific figures of Otherness in Europe, of Outsiders in Europe.
	 The	Europeanization	of	immigration	and	the	re-categorization	of	the	Other
Since the Amsterdam Treaty which was signed on the 2nd of October 1997 and 
came into effect in 1999, immigration and asylum policy has in principle become 
a European matter. The communitarization of this field corresponds with the end 
of the intergovernmental method and the transfer of competences over asylum and 
immigration to the supranational institutions, as well as the selection of a certain 
number of areas for which a common policy is put forward. The study of different 
measures in asylum (Dias Urbano de Sousa and De Bruycker, 2004; Guild, 2004) and 
immigration (De Bruycker, 2003; Guild, 2009) fields tends to show the emergence of 
a relative convergence of national policies in Europe. This trend towards convergence 
was brought to light long before the communitarization of public action in this field 
(Geddes & Favell, 1999 ; Guiraudon, 2000 ; Geddes, 2003). However, States remain 
primary actors in the definition of immigration policy. For example, each country 
continues to consider economic migration as a matter of national sovereignty, while 
regretting the lack of coherence between public policies (quotas in Italy and Spain, 
green card in Germany, points-based policy in the United Kingdom, etc.).
If the modus operandi of immigration policies reveals a limited level of European 
integration, this is not the case for the legal categories, particularly those of non-national 
and of European citizens. The European construction has led to a re-categorization of 
the legal definitions of national legislations, in particular those pertaining to issues 
of entry and stay of non-nationals. By introducing a principle banning nationality-
based discrimination as early as 1957, the European construction has had an impact 
on traditional legal categories (Bribosia et al., 1999). In fact, the classic distinction 
between nationals and foreigners has become more complex. Today, there are at 
least three different categories: the national, the EU Member State national and the 
third country national. This new categorisation did not erase all distinctions between 
nationals and nationals of other Member States, also called EU citizens. However, it 
helped to accentuate the common aspects and bring EU citizens closer to nationals 
while pushing non-European foreigners out. If some of the new rights obtained by 
third-country nationals within the European framework stem from the new rights that 
have been awarded to EU citizens, notably the creation of a European zone of free 
movement, clear-cut differences in treatment remain between EU and non-EU citizens. 
The debates concerning these differences have been analysed as the expression of 
either the passage from national to societal security issues (Waever, 1993), or from a 
control of territories to a control of populations (Bigo, 1996 ; Huysmans, 2006). This 
differentiation illustrates the way in which non-European foreigners are considered 
a threat, entailing the need for Nation-States and national institutions to acquire the 
means necessary to reduce the perceived risks. 
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In the first chapter of this book, Kees Groenendijk presents a vigorous analysis 
of labelling by national and EU law of statutory categories of immigrants. Using a 
historical approach beginning with the first European Treaty (1957) through to the 
Stockholm Programme (2009), he demonstrates how new EU migration law creates 
new categories and new distinctions amongst people. However, he argues that the 
labelling process of the EU law is not so different from Member States’s national law. 
He points out that the main difference between EU and national law is that the potential 
for divergence in moving from the legislative process to the application of those 
laws is greater with EU law. With Union citizenship, EU law creates an opposition 
between “We”, Unions citizens versus “Them”, third country nationals. However this 
categorization does not automatically produce stigmatization. Stigmatization follows 
from the rules that allow for the selective use of new technology (EU immigration 
databases) for third country nationals in irregular situation. 
The most visible sign of the Europeanization of immigration and integration 
policies lies clearly in the production of European legal norms, the Long Term Resident 
and Family Reunification Directives in particular. Political scientists have largely 
focused on analysis of the institutional framework (Radaelli, 2003) with supranational 
institutions and multi-level governance as their objects of study; legal scholars have 
also considered the legal tools produced at the European level and their translation at 
the national level. There is a recurrent question throughout this type of research: does 
Europeanization lead to a widening or a reduction of the rights of foreigners? The 
hypothesis of the alignment towards the lowest standards is most often suggested. 
According to a widely shared opinion, the legislative suggestions of the Commission 
were practically emptied of all substance by the Council of Ministers as a result of 
its obligation to reach unanimous decisions by representatives of all Member States. 
In this way, the academic image of the legislative process tends to align itself with 
the long-standing criticism of NGOs defending foreigners’ interests who claim that 
harmonization is bringing about a generalization of the lowest standards among 
the Member States and is thus unfavourable to the interests of foreigners. If this 
hypothesis is corroborated, then it would be time to question whether the European 
framework introduces more obstacles to foreigners obtaining rights than the national 
framework does. If this proves to be the case, it would seem that Europeanization 
tends to reinforce the threatening figure of the foreigner.
Many elements encourage a more moderate vision. Relations between European 
law and national law on immigration matters are much more complex than the 
hypothesis of a harmonization towards the lowest standards suggests. There are 
few points on which there has been harmonization and Member States have created 
numerous ways out of the obligations set by European law (including the introduction 
of non-constraining measures in directives that are by definition legally binding). 
Moreover, the fact that the Council, in each Directive, gives the Member States the 
right to maintain or introduce more favourable national provisions tends precisely to 
avoid a general harmonization towards the lower minimum standards agreed upon 
unanimously by Member States.
The story is more complicated when migrant integration policy is concerned. We 
cannot talk about a genuine European policy making effort aimed at harmonization. 
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Although the Lisbon Treaty for the first time provides an explicit legal basis to the 
European Union for activities in the domain of migrant integration, it also explicitly 
mentions the EU cannot try to harmonise legislations: “the European Parliament 
and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may 
establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States 
with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally 
in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States” (Article 79 (4) TFEU). This, however, does not mean there are not 
converging trends to be observed in the European Union.
	 Integration	and	risk	management
Whereas national immigration policies since the 1960s have mostly been blind to the 
cultural specificities of immigrants, it seems that this will no longer be the case in future. 
Even though European States refuse to consider themselves immigration countries 
like the United States or Canada, Europe seeks to implement immigration policies 
that incorporate demands for cultural conformity. Europe as a political community, 
intends to use its control over immigration in an utilitarian perspective, in response to 
needs in population and competencies (Bribosia & Rea, 2002), but also in an identity 
perspective. When European countries called upon Moroccan, Algerian, Turkish 
and Pakistani workers they did not worry about the cultural or religious identity 
of these populations. They were first and foremost a workforce. Today however, 
cultural and ethnic identity is becoming a preoccupation of policy makers, even if this 
preoccupation is not directly translating into material political measures. This is proven 
by the emergence of a European integration policy (Groenendijk, 2004). With the help 
of the Commission, Member States have thus set up a network of National Contact 
Points on immigration matters. On November 19th, 2004, the Council of Ministers of 
Justice and Internal Affairs adopted the Common Basic Principles on integration. The 
use of such instruments is not set within a legally-binding framework. However, it 
does participate in the Europeanization process and affects Member States’ policies. 
Political and media discourses rely on a rhetoric of peril (Hirshman, 1991), thus 
broadening classic discursive registers. Immigrants have often been represented as a 
danger to the stability of welfare systems, on the one hand, and to public peace, on 
the other. They are suspected of either working in conditions that threaten competition 
or of unlawfully taking advantage of the benefits of the Welfare State. Moreover, 
the inextricable link between immigration and delinquency leads to a systematic 
questioning of immigrants’ irreproachability. Since the 1990s, these two discursive 
registers have been complemented by the rhetoric of threat to the specificity of the 
European identity and to the external security. The growth of majority or minority 
multiple identities feeds the theory of the “clash of civilizations”. Certain cultural 
or religious specificities, particularly those linked to Islam, are seen to endanger 
European identity. Numerous disagreements appear in Europe on subjects linked 
to the management of cultural diversity (the Islamic veil, gendered space-division, 
dietary laws, religious holidays, etc.). These conflicts or litigations are regulated either 
socially (negotiation, mediation, etc.) or through the judiciary (court cases). 
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These new discursive registers lead to the implementation of precautionary risk-
management measures aimed at new migrations (Rea, 2009). The perceived risks 
linked to certain cultural characteristics are becoming an important factor in the 
choice of new recruitment areas for new migrants. While still fulfilling their duty of 
protecting refugees as well as foreigners already settled on their territory, Member 
States increasingly intend to control the cultural identities of new migrants. They are 
thus adopting the principle that the right to emigration finds its limits in the right 
for a political community to preserve its specific way of life. The introduction of 
integration criteria, prior to new migrants entering the territory, in certain Member 
States indicates that European countries are seeking to control the entrance of 
immigrants onto European soil on a basis of cultural belonging. The principle of 
precaution is aimed at ethnic minorities whose practices and cultural and religious 
claims seem to endanger the compromises negotiated historically to institutionalise 
Church-State relations in European countries. 
After a period of acceptance of diversity in certain European countries such 
as the Netherlands and Sweden, multiculturalism is now being questioned (Joppke 
and Morawska, 2003; Jacobs, 2004) everywhere in Europe. New policies are being 
introduced that focus instead on cultural conformity. There is a tendency to introduce 
more active integration policies in European countries. They are articulated along two 
axes: knowledge of the national language and knowledge of the host society and its 
political system. Contrary to the hypothesis of Joppke (2007) that the proliferation of 
such integration policies signals the end of “national models” of integration in Europe, 
it may be argued that the implementation of integration policy is still determined 
by national models, even if some components of this policy are shared by different 
countries (Jacobs and Rea, 2007). After all, the aims of these integration policies vary 
significantly in different European countries: reducing cultural diversity, conditioning 
access to social or civil rights and learning about the social, institutional and cultural 
context in which the new migrants are living. 
In Chapter II of this book, Yves Pascouau highlights the importance accorded to 
integration issues in the European Union and the Member States with special attention 
to mandatory integration provisions. He demonstrates that the issue enjoys political 
support at the highest level, is implemented in Member States, and is accompanied 
by operational instruments. Yves Pascouau argues that these integration measures 
or conditions adopted in the EU seem to act as tools of migration policy. Focusing 
on Dutch and French implementation of integration policy and more particularly 
family reunification, Yves Pascouau demonstrates that integration rules function as 
a criterion to limit migration flows. More precisely, integration requirements are 
established in order to deter family members from exercising their right to family 
reunification. Therefore, the extension of pre-departure measures in the framework 
of external relations is relevant in this regard. In Chapter III of this book, Saskia 
Bonjour also analyses integration policies. Both France and the Netherlands have 
recently introduced policies which require migrants to learn about the language 
and customs of the host country before being granted entry. Dutch civic integration 
abroad policy however is much more restrictive than the French. Bonjour compares 
parliamentary decision-making regarding civic integration abroad policies in order 
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to evaluate whether “national models” are capable of explaining this difference. She 
argues that while Dutch and French politicians define the “problem” at hand in highly 
similar ways, their policy responses are shaped by country-specific discursive and 
institutional structures. 
	 The	Europeanization	of	anti-discrimination	policies	
In certain areas the action of the European Union has clearly contributed to the 
extension of the rights of non-national residents. By deepening and complementing 
the actions of several international organisations such as the United Nations and the 
Council of Europe working towards the protection of human rights, the European 
Union has led Member States to develop their legislative protection of the principle of 
equal treatment and to reinforce their national anti-discrimination policy (Guiraudon, 
2006). Anti-discrimination tools are usually constructed through a multi-stage process 
(Simon, 2004). This process starts when the issue of discrimination is put on the 
political agenda, sometimes as a result of a mobilization campaign. Then, the usual 
first type of reaction consists of admitting that the most blatant cases of discrimination 
(“direct” discriminations) should be brought to justice. The limitations of such a 
reaction and the lack of substantial improvement to the situation of the discriminated 
groups lead to recognition that the systematic nature of these discriminations must 
be taken into account. As a consequence, “indirect” discriminations, that may be 
unintentional, can be tackled. The fight against discriminations strives to remedy 
inequalities inscribed in general rules, for instance through the implementation of 
“reasonable accommodations” that would benefit particular groups. 
It is crucial to understand the impact of the European Union on anti-discrimination 
policies in this context. On the one hand, the elaboration of these European policies 
proceeds partially through a bottom-up mechanism where national laws and 
practices inspire and feed into a common norm. On the other hand and conversely, 
Europeanization also implies the impact of the common norm on the legal orders of 
the Member States. This latter dimension is present, in particular, in the banning of 
discriminations based on nationality – indeed in this case the European normative 
level was the driving force. However, as far as ethnic and religious discriminations 
are concerned, the European level is grafted onto existing national laws and practices, 
taking inspiration from as well as completing them. Without creating new categories, 
the European Union contributes to the reshaping of identities and to the creation of new 
ones. The fundamental principle of fighting against nationality-based discrimination 
that has been at the heart of European integration since its beginnings, is now 
completed by tools used to fight against discriminations based on race and ethnic 
origin on the one hand, and on religion and beliefs on the other. Today however, this 
latter policy remains underdeveloped at the European level. The Amsterdam Treaty 
introduced the legal basis allowing for the adoption – through a unanimous decision 
of the Council – of European policies against discriminations based on gender, sexual 
orientation, handicap as well as race, ethnic origin, religion and beliefs. Despite the 
fact that unanimity was required, the political context (i.e. the increasing electoral 
power of extreme right-wing parties in Europe) facilitated the rapid adoption of two 
European directives on this matter: Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle 
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of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (the Race 
Equality Directive) and Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation (the Employment Equality Directive) 
(Bell, 2002).
In Chapter IV, Chloé Hublet analyses the application of the principle of non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality to third country nationals in European 
Union law. Recognising that Article 18 TFEU, prohibiting discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality, cannot apply to them, as the ECJ confirmed this classic 
interpretation in its recent Vatsouras case, she examines additional means of 
protection which could be available in EU law. Her conclusion is that a gap exists 
in the protection of third country nationals against discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality, a gap which hinders their integration in Europe.
These legal tools also enable us to measure the transformations of the figure of 
the foreigner. After living in Europe for over forty years, some immigrants, most 
of whom have become nationals, as well as their descendants, are, in some degree, 
maintained in an immigrant status which is the cornerstone of their racial and ethnic 
discrimination. These figures of foreigners whose legitimate presence is still disputed 
are always suspected of refusing to integrate. Rising racism and increasing racial and/
or religious discrimination, also in institutional categories such as “non-western”, 
confirm the construction of an ethnic European society. This is a mosaic of national 
identities as well as a budding supranational identity strewn with minority ethnic 
identities resulting from successive migrations. The figure of the foreigner is growing 
larger, encompassing even those persons of migration background who are citizens 
of European countries. One of the consequences is that they increasingly become 
targets for monitoring and profiling, which, however, are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated.
On this topic, in Chapter V, Didier Bigo, Julien Jeandesboz, Francesco Ragazzi 
and Philippe Bonditti offer an important contribution to the debate. They question 
how the border and the politics of bordering produce the categorisation of Otherness. 
In this perspective Otherness is the result of techniques for governing populations. 
Techniques for controlling mobility constitute a way to construct categories of 
people defined as “undesirable” or “potentially dangerous”, people who should be 
blocked at the border, while others, defined as “desirable persons”, should see their 
travel expedited through technology. This approach insists on the fluidity of border. 
Rather than stopping or blocking, emphasis is on filtering or sorting people and 
more efficiently banning the undesirable. These practices have been coined in recent 
years as “smart border technology” and result from the Schengen experiment. The 
virtualisation of borders contributes to the securitisation of borders, which is a way 
to govern populations on the move, to trace them and to sort them out “smoothly”, 
without hurting them. The visibility of coercion at the borders is then often limited 
and violence is relocated to the bureaucratic procedures of categorising, profiling 
and tracing people through the selection of computerized data. One might actually 
wonder to what extent the increasing invisibility and technical sophistication of 
border control is not only linked to the imperative of free movement of people within 
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the European Union but is also to be understood in the light of a stronger emphasis on 
anti-discrimination policy making on the European level. 
The introduction of anti-discrimination instruments at the European level is, 
indeed, not without challenges. One can observe a shift from a logic centred on the 
nationality criterion to an increased focus on the ethnic criterion, and in a lesser degree 
to religion. However, the law is less at ease with ethnic or religious categories than 
with the traditional category of nationality, which is more easily objectively identified. 
Furthermore, the Race Equality Directive prohibits not only direct and intentional 
discriminations, but also indirect ones. As a consequence, one can notice a shift from 
the individual to the group that involves a connection to categories based on ethnicity. 
The recourse to statistics as a major way to prove indirect discriminations strengthens 
the need of an ethnical classification in Member States (De Schutter and Ringelheim, 
2010). The notion of ethnic category is, however, far from being defined in the same 
way in various European countries. In addition, categorization based on religion is 
tricky. Several tools used to fight against discriminations are not easily deployed in the 
field of religious discriminations, where the separation between Church and State as 
well as the principle of neutrality of the State are at stake. For instance, some States are 
reluctant to address the requests of “reasonable accommodation” put forward by some 
religious groups or individuals (e.g. allocation of a praying area at work, availability 
of special diets in canteens, etc.) (Woehrling, 1998). Finally, to a certain extent, the 
impact of these policies could be paradoxical: by protecting individuals identified on 
an ethnic or religious ground one could contribute to strengthen the categories built on 
such criteria and increase the process of racialization of society. 
In Chapter VI, Emmanuelle Bribosia, Andrea Rea, Julie Ringelheim and Isabelle 
Rorive consider the relevance of the concept of reasonable accommodation as a 
device for handling religious plurality in European labour relations. They offer a trans-
disciplinary approach of the reasonable accommodation issue, integrating a legal and 
a sociological analysis. Considering EU law, the ECHR and national laws and policies 
regarding accommodation of minority religious practices (Belgium), the authors assess 
that a legal duty to provide accommodation for religious reasons could be derived 
from antidiscrimination and/or religious freedom norms. After a presentation of the 
main findings of a study on what sorts of adjustments are de facto asked for in the 
employment sector and how employers cope with such demands, the authors highlight 
that despite the absence of any clear right to reasonable accommodation, informal 
practices of negotiated accommodation can be observed in various employment 
settings. The legalisation of accommodation practices could contribute to the equality 
of individuals in the treatment of their demands but at the same time it could also cause 
some inconveniences (employers might avoid hiring Muslim employees, fearing that 
they might invoke the right to reasonable accommodation). 
	 Denials	of	recognition	and	identity	mobilization
As mentioned earlier, even though many immigrants and their descendants have 
become nationals, they are not necessarily perceived as fellow citizens or as European 
citizens. Some of them remain stigmatized as outsiders, especially Muslims and Black 
Europeans. Despite their social, economic and political integration, some nationals 
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are assigned an identity of otherness that may not be of their own choosing. Victims of 
racial and ethnic discrimination, they continue to suffer from a lack of recognition. In 
addition to being excluded from national “imagined communities”, immigrant groups 
are excluded from the emerging European identity, which is increasingly homogenised 
by political discourses and media imagery. As a consequence, their identity becomes 
marginalized and stigmatised in both the national and the European contexts. 
The theory of the struggle for recognition (Honneth, 1996) and its application to 
the issues of racism and xenophobia (Sanchez-Mazas, 2004) suggest an analysis of 
these phenomena in terms of the denial of recognition, which can take various forms 
such as a denial of rights (citizenship rights, social rights, freedom of movement, etc.), 
a denial of social esteem such as negative opinions of the culture and/or religion of the 
Other, or a denial of “voice” which delegitimizes the demands and aspirations of these 
groups, especially in a public sphere perceived as secular and in need of protection 
against the influence of religion. Different forms of denial of recognition are likely 
to occur simultaneously when public discourse conflates two very different types of 
concerns under the single label of “immigration issues”: on the one hand matters 
linked to immigration per se, such as the number of entries (legal and/or illegal) 
into a territory, and on the other hand those due to the (often permanent presence) 
on this territory of immigrant populations or ethnic minorities. The constitution of 
a European identity and the shifting of the ethnic boundaries of the figure of the 
Outsider are certainly at the source of the persistence or even reinforcement of the 
denial of recognition in the social sphere, i.e. the denial of social esteem: access to 
national citizenship does not give immigrants access to the recognition granted to 
native European citizens. 
However, the assertion of their identity by minorities cannot be understood as a 
mechanical consequence of the discourses and practices of majority groups: ethnic 
groups are always stake-holders in the construction of their identity. Belonging to a 
group comes about through an imputation and a subscription process: it is only to the 
extent that a person identifies him/herself or is identified by others that ethnicity is 
manifested by distinctive features (Barth, 1968). Seen from this angle, ethnic identity 
is a resource that can be used by groups to create and recreate their boundaries. To 
do so, these groups mobilize the most diverse symbolic marks from the most blatant 
to the most subtle, sometimes including the emblem of their own racial or ethnic 
stigmatisation which they then use as the banner of their identity (Eriksen, 1993). 
The production of “us/them” relations by the surrounding society is mirrored by 
a symmetric construction, which inverts the order of inferiority. Such a process 
supposes that the actors consciously perceive this categorization and the attributes 
that bring it to life. However, this sensitivity is strongest amidst opinion leaders and 
social entrepreneurs. Their role is absolutely crucial when identities are studied under 
the angle of mobilization. 
In Chapter VII, Didier Fassin explores the development of racialized social 
boundaries in France over the previous decades. Racialization, he argues, has to be 
understood as a process as well as a problematization, a specific way of describing the 
world. The “racial scene” is comprised of processes of ascription and self-identification. 
The descriptions of intellectuals and politicians, which have a performative effect, 
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contribute to this construction. Fassin questions the delayed public recognition of the 
phenomenon by the French, which is due, in his view, to three peculiarities that have 
long made up a colour-blind country, where the State is idealised as treating all its 
citizens equally: the Republican imaginary, the assimilationist ideology of the Nation 
and the sole reference to class in assessing inequalities. Although his reflections are 
based on the French case, he argues that they can be broadened to contemporary 
Western Europe. The European scene is also a racialized scene comprised of citizens 
who are considered and consider themselves as aliens because of their phenotype, 
origin, culture or religion. This fact must be taken into account rather than denied or 
occulted.
Applying a social psychological approach, Chapters VIII and IX of this book 
are dedicated to the effect of categorization imposed by the majority group on 
ethnic minority group members. Maykel Verkuyten reviews the literature in social 
psychology on ethnic identification and perceived discrimination. He discusses how 
ethnic identification can influence discrimination perceptions, but also how perceived 
discrimination influences ethnic identification with the country of origin and the host 
society. Coping strategies of individuals facing discrimination are also explored. In 
Chapter IX, Alejandra Alarcon-Henriquez and Assaad Azzi explore the reactions to 
ethnic or religious discrimination in a qualitative study. Particular attention is paid to 
what inhibits or favours the use of legal actions in the struggle against discrimination. 
Social psychologists have investigated the motivations of disadvantaged group 
members in their fight against inequalities by focusing mainly on collective action. 
They analyze whether this literature can also be applied to legal anti-discrimination 
actions. 
Whereas, in the past, associations linked to immigrant communities mostly 
focused on issues of equal social or civil rights or on the struggle against racism and 
xenophobia, today new associations are emerging as an answer to the processes of 
Europeanization or globalization. Similar to what happened in the United States where 
the struggle of African Americans for civil rights largely gave way to an Afro-centrism 
that places the debate on the cultural level (Fauvelle-Aymar et al., 2000), associations 
are appearing in Europe with an agenda that hesitates between political and cultural 
demands on a national or transnational basis. The social embeddedness of ethnic 
minorities is increasing, as they constitute transnational networks which facilitate the 
movement of people and merchandise (Basch et al., 1994). These emerging networks, 
favoured by new communication technologies can take on different forms, from the 
reinforcement of ties to the country of origin to the creation of a true archipelago of 
identities uniting communities present in several EU countries in a single ethnoscape 
(Appadurai, 1996). Transnational identities are thus born on European territory, 
nationally disembedding themselves and sometimes becoming diasporas such as the 
Turkish, Moroccan, Pakistani, Albanian, or Congolese communities in Europe.
The construction of ethnic boundaries by minority groups is now taking place 
within national spheres and at the European level. Whether the issues are religious 
specificities such as the Islamic veil or the affirmation of “black” culture amongst 
many youths of African or West Indian origin, the practices of “voice” are spreading 
to all minority groups in Europe. New forms of discursive assertiveness often come 
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from younger generations who refuse the denial of cultural difference and in particular 
its stigmatization or derogation. The identities carried by these new generations are 
often not in accordance with those of their parents: they are more generic than the 
old national references. Associations and individual actions with a collective reach, 
such as strategic litigation in favour of minority ethnic groups (ERRC et al., 2004) are 
working towards the development of a multicultural citizenship in Europe, without 
necessarily taking on the classic form of social movements (Martiniello, 1997).
From a more anthropological perspective, Nicole Grégoire and Pierre Petit describe 
and analyze the recent development and redefinitions of Pan-African ideologies in the 
African associational milieu of Belgium in Chapter X of this book. Comparing the 
way Pan-Africanism is utilized to build a Belgian “African community” similar to 
developments in the US, the authors illustrate that the nature and scope of reactions 
to the majority’s construction of Otherness must be subjected to careful contextual 
and historical analysis. In Chapter XI of the book, Bruno Riccio focuses on the 
associational creativity of youth of immigrant background in an Italian context marked 
by a “backlash against diversity”. Drawing on case studies of seven second generation 
associations, he shows how they differ from first generation migrants’ associational 
involvement. Being more assertive, they challenge Italian common representations of 
otherness and discrimination by putting forward cosmopolitan identities and claiming 
equal citizenship and opportunities of social mobility. Their socio-political trajectory, 
the author argues, shows citizenship as a process that is negotiated, contested and can 
never be taken for granted.
We hope this introduction to the topics addressed in this book gives a flavour of 
the added value of analysing the construction of Otherness in Europe from multiple 
disciplinary perspectives. The completion of this volume would not have been possible 
without financial contributions from the Ministère de la Communauté française de 
Belgique, Direction recherche scientifique (who also funded the MAM-project as a 
Action Recherche Concertée) and the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (ULB). For 
their intellectual input, we wish to thank the participants of the International Symposium 
organised by the MAM, which took place in Brussels on the 6th March 2009. This 
Symposium could not have taken place without the energy and commitment of Irina 
Bussoli. Special thanks go to Marco Martiniello who provided the conclusions to this 
International Symposium as well as to Virginie Guiraudon for her extensive contribution 
on this occasion. We also thank Kerri Poore for her priceless efforts in proofreading the 
manuscript, and Daniel Zamora for his valuable work on the layout.

chapter i
Categorizing human beings 
in EU migration law
Kees Groenendijk
	 Immigrants,	labels	and	laws	
The law always labels and categorizes people. It distinguishes between persons 
entitled to benefits, rights, protection or land and those who are not or not yet; and 
between those who have obligations and those who are exempted. This labelling 
is especially effective when the statutory categories coincide with longstanding 
social categories. Statutory categories may have dangerous effects if they coincide 
with ethnic or religious demarcations. New laws may create new distinctions. New 
distinctions, often accompanied by new terminology, may function as a justification 
for a new policy. 
This process occurs in state law but also in informal law, e.g. in social norms 
setting the rules for correct behaviour at a workplace, a university institute or 
a seminar. The main difference is that categorization by state law is supported by 
force. The power of the state can be applied to enforce the distinctions, if necessary. 
Moreover, distinctions sanctioned by state law or regularly applied by state officials 
produce the appearance of objectivity and correctness. 
	 Dutch	and	German	terminology	for	immigrants
In the early 1990s, the Dutch Central Statistical Office (CBS) introduced 
a distinction between autochtone and allochtone residents of the country to its 
population statistics on immigrants. Allochtone became the new designation for 
persons born abroad and persons with one parent born abroad. The common, neutral 
term used by demographers (“persons born abroad”  1), indicating persons who had 
1 Interestingly, the size of the population born abroad is quite similar in several developed 
countries. For France, Sweden, the UK and the US, it varies between 8% and 12% of the total 
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moved across an international border after their birth, was replaced by the term 
allochtone, an ethnically determined term. It includes not only those born abroad, 
irrespective of their nationality or ethnic origin, but also the descendents of migrants. 
Half of the persons concerned were included in this category only on the basis of their 
descent (Geschiere, 2009, chapter 5). A side effect of the new terminology was that 
the number of persons designated was two times the number of immigrants previously 
counted. Suddenly, one fifth of the Dutch population had become allochtones. 
Since this new category included a large number of persons who were not 
considered to be problematical by politicians – the Queen and the members of the royal 
family were all allochtone under the new definition – the category of allochtone was 
divided in two, on the basis of political criteria: Western and non-Western allochtone. 
Persons born in or having a parent born in Europe (but not Turkey), Indonesia, Japan, 
Australia, New-Zealand or North America were defined as “Western”. Persons born 
in or having a parent born in Turkey, South-America, Africa or Asia were defined 
as “non-Western”. Turkey is included in this category, even though it is a member 
of the Council of Europe and NATO, because Turkish immigrants are considered a 
problem category in the political debate. Persons born in or having a parent born in 
Indonesia or Japan are defined as “Western” because they are no longer seen as a 
problem category. In political discourse the word allochtone is often used to indicate 
non-Western allochtone which is considered to be the problem category. The category 
non-Western allochtone covers virtually all migrants from Muslim countries and their 
descendents. Social scientists and lawmakers were quick to adopt these ethnically and 
politically defined categories. In the 1990s the new labels were used in legislation 
intended to support the integration of immigrants into the educational system and the 
labour market and to designate the beneficiaries of positive action programs. After 
11 September 2001 and the murder of Pim Fortuyn in 2002, those programs were 
gradually dismantled and the related legislation abolished. Instead the term allochtone 
that had become accepted in daily and bureaucratic communication in the Netherlands 
was now used in the opposite direction, i.e. in proposals for new legislation abolishing 
rights for particular categories of immigrants or imposing obligations on certain 
categories of immigrants on the basis of being born abroad or having a parent born 
outside the Netherlands (Groenendijk, 2007). As a result of EU free movement rules, 
EU nationals were exempted from these new laws and proposals. This only enhanced 
the message that these measures targeted non-European immigrants. The distinction 
between Western and non-Western has been a core element of the “integration” policy 
of four successive Dutch governments since 2002. 
In 2005 the German Federal Statistical Agency introduced similar terminology. 
Germany’s population was divided into persons with or without a migration background 
(Migrationshintergrund). Children of migrants are included in the former category  2. 
population. In the Netherlands it was 10% in 2009 (in the official terminology “first generation 
allochtone”). 
2 The official definition is: “alle nach 1949 auf das heutige Gebiet der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland Zugewanderten, sowie alle in Deutschland geborenen Ausländer und alle in 
Deutschland als Deutsche Geborenen mit zumindest einem nach 1949 zugewanderten oder als 
Ausländer in Deutschland geborenen Elternteil”.
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This new terminology sounds similar but is more neutral than the Dutch-Greek terms 
autochtone and allochtone. The German term focuses on migration whilst the focus of 
Dutch terminology is on foreign or indigenous origin. There are two other important 
differences with the official terminology in the Netherlands. The German government 
does not legitimize a distinction between Western and non-Western residents. 
Moreover, official statistics on persons with and without a migration background are 
published together with data on the nationality of both groups. This made it clear 
from the very beginning that the majority of persons with a migration background are 
German nationals and a considerable portion of those without a migration background 
are non-nationals  3. The authorities made it clear that nationality, migration background 
and ethnicity do not coincide. Thus far, in the Netherlands, no such data have been 
published. The fact that the majority of the persons officially defined as “non-Western 
allochtone” are in fact Dutch citizens often is not mentioned by those using the term 
in the political debate or in the press.
In this article I intend to deal with three questions. Which categories are used 
in EU migration law and have those categories influenced the labelling process in 
Member States and, if so, how? My supposition with respect to this categorizing or 
labelling process is that EU law is not so different from the national law of Member 
States. The main difference between national and EU law is that the potential for 
divergence and inconsistency in moving from the legislative process to the actual 
application of those laws is greater with EU law than with national law. Moreover, 
EU law is formulated in 21 different languages. This enhances the possibility that 
certain terms used in EU law may have different connotations and effects in the 
various Member States. Ideally, EU law is implemented through national law. Often 
it must compete with pre-existing national law on the same issue. Hence, it may take 
years before the persons entrusted with the implementation of EU law (state and 
local officials, lawyers, judges, immigrants and their organizations) learn about the 
EU law and start taking it seriously in their work. It took approximately 10-20 years 
for the Community rules on freedom of workers to be fully taken into account by 
practitioners (Groenendijk, 2007). It took more than 15 years before the detailed rules 
on the legal status of Turkish workers and their family members based on the EEC-
Turkey Association were taken seriously in the main EU Member States concerned  4.
	 Which	categories	are	used	in	EU	migration	law?
The answer depends on which rules you look at. The EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which became binding EU Treaty law upon the entry into force of the 
3 In January 2008, according to the Federal Statistical Office, 15.6 million residents (19% 
of the total population of Germany) had a migration background. The majority, 8.3 million, 
were German nationals, see Migration und Bevölkerung, February 2010, p. 2 and www.destatis.
de. The share of the population with a migration background in Germany was almost the same 
as the share of those designated as allochtone in the Netherlands: 19.5% in 2008. 
4 The first official instructions by EU Member States taking the EEC-Turkey Association 
Council Decisions 2/76 and 1/80 seriously were issued by the competent ministries in the 
Netherlands in 1994 and in Germany in 1998.
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Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009  5, stipulates rights for “everyone” in most of its 
provisions. Some articles of the Charter grant rights to more restricted categories, 
such as workers, children or residents  6. In the Charter a few rights are granted only to 
Union citizens  7 or to lawfully resident nationals of third countries  8. Both categories 
are based solely on the nationality or the residence status of the persons concerned. 
The category of third country nationals, used in the Charter, is a universalistic and 
neutral term. It refers to the nationality of an individual from a state outside the EU 
and not to the ethnic origin or culture of the persons concerned. The term is relatively 
new and does not have a normative connotation (yet). It was introduced to the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992  9. The term is used in 
almost all measures on migration and asylum that have been adopted under Article 
62 and 63 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (ECT) inserted by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. With the implementation of these new migration and asylum 
directives and regulations, the term “third country national” found its way into the 
national legislation of the Member States as well. 
Categorization within the EU Visa Regulation  10 differs considerably from the 
categories in the Charter. Third country nationals are divided in two categories on the 
basis of their nationality in two annexes to this Regulation. Third country nationals 
on the positive list do not need a visa for visits up to three months, while those on 
the far longer negative list require a visa even for a short visit as a tourist or for 
commercial or family purposes. Most of the third countries on the positive list happen 
to be rich countries or countries in Europe or the Americas with predominantly white 
populations. With a few exceptions, African and Asian countries are on the negative 
list. All countries with a predominantly Muslim population are on the negative list 
except for Malaysia and Brunei. The decision to place a country on the positive list is 
not based on the religion of the population but on criteria such as actual or potential 
security risks, illegal immigration and economic relations. The result, however, is that 
almost all countries with a predominantly Christian population are on the positive list 
and almost all Muslim countries are on the negative one. These two legal documents, 
the Charter and the Visa Regulation, clearly create varying categories and legitimize 
different behaviours of authorities towards the persons in the categories used or 
5 Article 6 Treaty on the European Union. For the text of the (revised) Charter see OJ 2010 
C 83/389.
6 The right to petition the European Parliament or the European Ombudsman and the 
right of access to documents of the institutions and bodies is granted to any natural person, 
irrespective of the nationality or the lawfulness of his or her residence, in Articles 42-44.
7 Political rights (Article 12 (2), Article 39 and Article 40), access to employment (Article 
15 (2)), freedom of movement (Article 45) and diplomatic protection (Article 46) are granted 
to Union citizens.
8 Article 15 (3) (equal working conditions) and Article 45 (2) (freedom of movement and 
residence may be granted).
9 Article K.1 (3) TEU.
10 Regulation 539/2001 of 15 March 2001, OJ 2001 L 81/1. The two lists were amended 
in December 2009 to transfer Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia from the negative to the 
positive list, see OJ 2009 L 336/1.
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created within those instruments. Both documents send different and contradictory 
messages both to migrants and to the majority population of the Member States. One 
stresses equal treatment while the other justifies differences in treatment. Which of 
those contradictory messages is observed and taken more seriously by migrants and 
by the rest of the population? 
	 Historical	development	of	the	terminology
The number of categories used in EC migration law (or, since 1 December 2009, 
EU migration law) has expanded considerably over the last fifty years. Over the last 
five decades and since the signing of the EEC Treaty in 1957, four periods in the 
development of migration law can be distinguished.
 From workers to Union citizens (1957-1992)
During this period, the freedom of workers and other Member State nationals 
was gradually developed and applied in practice. Article 48 of the original EEC 
Treaty spoke about “workers of the Member States”. However, this neutral category 
was restricted to Member State nationals from the beginning in the secondary 
legislation. Nationality as opposed to worker status became the defining characteristic. 
From the perspective of having one common labour market, it was rather odd to 
exclude a segment of the workers, lawfully employed in the Member States, solely on 
the basis of their nationality. That restriction is less surprising if one remembers that 
four of the six original Member States were strongly opposed to the inclusion of the 
free movement of workers in the EEC Treaty. Only Italy fought for the free movement 
of workers in order to create an opportunity for the large numbers of its unemployed 
to find employment abroad. It successfully negotiated the inclusion of this fourth 
freedom. Italy was only supported in the negotiations by the Belgian government 
which expected free movement to have a downward effect on its relatively high wages 
(Goeding, 2005, p. 117 ff).
For 35 years EC law explicitly provided for privileged treatment of workers of 
other Member States. During that time, the scope of free movement was gradually 
extended to other nationals of Member States, such as the self-employed, service 
providers and tourists (Condinanzi et al., 2008; Guild, 2001; Groenendijk, 2009). 
The effect was that EC law created three categories in each Member State: (1) 
nationals of the Member State, (2) nationals of other Member States, and (3) workers 
or other migrants from states outside the EC. Those in the third category were the 
real foreigners, aliens, Ausländer, étrangers or vreemdelingen in national legal 
terminology. This terminology was still in use in the early nineties at the European 
level. The 1990 Schengen Implementing Agreement still used the term “alien”. 
According to the definition in Article 1, an “alien” is “a person not being a national of 
one of the Member States of the European Communities”. 
In these 35 years, there was one category that blurred the line between the second 
and the third category: third country family members of EU migrants  11. Ever since 
11 Other “borderline” categories are: EU nationals with dual nationality, EU nationals who 
have not used their free movement rights, Union citizens subject to transitional measures during 
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the first Regulation on free movement of workers, adopted in 1961, this category 
had almost the same privileged status as their spouse, parent, son or daughter who 
were Member State nationals working in another Member State  12. For decades, this 
privileged status was often disregarded in the daily practice of immigration or consular 
officers and other authorities in all Member States. Family members received the same 
treatment as all other third country nationals (members of the third category). Their 
nationality was considered to be the primary basis for that treatment notwithstanding 
their status as beneficiaries of EU free movement law. Forty-five years after this 
first regulation was adopted, several Member States seized the opportunity offered 
by the implementation of the new Directive 2004/38 on free movement of Union 
citizens and their family members to make the admission of those family members 
subject to national law on family reunification again, justifying their decision with 
reference to the Akrich judgment  13. This clearly indicated the persistent rejection 
of and opposition to the transition of this (relatively small) group of third-country 
nationals to the privileged second category. In the Metock judgment of June 2008, the 
Court of Justice explicitly departed from its position in Akrich and reminded Member 
States that they had to comply with the basic free movement rules and the Directive 
they had adopted in 2004  14. The noisy opposition to this judgment in some Member 
States (Denmark, Ireland and the UK) calmed down relatively quickly. Within weeks 
or months all Member States openly disregarding the privileged status of third country 
family members complied with the Court’s ruling and adjusted their national law or 
practice or both.
With the accession of new Member States in 1971 (Denmark, UK and Ireland), 
1981 (Greece) and 1986 (Portugal and Spain), large numbers of settled immigrants who 
had previously been designated as foreign workers (Gästarbeiter) became members 
of the privileged second category (nationals of a Member State) overnight. This new 
status facilitated the return to the country of origin for some. For the large majority 
remaining in the Member States, however, this contributed to their integration in the 
host country. 
 Between Maastricht and Amsterdam, the third country national is born  
(1992-1999) 
The Treaty of Maastricht instituted Union citizenship  15. This new status made 
the EU migrant less of a migrant and more of a co-citizen in the host Member State. 
At first this was mostly a symbolic change of labels. But, during the second half of 
the first years after accession of their country to the EU and EU nationals with a migration 
background.
12 Article 11-15 of Regulation No. 15 of 12 June 1961, OJ of 26 August 1961.
13 ECJ, Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Hacene Akrich, 23 
September 2003, (2003) ECR I-9607. The Court held that the free movement of third country 
family members could be made conditional on their previous admission in another Member 
State.
14 ECJ, Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform, 25 July 2008, (2008) ECR I-6241.
15 Articles 8-8a ECT introduced in 1992.
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the nineties, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had the opportunity to take that 
new status seriously and use it to extend the scope of equal treatment (Condinanzi et 
al., 2008). The differences between the second and first category mentioned above – 
nationals of the Member State and nationals of other Member States – were reduced 
once again. Both became species of the genus Union citizen. But Union citizens still 
have a few more rights inside their own Member States than in another Member State. 
The most relevant remaining differences between these two categories are that EU 
nationals in another Member State have political rights only at municipal level, no 
full protection against expulsion and only partial access to public assistance during 
the first years of residence. The Maastricht Treaty also introduced the possibility for 
Member States to make common rules on admission and residence of third country 
nationals (TCNs) within the new Third Pillar of the EU, hence outside the scope of 
the ECT. The Treaty introduced two new pivotal terms for new policy development: 
Union citizen and third country national (TCN)  16. Both are “neutral” terms indicating 
that nationality is the main criterion for making and justifying difference in treatment.
 The Third period: between Amsterdam and the Hague (1999-2004)
The intergovernmental cooperation provided for in Maastricht produced little 
binding law on migration or asylum. It yielded mostly non-binding resolutions and 
decisions. But those documents may have paved the way for the intense legislative 
activity in the period after 1999. The sole binding instrument in this field, the Dublin 
Convention, was adopted in 1990, hence before Maastricht, and it took six years 
before that convention entered into force. Common binding rules on migration and 
asylum after 1990 were produced by a smaller number of Member States in the 
intergovernmental cooperation within the Schengen group. In 1999 the Schengen 
acquis was transformed into Community law (EU law since the Lisbon Treaty). Since 
then, most Schengen rules have gradually been replaced by regular instruments of EU 
law.
 Two fears in 1992: “We” Union citizens versus “them” third-country nationals
When Union citizenship was introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, 
I had two fears regarding this new term. Firstly, I was afraid that the term would 
prove to be an empty shell. Spain and other southern Member States had proposed 
Union citizenship with the aim of providing better protection for their citizens living 
and working in northern Member States, which in turn did their best during the 
negotiations on the treaties to deprive the relevant provision on the free movement of 
Union citizens (today Article 21(1) TFEU) of most of its content. My second fear was 
that Union citizenship would become a “symbol for exclusion”, that it would stimulate 
and justify differences in treatment between EU nationals and third country nationals 
resident in the EU (Groenendijk, 1995; 2000, p. 226)  17. This fear was reinforced in 
1996 when the Court in Strasbourg used the “establishment of its own citizenship” 
16 The term third country national had been used in one clause in Article 59 ECT on 
provision of services. But it became a central term in the new K. (1)(3) TEU in 1992.
17 This paragraph is an updated summary of an earlier acknowledgement of my mistakes 
in Groenendijk, 2006. 
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by the EU as extra grounds for the justification of different treatment of EU nationals 
and TCNs in the case C v. Belgium  18. Has the introduction of the concept of Union 
citizenship actually added to the tendency to distinguish between “us” Europeans and 
“them” strangers from outside Europe?
In hindsight, developments in EU migration law in the almost two decades since 
Maastricht have proved me wrong on both accounts. I underestimated both the role of 
the European Court of Justice as an institution that takes the rights of migrants seriously 
and the readiness of Member States to agree on binding rules on the admission and the 
rights of third country nationals lawfully resident in their country.
 Union citizenship: no empty shell
My first fear was mistaken because, in a series of judgments starting with 
Martinez Sala in 1998, the European Court of Justice turned Union citizenship into 
an instrument of dynamic change, extending the rights of EU migrants within the 
EU  19. Moreover, in 2001, four large Member States took a step of great symbolic 
importance: EU nationals would no longer need to apply for a residence permit with 
the aliens police. In a common declaration at the Justice and Home Affairs Council 
in Marseille, France, Germany, Italy and Spain first voiced their intention to take 
this step  20. The change was actually realized in Spain and France in 2003  21 and 
in Germany in 2004. The 2004 German Act on the freedom of movement of EU 
citizens provides that these migrants can simply register with the municipality, just 
as any German citizen who changes his residence. The population registration office 
would inform immigration authorities which, on their own initiative, would issue 
the document certifying residence status  22. This simple measure of administrative 
efficiency sent an important message. Nationals of other Member States are no longer 
“real aliens”; they are almost one of us. In 2004 important elements of recent case 
law of the Court on the rights of Union citizens were codified in Directive 2004/38 
on the free movement of Union citizens and their family members. Member States 
unanimously agreed to codify judgments that they had severely criticized when they 
were handed down by the Court only a few years earlier  23. In 2008 the Court held in 
the Huber judgment that Germany could not register Union nationals in the central 
18 Eur. Ct. H.R., C. v. Belgium, 7 August 1996.
19 ECJ, Case C-85/96, María Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern,12 May 1998, (1998) ECR 
I-2691.
20 Déclaration Commune de la France, de l’Allemagne, de l’Espagne et de l’Italie pour le 
Conseil Informel J.A.I. des 28-29 Juillet 2000 and Council document 15380/01 of 18 December 
2001, p. 2. The UK never really pressed EU nationals to apply for residence documents. It was 
more the other way round. EU nationals applied for these documents because it entailed proof 
of their rights under EC law and could result in a more secure status under UK law.
21 In the Loi Sarkozy of November 2003. Today, the relevant provision is Article L 121-1 
of the Code de l’Entrée et du Séjour des Etrangers et du Droit d’Asile. In Spain the amendment 
of the immigration legislation occurred by a Royal Decree of 2003. 
22 Article 5 of the Freizügigkeitsgesetz EU of 2004, Bundesgesetzblatt 2004 I, p. 1950.
23 ECJ, Case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-
Louvain-la-Neuve, 20 September 2001, (2001) ECR I-6193 and ECJ, Case C-148/02, Garcia 
Avello, 2 October 2003, (2003) ECR I/11613.
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alien registration (Ausländerzentralregister) nor use that data for police and criminal 
justice purposes, since German nationals are only registered in municipal registers 
and not in one central data base  24. 
 Union citizenship: a symbol for exclusion of other immigrants?
My second fear proved to be wrong, mainly because over the last two decades, 
and especially after 1999, a whole range of intermediate statuses within Community 
migration law were developed. These new statuses actually bridge and diminish the 
differences in the treatment of nationals and non-nationals rather than sharpening and 
justifying that distinction as was my fear in 1992. The traditional sharp divide between 
nationals and non-nationals (citizens and aliens) has been blurred by the introduction 
of a range of new intermediate statuses in EU migration law. The four most relevant 
intermediate statuses in declining level of rights and protection are Union citizenship; 
the status of Turkish workers and their family members under Association Council 
Decision 1/80; the status of long term resident third country nationals under Directive 
2003/109; and, the status of categories of TCNs on the basis of the new Directives 
on legal migration and asylum, such as admitted family members, students, refugees, 
other protected persons and asylum seekers  25.
 How is the gap between “us” and “them” bridged?
This gradual blurring of the distinction between nationals and non-nationals is the 
result of four developments. First, the position of Union citizens (nationals of other 
Member States) has steadily come closer to that of nationals. The most important 
remaining exceptions are expulsion in exceptional cases, certain restrictions on access 
to public assistance and no full political rights. EC legislation (Directive 2004/38) and 
the ECJ’s case law continue to restrict the scope of those exceptions. 
Successive EU enlargements, especially those in 2004 and 2007, constitute the 
second major development. The accession of new Member States had three effects. 
First, paradigmatic “aliens” in some Member States (Poles in the Netherlands, 
Rumanians in Italy and Roma in many Member States) became Union citizens in law 
overnight. Old prejudices continued to influence the behaviour of authorities and part 
of the population but the room for action on the basis of those prejudices was severely 
restricted by EU law. Secondly, the accessions of 2004 and 2007 gave birth to a new 
intermediate status: Union citizens with partial movement rights only. Their status is 
somewhere in between those of full Union citizens and the Turkish workers under the 
Association Agreement. Thirdly, these accessions gave rise to considerable migration. 
In 2008, 1.7 million Rumanian nationals were registered residents of another Member 
24 ECJ, Case C-524/06, Heinz Huber v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 16 December 2008, 
(2008) ECR I-09705.
25 There are other intermediate status than the four presented in the text: e.g. in between 
Union citizens and Turkish nationals, there are the third country national family members of 
Union citizens and the citizens of new Member States who, under the transitional measures, 
have restricted free movement rights. The status of holders of the Blue Card on the basis of 
Directive 2009/50 is somewhere in between the status of Turkish nationals under Council 
Decision 1/80 status and the long term residents.
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State and 1.2 million Polish nationals were living elsewhere in the EU. Rumanian 
migrants outnumbered Italian migrants in the EU (1.3 million); Polish migrants 
outnumbered the Portuguese (almost 1 million) and the British residing in another 
Member State (0.9 million)  26. In some Member States these large new immigrant 
groups held the new intermediate status provided for in the Accession Treaties during 
the transitional period (up to seven years), as Union citizens but without full free 
movement rights.
The third major development has been the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice on the Association Agreement between the EEC and Turkey. In more than 
45 judgments over the last 20 years the Court has gradually built a status for Turkish 
workers and their family members that includes a secure right to residency, substantial 
and procedural protection against expulsion  27, equal treatment in electoral rights for 
workers and educational grants. Second generation individuals born in the country 
of residence are also protected by this status as a result of the Cetinkaya judgment  28. 
This development started with Demirel (1987) and Sevince (1990). By 1999 the 
Court had already given 13 judgments on EEC-Turkey Association rules. In the early 
1990s, Advocate General Darmon described the status of Turkish workers under the 
Association Agreement as halfway between that of EU workers and the workers from 
other third countries (“une situation intermédiaire”)  29. Today their status approaches 
that of EU migrants. The 2010 judgment Commission/Netherlands will considerably 
reinforce that process  30.
The fourth major development bridging the gap between nationals and non-
nationals has been the adoption of a series of directives and regulations on the 
admission and status of third country nationals on the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
The adoption of Directive 2003/109 on the status of long term resident third country 
nationals  31 was of major importance because the directive entitles immigrants with five 
years lawful residence in a Member State to the EC long term resident status including 
reinforced protection against expulsion and a set of rights not equal, but “as near as 
possible” to the rights of EU migrants or nationals. Moreover, the directive grants 
persons with the new status a conditional right of entry into other Member States. If 
Member States refrain from blocking access to that status by introducing integration 
conditions, almost half of all third country nationals lawfully living in the Union could 
qualify for this new status. In addition, a right to admission and a set of rights after 
26 Eurostat, Statistics in focus 94/2009 (K. Vasileva), p. 4.
27 ECJ, Case C-136/03, Dörr and Unal, 2 June 2005, (2005) ECR I-4759.
28 ECJ, Case C-467-02, Inan Cetinkaya v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 11 November 2004, 
(2004) ECR I-10845.
29 In point 62 of his conclusion in the Kus case: ECJ, Case C-237/91, 16 December 1992, 
(1992) ECR I-06781 and in points 23 and 25 of his conclusion in case Eroglu: ECJ, Case 
C-355/93, 5 October 1994, (1994) ECR I-5113.
30 In ECJ, Case C-92/07, European Commission v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, 29 April 
2010, not yet reported, the Court held that the standstill clause in Article 13 of Association 
Council Decision 1/80 applies to the first admission of Turkish workers and their family 
members.
31 Adopted on 22 September 2003, OJ 2003 L 251/12.
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admission in a Member State have been granted to large categories of third country 
nationals, especially in Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification  32, in 
Directive 2004/83 on refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection  33, 
in the Students Directive 2004/114  34 and in Directive 2009/50 on highly qualified 
workers, the so-called “Blue Card Directive”  35. The effect of those five directives is 
that large groups of lawfully resident third country nationals today have rights under 
EU law that can be directly enforced within the Member States, if necessary with the 
assistance of the national courts under the guidance of the European Court of Justice. 
It may take several years before the national immigration authorities recognize and 
respect the new rights under EU migration law, just as happened with the right of 
EU workers and Turkish workers under Community law. But they will no longer be 
dependent on the discretion of national immigration authorities or at the mercy of 
national immigration law which is always influenced by the politics of the day. They 
are no longer only guests or foreigners, but persons with rights, even residence rights 
under EU law.
In 2008 almost 31 million non-nationals were living in EU Member State territory, 
i.e. 6% of the total EU population; 11.3 million (37%) were nationals of another 
Member State and 19.5 million (63%) were third country nationals. Turkish nationals 
(2.4 million) counted for 8% of all non-national residents or 12% of all resident third 
country nationals  36. The majority of all non-nationals, including the large majority 
of the third country nationals living in one of the 27 Member States, have one of the 
four EU residence statuses mentioned above. Union citizens living in another Member 
State count for 37% of all non-nationals in the EU; Turkish nationals are 8% of the 
non-nationals; in 2009 40% of all registered third country nationals in Austria had 
an EC long term resident status (BMI, 2009); probably half of the registered third 
country nationals are living for five years or longer in the Member States  37 and around 
half of the third country nationals are admitted for family reunification or born in a 
Member State.
 The Fourth period: between The Hague and Stockholm (2005-2010)
During the period between the five year Justice and Home Affairs policy 
programme adopted by the European Council in The Hague in December 2004  38 
and the programme adopted in Stockholm in December 2009  39, the process of legal 
categorization and labelling was influenced by developments in EU migration law 
in two opposing directions. On the one hand, the post Amsterdam migration and 
32 Adopted on 25 November 2003, OJ 2004 L 16/44.
33 Adopted on 29 April 2004, OJ 2004 L 304/12.
34 Adopted on 13 December 2004, OJ 2004 L 375/12.
35 Adopted on 25 May 2009, OJ 2009 L 155/17.
36 Eurostat, Statistics in focus 94/2009 (K. Vasileva).
37 In 2008 almost three quarters of the 6.7 million non-nationals registered in the Central 
German Aliens Register were living in Germany for eight years or more. Half of the total non-
national population was living in Germany longer than 15 years (Federal Statistical Office).
38 Council Document 16054/04 of 13 December 2004.
39 Council Document 17024/09 of 2 December 2009.
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asylum directives were gradually implemented in Member States’ national legislation 
(Groenendijk et al., 2007). The term “third country national” was gradually introduced 
to Member States’ immigration law. Lawyers, judges and immigration authorities 
became adjusted to the idea that third country nationals may have residence rights 
under EU law and may be entitled to equal treatment with Union citizens in certain 
areas. This prompts the following question. To what extent would the status of EU 
migrants function as a model for the interpretation of these new EU directives whose 
explicit aim is to grant rights comparable or equivalent to the rights of Union citizens 
to categories of third country nationals? Will the Court also use a similar interpretation 
to the rights of third country nationals under the new directives on legal migration as 
that applied to the rules on Turkish workers and their family members? The judgment 
in Chakroun, whereby the Court held that the excessive income requirement for family 
reunification in Dutch law violates the Family Reunification Directive, could well 
provide the first indication of the Court’s position on this issue  40.  Such a development 
may send the message of a reduction in the differences in treatment between “us” 
Union citizens and “them” third country nationals. At the very least, these directives 
will require Member States authorities to justify some of the differences in treatment 
under EU law  41.
On the other hand, two developments during the five years following 2004 
may work in the opposite direction. The first development is the adoption of three 
important instruments that may well enhance the differences in treatment: the 2006 
Schengen Border Code  42, the 2008 Return Directive  43 and the 2009 Visa Code  44. The 
Border Code makes an explicit distinction between Union nationals and third country 
nationals with regard to their treatment by border guards at the external borders of the 
Schengen area  45. Then again, the code also provides the basis for a legal challenge of 
decisions of border guards refusing the entry of third country nationals and it contains 
40 ECJ, Case C-578/08, Chakroun, 4 March 2009, not yet reported in ECR. In that judgment 
on the Directive on family reunification of third country nationals, the Court twice refers by 
way of analogy to recent judgments on the rights of family members of EU nationals, see points 
46 and 65 referring to the judgments in Eind and Metock. The infringement procedure of the 
Commission against the Netherlands on the levy of high fees for EU long-term resident status 
might be a second example. In that case, the Commission uses the same reasoning as the Court 
in the Sahin judgment: ECJ, Case C-242/06, 17 September 2009, (2009) ECR I-08465.
41 Article 21(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights or the general non-discrimination 
principle may play an important role since it requires Member States to justify existing or new 
differences in treatment on the grounds of nationality.
42 Regulation 526/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 March 2006, 
OJ 2006 L 105/1.
43 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals, OJ L 348/98. For a critical discussion of this directive see Baldaccini 
(2009) and Acosta (2009).
44 Regulation 810/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009, OJ 
2009 L 243/1.
45 Article 5 and Article 7(2) of the Schengen Border Code.
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an explicit prohibition of racial discrimination at the border  46. The latter provision may 
turn out to be the basis for external control on an essential field of decision making by 
state officials that largely escaped such controls until now. The Return Directive and 
the Visa Code both apply primarily to third country nationals. The Return Directive 
regulates the expulsion of third country nationals, their detention pending expulsion 
and the re-entry ban. This directive introduces the category “illegally staying third 
country nationals” in EU migration law. The Visa Code provides detailed rules for 
handling applications for the common visa for a short stay in the Schengen area. 
Only nationals of third countries on the negative list of the EU Visa Regulation need 
such visa. But the process of application for such a visa often also involves a sponsor 
who is resident in the EU and may be a Union citizen of immigrant origin or a third 
country national. This brings us to the second development: the establishment of large 
immigration databases and the use of the data in those databases for police, criminal 
justice and intelligence purposes.
In the Hague Programme of November 2004, Member States, in reaction to the 
terrorist attacks and bombs in New York, Washington (September 2001) and Madrid 
(March 2004), adopted the so-called “principle of accessibility” and the “principle of 
interoperability”  47. In plain language those new terms justified a policy that all digital 
information available to Member States should be linked and used in the fight against 
terrorism, other serious crimes and illegal immigration. The list of what are considered 
to be serious crimes is long and includes some strange bedfellows. It includes such 
diverse crimes as trafficking in stolen vehicles, corruption and forgery of means of 
payment  48. These two new “principles” are the opposite of the principle of purpose 
limitation, one of the centre pieces of European and national data protection law over 
the last decades. According to the Hague Programme, information in databases built for 
immigration and asylum purposes should be available for police, criminal prosecution 
and intelligence purposes as well. In this case, I fear that the establishment of the new 
large immigration databases and the wider use of existing immigration databases will 
result, in practice, in the stigmatisation of lawfully resident third country nationals 
and of EU nationals of immigrant origin. Moreover, the use of these databases may 
actually hamper or take away rights granted to third country nationals under the new 
post Amsterdam migration and asylum directives.
At the beginning of 2010, two large EU immigration databases were operational: 
the Schengen Information System (SIS) and EURODAC. In 2008 the EU Council 
decided to build a third Visa Information System (VIS)  49. A new version of SIS, called 
46 Article 6 and Article 13 of the Schengen Border Code.
47 See note 44.
48 Reference is made to the list in Article 2(2) of the 2002 Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002 on the European Arrest Warrant, OJ 2002 L 190/1.
49 In addition, in 2009 the Council decided to develop an electronic data system recording 
all entries and exits across external borders, the outline of which is not yet clear. See on SIS and 
the other two databases: Brouwer (2008), with data on the actual application of SIS-I in France, 
Germany and the Netherlands and chapter 5 on EURODAC and VIS.
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SIS-II, is under development  50. The new central SIS-II database will be linked to 
“over half a million terminals located within the security services of the Member 
States”  51. New search techniques interlinking various types of data will allow data 
mining or data profiling and the data in SIS should be linked to data in other European 
databases  52. The strict separation between immigration data and data for criminal law 
purposes in the current SIS-I will be abolished in SIS-II. EURODAC and SIS contain 
impressive amounts of information about asylum seekers, irregular migrants and third 
country nationals who should be refused entry. At the end of 2008, fingerprints and 
data on more than 1.3 million third country nationals had been stored in the Eurodac 
Central Unit in Luxembourg, 85% of these are the fingerprints of asylum seekers  53. 
At the beginning of 2009, SIS contained data on approximately 930,000 persons, 
four-fifths of those are third country nationals registered with a view to refusal of 
entry in the 28 states of the Schengen group  54. VIS will contain data on all foreigners 
who request a short term visa, as well as on their sponsors – among whom residents 
of migrant origin are likely to be over-represented. In 2008, approximately 11.6 
million applications for short-stay visas were made with the consular authorities of 
the Schengen states  55. Since most data will be stored in VIS for at least five years, 
eventually data on 60 to 90 million third-country nationals (applicants and sponsors) 
and on millions of EU nationals (sponsors) will be stored in VIS. SIS contains indirect 
ethnic data, i.e. the place of birth, while VIS registers not only the place of birth but 
even the nationality of birth. In recent years, the number and type of authorities who 
have access to this data has expanded significantly and steps have been taken to use 
these immigration databases for criminal investigation purposes.
I find these developments extremely worrisome, first because the quality of the 
information is poor, particularly in SIS. Second, there is not a single clause either 
in SIS-II or in VIS protecting the residence rights of third country nationals under 
community law against unlawful or incorrect decision of immigration authorities 
on the basis of the system. My third and main concern is that, because data on 
immigrants in all three databases will be used for the purpose of criminal investigation 
and prosecution, third country nationals will be far more likely to face criminal 
investigation and charges than EU nationals.
Immigration data concern all asylum seekers, all visa applicants and all visa 
sponsors indiscriminately. Third country nationals can only avoid being registered 
50 Regulation (EC) No. 1987/2006 of 20 December 2006, OJ 2006 L 381/4; see also 
Council Decision of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen Information System, OJ 2007 L 205/63.
51 Council document 13305/09 of 15 September 2009, p. 3.
52 Steve Peers, Schengen Information (SIS) I, Statewatch Summary, June 2006, http://
www.statewatch.org. 
53 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Annual 
Report to the Council and the European Parliament on the activities of the EURODAC Central 
Unit in 2008, COM(2009) 494 final, p. 10.
54 SIS Database Statistics at 1 January 2009, Council document 5764/09 of 28 January 
2009.
55 Council document 12493/09 of 31 July 2009, p. 95.
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in VIS or EURODAC by not applying for asylum or for a visa or not sponsoring 
a family member who intends to come for a visit. The multi-purpose use of the 
immigration data, the interlinking of data within one system and the interlinking 
of data between the different databases, will increase the chances that third country 
nationals will be investigated, suspected and convicted for crimes far more often than 
the EU-nationals (Baldaccini, 2008). The photographs, fingerprints or other personal 
data of EU nationals are only in exceptional cases, not systematically, stored in these 
data bases. These are exactly the effects that the German Constitutional Court held 
to be unconstitutional in its 2006 judgment on data profiling (Rasterfahndung) of 
Moroccan youth: the higher risk for the persons concerned to become the target of 
criminal investigation and the possibility of stigmatisation of a group of persons in 
public life  56. None of the “safeguards” that the drafters have introduced in the rules on 
these new immigration databases effectively addresses the risk of stigmatization. The 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights made it clear that precisely 
the kind of statistical data that some Member States and the Commission use to 
support their case for the use of EURODAC for criminal law purposes, is insufficient 
to justify extended registration of fingerprints of persons who have not been convicted 
for a crime  57. 
	 Conclusion
This stigmatization is not a direct effect of EU rules and terminology. Stigmatization 
follows from the rules that allow for the selective use of new technology thereby 
creating extra risks mainly or exclusively for third country nationals irrespective of 
the lawfulness of their residence. In the Huber case, the European Court of Justice 
protected EU migrants and their family members against increased risk of being the 
subject of police or criminal justice activities caused by their being registered in the 
special central registration of non-nationals. There are good reasons why Germany 
(and most other EU Member States) does not have one central database with personal 
data of all nationals or all residents of the country for use by police authorities. 
The building of large immigration databases and their use for purposes other than 
immigration control will create that same risk at the European level that the Court held 
to be a violation of the non-discrimination principle at the national level.
Until 2004, the new categories introduced in EU migration law (Union citizen, 
Turkish worker, third country family member, third country national) generally did 
not send an exclusive message. The new terms were neutral. EU migration law in 
the 1980s and 1990s tended instead to include ever larger groups of migrants within 
the protection provided by EU law. This process has been reinforced by the adoption 
of the directives on legal migration and the accessions of 2004 and 2007. Since 
the Hague Programme (2004), developments have become more ambiguous. The 
outcome will depend critically on whether the European Court of Justice and Member 
56 BVerfG 4 April 2006, 1 BvR 518/02, www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de. 
57 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber), S. and Marper v. UK, 4 December 2008, application 
30562 and 30566/04. For limited data on “hit rates” presented by the Commission as evidence 
of the usefulness of linking these data, see SEC(2009) 936, p. 8. The Court in Marper observed 
that hit rates do not tell what results the “hits” actually produced.
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States will use Union citizenship as a model when interpreting and applying the two 
main directives on legal migration and whether the risk of stigmatization by the multi-
purpose use of the new large information systems with personal data on millions of 
third country nationals will materialize.
chapter ii
Mandatory integration provisions in EC  
and EU Member States law  1
Yves Pascouau
The question of third country nationals integration (TCNs) in European Member 
States has been debated within European institutions since the mid 1970s and 
throughout the 1980s even though the EC did not yet possess the competences to adopt 
rules related to migration issues. During this period, security of stay and residence, 
acquisition of rights, acknowledgement of obligations to be fulfilled by TCNs and 
acquisition of language skills were emphasized as relevant elements in the integration 
process (Carrera, 2009). The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) introduced migration issues 
as questions of “common interest” into the EU’s third pillar. Integration issues were 
dealt with in a 1994 Commission Communication recalling the principles outlined in 
previous years (European Commission, 1994, p. 32).The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) 
awarded competence to the EC over the adoption of rules for immigration. However, 
neither the Treaty, nor the Member States expressed the will to give legislative 
competence over integration to the EC. On the one hand, the Treaty’s provisions were 
drafted in such a way as to make it difficult to identify clear competence. On the other 
hand, Member States considered this issue a national one, falling under the principle of 
subsidiarity. As a consequence, political orientations defined in the Tampere Summit 
(1999) or in the Hague Program (2005) highlighted “the need for greater coordination 
of national integration policies” (European Council, 2005, p. 4). The Lisbon Treaty 
follows this path and ends the debate regarding the legislative competence of the EU: 
“The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for 
the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country 
1 This chapter was finalised 1 March 2010.
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nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws 
and regulations of the Member States” (Article 79 (4)). 
In other words, the EU may help and coordinate integration national policies but 
may not harmonise them. 
Notwithstanding this narrow reading of EC/EU competence over integration, the 
EC has the power to enact immigration rules which have a direct impact on integration. 
This is the case in two domains: family reunification of TCNs under Article 63 (3) (a) 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereafter ECT) and the creation 
of long term resident status under Article 63 (4) ECT. The first domain allows TCNs 
to be joined by family members and ensures their integration into the host country. 
The second domain provides TCNs with stronger rights and improved status upon 
completion of a certain period of legal residence. The acquisition of a secured status 
provides a certain degree of integration into the host society. While initial proposals 
of the European Commission reflected the goal of improving TCN integration into 
Member States, negotiations within the Council have modified this purpose. Member 
States have introduced integration criteria into these Directives which must be fulfilled 
in order to benefit from the rights enshrined in EC law. Thus, as integration becomes 
part of EC migration policy, it raises the question as to whether integration might be 
used as a tool to regulate migration flows rather than to enhance TCNs status within 
Member States. This article examines the status and goals of integration provisions, 
and more particularly mandatory integration provisions, in EU and Member States’ 
legislation and policy. The first section evaluates the impact of EC law on Member 
States when the directives are transposed. The second section focuses on recent 
political documents and statements which demonstrate that the introduction of 
integration requirements into national migration laws will probably concern a larger 
number of Member States in the months or years to come.
	 Integration	provisions	in	EC	and	national	law	with	regard	to	family	
reunification	and	long	term	residents
This section assesses the extent to which Member States have taken the 
opportunity offered by the transposition of the Family Reunification and Long Term 
Resident Directives to introduce integration provisions in their legislation.
	 The	Family	Reunification	Directive
Two types of integration provisions can be distinguished in the Family 
Reunification Directive (Directive 2003/86/EC): integration conditions and integration 
measures. Integration conditions allow Member States to condition the right to family 
reunification on the fulfilment of integration requirements. In contrast, integration 
measures cannot constitute an obstacle to the right to family reunification but may be 
introduced to assess the integration capacity of TCNs  2.
2 For a definition of the difference between integration measures and conditions, see 
Council document 7393/1/03 of 14 March 2003, p. 5.
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 Integration conditions
Integration conditions are outlined mostly  3 in Article 4 (1), second indent of the 
Directive. This Article states: 
“by way of derogation, where a child is aged over 12 years and arrives 
independently from the rest of his/her family, the Member State may, before 
authorizing entry and residence under this Directive, verify whether he or she meets 
a condition for integration provided for by its existing legislation on the date of 
implementation of this Directive”. 
This provision, introduced through the initiative of Austria and Germany (Carrera, 
2009), “is intended to reflect the children’s capacity for integration at early ages and 
shall ensure that they acquire the necessary education and language skills in school” 
(recital 12 of the Directive). This provision was challenged before the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) by the European Parliament. Though the ECJ considered that this 
provision does not run “counter to the right to respect for family life” as interpreted 
by the European Court of Human Rights, it nevertheless delineated the margins of 
manoeuvre of the Member States. The ECJ stated that: 
“Member States which wish to make use of the derogation cannot employ an 
unspecified concept of integration, but must apply the condition for integration 
provided for by their legislation existing on the date of implementation of the 
Directive in order to examine the specific situation of a child over 12 years of age 
arriving independently from the rest of his or her family”  4. 
The ECJ also added “the final subparagraph of Article 4 (1) of the Directive 
cannot be interpreted as authorizing the Member States, expressly or impliedly, to 
adopt implementing provisions that would be contrary to the right to respect for 
family life”  5. 
Available reports on the implementation of the Family Reunification Directive 
(Odysseus Network, 2007; Groenendijk et al., 2007; European Commission, 2008) 
indicate that three Member States rely on such an integration requirement. In 
Germany this integration condition has been applied since 1990. Minors over the 
age of 16 and who arrive independently from the rest of the family must demonstrate 
either that they have command of the German language or that they will be able to 
integrate into the German way of life. The fulfilment of this integration requirement 
is assessed by diplomatic missions or by competent authorities if the child is already 
on German territory. The language requirement is considered to be met once the 
3 This article does not focus on Article 4 (5) of the Directive which allows Member States 
to determine an age criterion justified by integration purposes. Article 4 (5) states “in order 
to ensure better integration and to prevent forced marriages Member States may require the 
sponsor and his/her spouse to be of a minimum age, and at maximum 21 years, before the 
spouse is able to join him/her”.
4 ECJ, Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 27 June 
2006, (2006) ECR I-05769 , point 70.
5 ECJ, Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 27 June 
2006, (2006) ECR I-5769, point 71.
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applicant illustrates language skills which correspond to level C1 of the CEFR  6, 
whereas ability to integrate is assessed on the basis of the child’s education and way of 
life. In the Netherlands, minors aged 16 and 17 who do not have to go to school, must 
pass an integration test prior to admission into the Netherlands. The test consists of a 
language test (level A1 CEFR) and questions regarding Dutch society. The purpose of 
this provision remains unclear as arrival independent from the rest of the family is not 
specifically required. This leads to the conclusion that this condition falls within the 
scope of integration measures set up by Article 7 (2) of the Directive. This is probably 
why the Commission did not think the Netherlands had violated the standstill clause  7 
inserted into Article 4 (1). Finally, Cyprus introduced an integration condition for 
minors over the age of 15. But, as outlined by the Commission, this requirement was 
introduced after the date of implementation of the Directive and constitutes a breach 
of the standstill clause (European Commission, 2008). 
In sum, the integration condition of Article 4 (1), second indent, of the Directive 
only applies in Germany and awaits clarification in the Netherlands. It is worth 
noting that even Austria, which lobbied for the integration of such a condition in the 
Directive, did not transpose it into its own legislation and is now forbidden to do so 
as a result of the standstill clause. Thus, by “uploading” its national legislation into 
the Directive, Germany has unintentionally settled the question of minors arriving 
independently from the rest of their family as such requirements cannot be introduced 
anymore in national laws.
 Integration measures
Article 7 (2) of the Directive indicates that “Member States may require third 
country nationals to comply with integration measures, in accordance with national 
law”. The second indent of the provision adds “with regard to the refugees and/or 
family members of refugees referred to in Article 12 the integration measures referred 
to in the first subparagraph may only be applied once the persons concerned have 
been granted family reunification”. This provision has raised several comments 
surrounding three major points. First, as mentioned above, there is a difference 
between integration “measures” and “conditions”. Whereas the latter allows Member 
States to impose conditions before a TCN can benefit from a right, the former only 
allows Member States to impose measures on TCNs which cannot condition a right 
awarded by Community law. In this sense, when transposing Article 7 (2) of the 
Directive, Member States cannot condition the right to family reunification. Second, 
this provision introduces the possibility of integration measures which can be applied 
to TCNs in the country of origin. Finally, this provision is not accompanied with a 
6 Common European Framework of Reference. Adopted by the Council of Europe, this 
document provides a basis for the mutual recognition of language qualifications.
7 A standstill clause means that Member States are not allowed to introduce specific rules 
into their national law after the entry into force of a directive. For instance, the possibility to 
transpose Article 4 (1) second indent of the Directive was possible until its entry into force. 
Afterwards, Member States are not allowed anymore to introduce such rules in their national 
legislation. 
mandatory integration provisions     41
standstill clause. Hence, nothing prevents Member States from joining those which 
have implemented Article 7 (2) of the Directive. 
Eight Member States  8 have transposed Article 7 (2) of the Directive into their 
national rules (Odysseus Network, 2007; Groenendijk et al., 2007; European 
Commission, 2008). Once again, differences exist among them. A distinction may 
be drawn between Member States which have organised integration measures after 
entry into the territory and those which have instituted integration measures in the 
country of origin. Regarding the former, Latvia and Greece must be set aside as their 
integration measures are more broadly required to obtain a permanent or long term 
residence permit. Austria and Cyprus have established integration measures which 
must be fulfilled after admission into the host Member State. In Austria, all family 
members accepted for family reunification must sign an “integration agreement”  9. 
This agreement stipulates that TCNs must take two modules. The first module 
includes literacy courses and must be completed within twelve months from entry 
into the country. The second module entails learning German and includes elements of 
political education. This module must be completed within five years and ends with a 
written examination. Denmark, a Member State not bound by the Directive, has also 
established an integration test called an “immigration test” (Ersbøll, 2010). In practice, 
an applicant for family reunification must receive recognition of his application for 
family reunification in advance. He will then be granted a temporary visa in order to 
take an integration test in Denmark. The test includes a language test (level A1 minus 
CEFR) and a test on Danish society. The purpose of the test is to allow the family 
member to prepare for his/her integration in Denmark. If the applicant fails the test, 
it may be taken again upon payment. In the end, family reunification may also be 
refused if the applicant does not pass the test requirements. 
The latter group concerns the three Member States which require the fulfilment 
of integration measures by family members in their country of origin. Surprisingly, 
Denmark is not amongst these countries although Denmark proposed integration 
abroad during the Directive’s negotiations. This proposal was immediately supported 
by Germany and the Netherlands (Carrera, 2009). And, though France did not initially 
support this provision, it implemented it a few years later as a result of changes in the 
government. Once again national rules present broad differences. The Netherlands 
was the first to implement such integration measures (Human Rights Watch, 2008). 
Dutch legislation requires adults and children of 16 and 17 years who are no longer 
required to attend school  10 to pass an integration test as a requirement for family 
reunification prior to admission into the Netherlands. The test, taken at a Dutch 
embassy or general consulate, includes a language test (level A1 CEFR) and questions 
8 Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, the Netherlands and Denmark.
9 At the moment of entry into Austria, children under the age of 9 as well as elderly or sick 
people are exempt from such requirements.
10 Those exempted from this requirement include: children under the age of 16, family 
members who have reached the age of 65, persons who are permanently unable to pass an 
integration exam on the grounds of a proven physical or mental handicap and persons from the 
EU, Surinam, Australia, Canada, Japan, US, Monaco, South Korea, Switzerland, New Zealand, 
the Vatican, or Iceland.
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regarding Dutch society. The candidate answers questions by telephone. A computer 
based in the United States assesses whether the applicant has passed the exam. If a 
candidate fails the test, the visa required to enter the Member State is not issued and 
the test will have to be taken again which means that the applicant must pay the 350 
Euro exam fee again. The decision cannot be challenged. Obviously this rule violates 
the Directive as the procedure places conditions on the right to family reunification. In 
this sense, Dutch law institutes integration conditions where the Directive only allows 
the creation of integration measures. After admission into the Netherlands, migrants 
must pass another, more difficult, integration test on language and society within five 
years. 
In Germany, before 2007 and as a general rule  11, spouses were granted a residence 
permit if they were able to make themselves understood in German at a basic level 
(level A1 CEFR). A law adopted in 2007 extended this mechanism to the issuance 
of the visa. Hence, a foreigner seeking family reunification must possess the above-
mentioned language skills before entering the country. Along with the visa application, 
the applicant must submit a certificate from the Goethe Institute for the A1 language 
examination “Start Deutsch 1”. In countries where the “Start Deutsch 1” examination 
is not available, embassies or general consulates determine whether the spouse has 
basic knowledge of the German language during the visa application procedure. If, 
during the personal interview it becomes evident that the applicant has the required 
language knowledge, no separate proof is required. In exceptional cases, other 
language certificates are accepted as proof as long as they are of equal value to the 
“Start Deutsch 1” language test. Though this system may seem flexible, its compliance 
with Article 7 (2) of the Directive is questionable. First of all, it seems a visa will not 
be issued until an applicant proves his/her sufficient skills in German language. Even 
if German law does not institute a test per se and enables the applicant to prove his/
her knowledge in different ways, the effect of such a requirement leads in fine to a 
condition rather than a measure. Secondly, and consequently, the implementation of 
this rule should be monitored carefully in the future. In some countries, the “Start 
Deutsch 1” certificate may, in practice, become the main, if not the only, accepted 
evidence of language skills. Therefore the issuance of a certificate delivered following 
an exam may in fact require spouses to pass a test and thus constitutes a condition 
for family reunification. If German jurisprudence allows for other evidence  12, the 
potentially contradictory practice of staff at German embassies and consulates should 
be assessed. Thirdly, national authorities benefit from wide margins for manoeuvre 
when they assess language skills. This leaves the question of uniform implementation 
of German law worldwide open as it creates uncertainty for the applicants. Finally, 
it is not clear that the goal of integration requirements pursues integration purposes 
11 This rule does not apply to recognized refugees, spouses who are not able to prove basic 
knowledge due to physical, mental or psychic illness or disability, spouses who, as a result of 
their nationality, do not need a visa to enter (like citizens of Australia, Israel, Japan, Canada, 
The Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the United States of America) and spouses of short 
term residents.
12 High Administrative Court of Berlin Brandenburg (judgment of 16 January 2008, case 
2 M 1.08)
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in conformity with the Commission’s interpretation of Article 7 (2) of the Directive 
(European Commission, 2008). 
Aside from the Government’s objective of tackling forced weddings, some 
commentators have underlined that the German rule, as well as the Dutch one, were 
established to select skilled migrants (Michalowski, 2010). In fact only migrants 
who can demonstrate the skill and motivation to learn the language will be selected. 
This position is reinforced by the fact that neither Germany nor the Netherlands offer 
language classes in the country of origin. 
In France, a law adopted in November 2007 introduced new measures on family 
reunification. Since then, and in principle  13, persons benefiting from the right to family 
reunification are subject to an evaluation of their degree of knowledge of French 
language and the values of the Republic (Pascouau, 2010). If the level required (level 
A1 minus CEFR) is not met, the person may be asked to attend language and civic 
lessons in the country of origin. The visa is issued on the basis of a certificate attesting 
that the person has attended the courses. The law specifies that these courses may not 
last more than two months. They are immediately followed by a second evaluation 
in the country of origin in order to assess the content and length of the course family 
members must attend once in France as part of the “integration contract”. Compared 
to the Dutch and German system, French rules comply with the Directive as they do 
not impose a “test” but rather participation in courses. In this regard, these rules may 
be regarded as measures as they do not prevent the applicant from being admitted to 
France.
In conclusion, integration measures are applied by less than one third of the 
Member States and in very diverse ways. However, it should be kept in mind that 
Article 7 (2) of the Directive does not contain a standstill clause. This means that 
the trend to introduce integration measures regarding family reunification could be 
extended to other Member States as we will see in the second part of this article. As 
regards the diversity of schemes, a harmonised process may nevertheless emerge. 
Cooperation and benchmarking among Member States may give rise to a common 
approach on integration measures. Further, the Court of Justice may be asked to 
interpret Article 7 (2) of the Directive and therefore set the framework and the scope 
of integration measures. 
The Family Reunification Directive contains provisions related to TCN integration. 
It illustrates that integration concerns are a part of EU migration policy and might be 
used either to condition the right to family reunification of certain categories of TCNs 
or to assess the integration capacities of TCNs in the Member States. In this context, 
integration has played as a criterion to limit or to frame family reunification. Such a 
criterion has also been part of the Directive concerning the status of TCNs who are 
long term residents.
13 Those exempted from this requirement include: people aged under 16 or over 65 
years old, foreigners who have studied for at least 3 years at a French secondary school or 
at a francophone school abroad, foreigners who have studied for at least one year at a higher 
education establishment in France. 
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	 The	Long	Term	Resident	Directive
Directive 2003/109/EC created an EC long term resident status for TCNs legally 
residing in Member States for a certain period of time. As explained in the introduction, 
long term resident status provides stronger rights and enhanced status to TCNs after 
a period of legal residence. In order to benefit from the provisions of the Directive, 
Member States are allowed to either institute integration conditions for the acquisition 
of the status or establish integration measures for the status holder who wishes to 
reside in another Member State.
 Integration conditions for the acquisition of long term resident status 
in the first Member State
Article 5 (2) of the Directive allows Member States to require TCNs to comply 
with integration conditions when applying for the long-term resident status. Our 
analysis indicates that 13 Member States impose an integration condition  14. Each one 
requires TCNs to have language skills. But the similarities stop there. For example, 
proof of language skills concerns either only oral capacity or both oral and written 
capacity. Further, the level of required language ability varies significantly, ranging 
from a minimum level to a level of knowledge whereby the applicant exhibits fluent 
basic language. Aside from language requirements, six Member States  15 require 
applicants to prove sociological and political knowledge of the host society. Some 
Member States require knowledge of democratic values or institutions, others of 
history or society. Other divergences exist regarding integration facilities. Certain 
Member States do not provide such facilities. Where such facilities are provided, they 
may be free, partially reimbursed by the State or charged entirely to the applicant. 
Thus, we observe significant differences among Member States on this matter. 
 Integration measures for residence in a second Member State
Directive 2003/109/EC grants the holder of a long term EC residence permit the 
right to reside in another Member State for a period exceeding three months  16. Among 
the conditions defined for this right to be exercised, Article 15 (3) of the Directive 
allows Member States to require the long term resident to comply with integration 
measures. However, if TCNs have had to comply with integration conditions in 
order to obtain EC long term resident status in the first Member State, no integration 
measures may be imposed aside from language courses. 
Our analysis demonstrates that rules in the Member States are still very different. 
Some Member States impose integration measures even if the applicant has already 
complied with such requirements in the State where he/she was granted EC long term 
resident status and are thereby violating the Directive. Furthermore, in Member States 
where integration requirements are implemented, differences still exist concerning the 
14 Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and the United Kingdom. In Slovakia, the 
obligation to fulfil integration condition is up to the discretion of national authorities.
15 Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania and the Netherlands.
16 Article 14 of Directive 2003/109/EC.
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consequences for not fulfilling integration measures which may include revoking the 
residency permit, denial of its renewal or lost or reduced social benefits. 
The Directive also allows EC long term residents exercising their right to reside 
in a second Member State to be accompanied or joined by their family. However, 
two scenarios must be distinguished. The first scenario concerns the reunification 
of family members who already reside in the first Member State. In this case, the 
second Member State is not allowed to ask family members to fulfil any integration 
requirement. This is not the case, however, in the second scenario whereby family 
members join the long term resident for the first time in the EU. In this context, the 
integration requirement set up by Article 7 (2) of the Family Reunification Directive 
may apply to family members. Several Member States require family members 
to comply with the integration requirement without taking this distinction into 
consideration. If these measures do not constitute a condition for family reunification, 
failure to comply with the requirements may have consequences on residence rights 
such as non renewal of the residence permit, reduction of social benefits, non-issuance 
of a permanent residence permit and administrative sanctions. 
Integration requirements in EC Law are quite complex. The wording of the 
Directives is of primary importance. The difference between integration conditions 
and measures is significant. Measures cannot condition the granting of rights whereas 
conditions may. Secondly, an overview of national rules demonstrates that there is 
no common approach among Member States. National schemes are sometimes so 
different that it is hard to find points of convergence. Finally, the objective of such 
measures remains questionable. Do integration requirements aim at integration in the 
sense of fostering the status of TCNs? Or, do integration requirements constitute a tool 
relied on to limit migration and/or select certain categories of migrants i.e. those who 
are able to integrate easily into Member States? While this question remains open, the 
trend to introduce integration measures or conditions in the Member States is gaining 
importance.
	 Towards	the	extension	of	mandatory	integration	provisions
The Common Basic Principles for integration, adopted in November 2004 by 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council, establish the framework for EU policy in the 
field of integration. This political document considers basic knowledge of the host 
society’s language, history and institutions an important element of TCN integration 
into Member States. In this regard, the document awards great significance to existing 
introductory programmes as they “will allow immigrants to quickly find a place in the 
key domains of work, housing, education, and health, and help start the longer-term 
process of normative adaptation to the new society”. Acquisition of such knowledge 
constitutes the background for many political and operational instruments. This 
illustrates the will to extend integration requirements in Member States where they 
are not currently set up. 
 Political statements
Political statements have emphasized the importance of knowledge of the host 
society in the integration process within EU Member States. First, heads of state and 
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government adopted the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum in October 2008 
(European Council, 2008). Soon after, European Ministers met in Vichy, under the 
French Presidency, for a Ministerial Conference on Integration. On this occasion, the 
concept of the process of TCN integration was further clarified and developed. 
 European Pact on Migration and Asylum
The European Pact was adopted to “give a new impetus to the definition of a 
common immigration and asylum policy”. Among the objectives pursued, the first is 
to “organise legal immigration to take account of the priorities, needs and reception 
capacities determined by each Member State, and to encourage integration”. Hence, 
the European Pact dedicates several paragraphs to the question of TCN integration. 
The Pact outlines “the importance of adopting a policy that enables fair treatment of 
migrants and their harmonious integration into the societies of their host countries”. 
Within this scope, the European Pact takes two aspects of integration into account: 
family reunification and integration for TCNs who are likely to settle permanently.
Regarding family reunification, Member States agree: 
“(d) to regulate family migration more effectively by inviting each Member 
State, (...), to take into consideration in its national legislation, except for certain 
specific categories, its own reception capacities and families’ capacity to integrate, as 
evaluated by their resources and accommodation in the country of destination and, for 
example, their knowledge of that country’s language”. 
This objective is significant. Material conditions, such as income and housing 
capacities, and language skills are not considered as criteria to enhance integration 
of TCNs into the host society but constitute criteria used in order “to regulate family 
migration more effectively”. This sheds light on a recent trend in some Member States 
whereby they rely on integration criteria in order, explicitly or implicitly, to limit 
family reunification. Thus, the European Pact modifies the content of the Family 
Reunification Directive without modifying it through legal procedure. More precisely, 
the Directive contains optional clauses that allow Member States to choose conditions 
they wish to impose upon the right to family reunification. By inviting Member 
States to take resources, accommodation conditions and integration capacities, such 
as language skills, into consideration, heads of state and government have agreed to 
convert an optional provision, namely Article 7 of the Directive, into a mandatory 
one. In other words, Member States are strongly invited to introduce requirements 
regarding resources, accommodation and integration into their legislation. As the 
Directive does not contain any standstill clause in this matter such a modification is 
permitted. 
Regarding TCNs who are likely to settle permanently, the European Council 
agrees: 
“(g) to invite Member States, in line with the common principles approved by the 
Council in 2004, to establish ambitious policies, in a manner and with resources that 
they deem appropriate, to promote the harmonious integration in their host countries 
of immigrants who are likely to settle permanently; those policies, the implementation 
of which will call for a genuine effort on the part of the host countries, should be based 
on a balance between migrants’ rights (in particular to education, work, security, and 
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public and social services) and duties (compliance with the host country’s laws). 
They will include specific measures to promote language-learning and access to 
employment, essential factors for integration; they will stress respect for the identities 
of the Member States and the European Union and for their fundamental values, such 
as human rights, freedom of opinion, democracy, tolerance, equality between men and 
women, and the compulsory schooling of children. (…)”. 
This paragraph covers the period of time prior to the issuance of the long term/
permanent residence permit. This is significant since the Long Term Resident 
Directive just awarded Member States the possibility to require TCNs to comply with 
integration conditions without specifying of the content of those conditions. Here, 
the Pact fills in the gap as it puts forward two elements including the promotion of 
language-learning as it is implemented in several Member States. This trend should be 
improved in Member States as indicated by the wording “will include”. Secondly, the 
Pact emphasizes respect for Member State and EU identities and fundamental values. 
This also relates to the development of trainings and exams on issues related to values 
of the host society in some Member States. These two elements are becoming the basis 
of integration policies that should be developed in the Member States. The adoption 
of the Pact by the European Council constitutes a strong incentive and creates the 
potential for these policies to become more prolific within Member States. 
 Ministerial meeting on integration
Just one month after the adoption of the European Pact, Ministers of Integration 
of the Member States met in Vichy. Since national integration policies differ from one 
state to another, the ministerial conference’s aim was to improve the convergence of 
the concepts and practices of Member States in the continuation of the work already 
started at European level. The Ministers considered it: 
“necessary to promote and explore the common basic principles in greater depth, 
around the following themes, among other important integration issues: promotion 
of the fundamental values of the European Union, the integration process, access to 
employment and the promotion of diversity in employment, the integration of women 
and the education of children, intercultural dialogue and principles of integration 
policy governance”. 
Of major interest here is the paragraph dedicated to the integration process: 
“The introductory phase is a key step in the integration process from the moment 
of immigrants’ arrival and even, in certain cases, before their departure from their 
country of origin. Priority measures that can be organized in this introductory phase 
primarily involve learning the language, history and institutions of the host society”.
The Vichy declaration gives a European dimension to the national practices 
developed in some Member States and, in this context, gives precedence to the 
introductory phase. It is striking to note that this phase should start before the departure 
from the country of origin. The “Europeanization” of the concept of “integration 
abroad” developed by three Member States is endorsed by all representatives of the 
Member States. This reveals the ever increasing phenomena to insert integration 
issues within the management of migration flows particularly in the case of family 
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reunification and encourages Member States to establish such schemes. Even if 
the issue of integration measures abroad is rarely discussed at the European level, 
the trend to institute integration processes after admission to the host Member 
State constitutes another strong incentive advanced by the ministerial declaration. 
In this context, these processes should primarily deal with learning the language, 
history and institutions of the host Member States. At first glance, this perspective 
does not provoke particular commentary as this framework constitutes the general 
scheme accepted by some Member States. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that 
currently many Member States only require TCNs to improve their language skills. 
Therefore, the declaration proposes to widen the scope of integration processes to 
include institutional and historical matters. Finally, the modalities of the integration 
process remain imprecise. The declaration states that “Member States may introduce 
appropriate arrangements”. In this framework, Member States are granted wide 
margins of discretion in deciding whether to establish an integration agreement, the 
content and length of such processes and finally their nature, voluntary or mandatory. 
However, the option to create integration agreements such as in Austria or France may 
be one path to be explored. 
A movement is taking place at the highest European level to place integration 
issues at the top of the political agenda. Thus far, integration policies would rather 
serve migration policies than social and employment policies, as integration abroad 
measures illustrate. While political statements give a better understanding of the 
movement occurring in the field, operational instruments also demonstrate this 
movement.
 Operational instruments
Two different operational instruments demonstrate the tendency to invite Member 
States and even third countries to develop integration schemes: the creation of a 
European Integration Fund and the establishment of mobility partnerships. 
 European Integration Fund
Adopted in June 2007, the Decision to establish the European Integration Fund 
(Council Decision 2007/435/EC) reinforced the trends outlined above. Article 2 (1), 
of the Decision states: 
“the general objective of the Fund is to support the efforts made by the Member 
States in enabling third country nationals of different economic, social, cultural, 
religious, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds to fulfil the conditions of residence and to 
facilitate their integration into the European societies”. 
Contrary to the objectives put forward in the preamble  17, the Fund does not focus 
only on newly-arrived migrants. Actions developed by the Member States regarding 
admission procedures are also eligible for funding. According to Article 3 (a) and (b) 
17 Point 3 of the preamble: “The integration of third country nationals in the Member 
States is a key element in promoting economic and social cohesion, a fundamental objective of 
the Community stated in the Treaty. However, having regard to the Treaty, the European Fund 
for the Integration of third country nationals (…) should be primarily targeted at newly-arrived 
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of the Decision dealing with specific objectives, the Fund shall first of all contribute 
to “facilitation of the development and implementation of admission procedures 
relevant to and supportive of the integration process of third-country nationals” and 
then contribute to “development and implementation of integration process of newly-
arrived third-country nationals in the Member States”. As a consequence, Article 4 
of the Decision determining eligible actions focuses on admission procedures in the 
first paragraph and on programmes and activities aimed at introducing newly-arrived 
TCNs in the second paragraph. Therefore, it is not surprising to discover that the Fund 
will support actions which: 
“prepare third-country nationals for their integration into host society in a better 
way by supporting pre-travel measures which enable them to acquire knowledge 
and skills necessary for their integration, such as vocational training, information 
packages, comprehensive civic orientation courses and language tuition in the country 
of origin” (Article 4 (c)). 
It is important to note that the trend among Member States to set up pre-arrival 
measures, such as “integration abroad” schemes, is supported financially by the EU. 
Several press releases on support from the European Fund demonstrate that at 
least 13 Member States  18 will receive European financial support for projects related 
to the integration process of newly-arrived immigrants. Most of these projects are 
oriented towards acquisition of language and/or historical knowledge of the host 
society for newly-arrived TCNs  19. This funding might stimulate the development or 
the improvement of introductory programmes. 
The support of the European Fund is significant as it highlights, from an 
operational standpoint, which projects will primarily be financed. It appears then that 
pre-departure measures and introductory programmes are considered priorities to be 
supported by the EU. 
 Mobility partnership
The new concept of mobility partnership also covers the question of integration. 
The joint declarations on mobility partnership between the EU and Moldova and 
Cape Verde do not concentrate much attention on integration. Apart from a sub-
title mentioning integration issues, very little is dedicated to this issue in either the 
Moldovan  20 or Cape Verde mobility partnership. The latter stresses a few points 
related to integration but does not mention language or civic knowledge to be acquired 
third country nationals, as far as the co-financing of concrete actions supporting the integration 
process in Member States is concerned”.
18 Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom. As for Portugal it is currently unclear to what 
extent the funding relates to integration measures such as language and historical knowledge.
19 At least in 8 Member States: Bulgaria, France, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, United Kingdom.
20 “Integration facilitation – Proposal by the Hellenic Republic and Italy to offer pre-
departure training for Moldovans planning to migrate. Proposal by Italy to elaborate and 
disseminate a handbook on entry procedures and integration policies”, (Council of Ministers, 
2008, p. 11).
50     the others in europe
in the country of origin. However, this approach changed in the beginning of 2009. 
A document from the Council of Ministers (2009), entitled “Building Migration 
Partnerships” and issued to prepare for a ministerial conference to be held in Prague 
in April 2009, announced:
“This partnership (...) will address the issue of migration partnership by 
pursuing the following objectives: to prevent and fight illegal migration, to promote 
readmission, sustainable return and reintegration, to better manage labour migration, 
to further promote the integration of migrants in their host societies, and to make 
migration and mobility positive forces for development”.
Among the issues to be addressed for the promotion of the integration of legally 
residing TCNs, the document foresees the possibility “to promote “pre-departure” 
integration training in countries of origin, such as language training, orientation 
courses, knowledge of the fundamental values in the country of destination, and 
training on migrants’ rights and obligations” (Council of Ministers, 2009, p. 8). 
In other words, the issue of integration abroad should be considered as an integral 
element of the partnerships to be concluded by the EU with third countries. This 
again demonstrates the pervasive effect of integration measures which are now part of 
external relations in the field of migration. 
	 Conclusion
This article highlights the importance accorded to integration issues in the 
European Union and the Member States. It has demonstrated that the issue enjoys 
political support at the highest level, is implemented in EU and national instruments, 
and is accompanied by operational instruments. Nevertheless, a core question remains. 
What are the purposes pursued by integration measures or conditions adopted at 
the EU and the national level? If political statements claim that those measures or 
conditions are established to ensure better integration of TCNs in the Member States, 
it seems that the real objective lies elsewhere. In reality, integration measures and 
conditions seem to act as tools of migration policy. Here, integration rules function 
as a criterion to limit migration flows into the Member States and more particularly 
family reunification. More precisely, integration requirements are established in 
order to deter family members from exercising their right to family reunification. 
Therefore, the extension of pre-departure measures in the framework of external 
relations is relevant in this regard. In practice, integration conditions introduced in 
Dutch law have led to a significant decrease in family reunification applications. 
The introduction of integration measures in French law has had a similar effect. It is 
important to recall that the introduction of integration requirements regarding family 
reunification in French law was preceded by political speeches stating that migration 
for family purposes is too significant as compared to labour migration and that the 
balance between the two should be improved. In fact integration requirements are 
considered by Member States as instruments limiting migration of TCNs rather than 
enhancing their integration into the territories. Therefore, extension of the issue of 
pre-departure measures in the framework of external relations is also relevant.
chapter iii
Problematical Otherness:  
Defining and dealing with the Other in French  
and Dutch civic integration abroad policies
Saskia Bonjour
	 Introduction
Until recently, no country in Europe or elsewhere had imposed integration 
requirements on family migration, that is on the admission of foreigners who join a 
partner, parent or child. In 2005, the Dutch centre-right Balkenende government was 
the first to introduce such a requirement (Groenendijk, 2005, p.12). The French right-
wing Fillon government followed suit in 2007.
The civic integration abroad programs introduced by the Dutch Law on Civic 
Integration Abroad and the French Law on Migration Control, Integration and Asylum  1 
are broadly similar. They both require family migrants to familiarise themselves with 
the language and customs of the host society before being granted entry. In France 
as in the Netherlands, the introduction of civic integration abroad was a response to 
growing concern for the societal consequences of past and present migration flows. 
French and Dutch politicians perceived the process of migrant incorporation to be 
failing, to the extent that the cohesion of society as a whole was endangered and state 
intervention was necessary to restore the minimum conditions for society to function 
harmoniously. These conditions were apparently considered to include a certain 
degree of homogeneity in cultural values and skills among the population. Difference, 
or “Otherness”, was perceived as a problem that required a policy solution. 
In this paper, I seek to identify and account for differences and similarities in the 
framing of “Otherness” in the making of French and Dutch civic integration abroad 
policies. Relying on a constructivist approach to the study of policy-making (Schön 
& Rein, 1994; Hall, 1993; Hajer, 1989), my aim is to determine how problematic 
1 Loi No 2007-1631 du 20 novembre 2007 relative à la maîtrise de l’immigration, à 
l’intégration et à l’asile.
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Otherness is defined, i.e. what differences are believed to pose problems; which 
migrants or groups of migrants are perceived as problematically different; and finally, 
how this Otherness is dealt with through the modalities of French and Dutch civic 
integration abroad policies. To answer these questions, I have analysed parliamentary 
debates pertaining to civic integration abroad that took place in the Netherlands 
between June 2004 and April 2005 and in France between July and October 2007. 
In academic literature, a well established approach to explain differences 
between countries’ migrant policies refers to “national models”, i.e. country-specific 
institutional and discursive traditions in the policy field of migration and integration 
(Brubraker, 1992; Castles, 1995; Favell, 1998; Entzinger, 2005; Koopmans et al., 
2005). In these works, the Netherlands is often represented as a typical example of 
a pluralist country where ethnic, cultural and religious differences are acknowledged 
and protected by the state, whereas France is considered the archetype of a universalist 
country where such differences are barred from the public and political realm. In 
other words, France and the Netherlands are ascribed with opposing ways of dealing 
with Otherness. The analytical validity and usefulness of “national models” have 
recently been subject to debate (Joppke, 2007; Jacobs & Rea, 2007). Throughout this 
chapter, I shall assess how and to what extent “national models” may be of value in 
understanding the differences between the constructions of the Other in Dutch and 
French civic integration abroad policies. 
	 The	legal	definition	of	the	target	group
Overall, the target group of civic integration abroad is very similar in the 
Netherlands and France. In both countries, civic integration abroad applies to non-EU 
nationals between sixteen and sixty-five years old who request entry for the purpose 
of uniting with a partner, parent or child. It extends not only to those who come to 
join a resident foreigner, but also to family members of nationals. In France, as in 
the Netherlands, the age criterion of sixteen years was chosen because compulsory 
education ends at sixteen  2. Younger children are expected to learn the language and 
customs of their new country in school  3. In the Netherlands, religious ministers, in 
addition to family migrants, are also obliged to learn about Dutch language and society 
before being granted entry due to the “exceptional societal function” they fulfil  4. 
Both countries have accorded exemptions to nationals from some of their former 
colonies. Thus, Algerian family migrants who request entry into France are not subjected 
to the civic integration abroad requirement. Their conditions of entry and stay are not 
determined by regular French immigration law, but by a bilateral agreement between 
Algeria and France. However, the French government has expressed its intention to 
renegotiate this agreement at a later date  5. In the Netherlands, Surinamese nationals 
2 In the Netherlands, 16 year old foreigners who must attend school part-time are exempt 
from civic integration abroad.
3 Assemblée Nationale (further: AN), Rapport No 160, 12 September 2007; Tweede 
Kamer (further: TK) 29700 (3): 7, 21 July 2004.
4 TK 29543 (2): 10, 24 April 2004; cf. TK 29700 (6): 34, 6 December 2004.
5 Sénat, plenary, 3 October 2007.
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who can prove completion of at least primary school in Surinam – where Dutch is the 
official language – or in the Netherlands are exempted from civic integration abroad  6. 
Finally, but not insignificantly, the Dutch integration requirement at entry applies 
only to those family migrants who require a provisional residence permit  7 to enter 
the Netherlands. Nationals from Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United 
States and – since 1 June 2007 – South Korea may enter without such a permit, 
therefore without fulfilling the integration requirement. The government argued that 
it would endanger Dutch “foreign and economic relations” with these countries to 
introduce obstacles to the entry of their citizens. Besides, the countries concerned “are 
comparable to European countries in cultural, socio-economic and societal respect” 
and their nationals “in general possess a certain insight into the societal relations we 
have in the Netherlands and into Dutch norms and values”  8. 
	 Naming	the	problem	and	the	problematic	Other
In the classic “national models” approach, the Netherlands is represented as a 
pluralist country and France as a universalist country. Thus the Dutch perceive 
their nation as composed of minorities and the country’s public and political 
sphere as pluralistic. This pluralist tradition is relied on to explain why, in dealing 
with migrants, the Dutch state adopted a collective approach, identifying groups or 
communities mostly on the basis of national or ethnic origin as target groups of policy 
and recognising or protecting collective cultural and political rights (cf. Entzinger, 
2003, p. 62-65; Koopmans et al., 2005, p. 71). France, in contrast, defines itself as 
“one and indivisible”, a nation composed of individual citizens whose relation to the 
French state is not to be mediated by communities or organisations. The Republic is 
colour-blind. The ethnic, cultural or religious background of its citizens is irrelevant 
in its public sphere. This conception of equality among citizens of the Republic is 
seen to explain French aversion to state recognition of migrants’ collective identities 
or claims (cf. Viet, 1998, p. 419; Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2009, p. 31). To what extent 
have these “national models” shaped the content and outcome of French and Dutch 
parliamentary debates about civic integration abroad?
Politicians’ perceptions of the overall problem for which civic integration abroad 
is intended to solve are very similar in France and the Netherlands. They fear that, 
as a result of past and present immigration flows and failing immigrant integration, 
their societies are disintegrating into distinct, isolated, and even hostile groups. A 
French UMP deputy raised the spectre of “different cultures and ethnicities living 
together on the same territory while preserving their specificities, thus resulting in 
the formation of ghettos, the juxtaposition of antagonist blocs”  9. In the Netherlands, 
the first Balkenende government stated that “differences in ethnic origin (…) trigger 
centrifugal forces in society and lead to the physical, social and mental separation 
of population groups”  10. Ethnic and cultural diversity are seen to present a threat 
6 TK 29700 (27), 25 March 2005.
7 “machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf”, commonly referred to as “mvv”. 
8 TK 27083 (45): 8-9, 24 June 2004; TK 29700 (6): 32, 6 December 2004.
9 AN, Amendement No 59, 14 September 2007.
10 TK 28375 (5): 15-16, 3 July 2002.
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to the very cohesion of society. Migrants are considered both actors in and victims 
of the problem. On the one hand, they are the ones who are “pulling back into their 
community”  11 and “turning away from society and reverting to archaic norms and 
values”  12. On the other hand, they are the ones to suffer from “marginalisation” and 
“isolation”  13, as well as from being “locked up in communautarist schemes”  14. Both 
socio-economic and socio-cultural aspects play a role in this problem perception. 
Indeed, the cause for concern is precisely the idea that socio-economic disadvantage 
in the labour market and in education and housing overlaps with ethnic and cultural 
difference, i.e. that socio-economic gaps and cultural cleavages are mutually 
reinforcing each other. When specifying the differences in values and customs they 
find problematic, politicians in France and the Netherlands refer first to matters related 
to gender, family and sexuality, including forced marriages, domestic violence, child 
rearing, polygamy and, in the Netherlands, homosexuality and second to issues 
regarding religion and church-state relations. It is in these respects that groups of 
migrant origin – and more particularly, though rarely explicitly mentioned, of Muslim 
faith – are deemed most worrisomely different from the host society.
However, French and Dutch politicians offer very different accounts when 
defining why family migration in particular presents a problem that requires policy 
intervention. The French government has only referred to the size of family migration 
flows – almost twice the size of student inflow and more than six times that of labour 
immigration – to illustrate why this particular type of migration should be subjected 
to an integration requirement  15. French politicians presented the problem of family 
migration as purely quantitative in nature, not qualitative. The Dutch government on 
the other hand has elaborated at length on the problematic nature of family migration, 
not only in terms of size but also in terms of the type of migration. It stated that “the 
large scale immigration of the last ten years has seriously disrupted the integration of 
migrants at the group level. We must break out of the process of (family) migration 
which time and again causes integration to fall behind”. “Normally”, the government 
stated, each new generation with a migrant background would grow up to be better 
integrated than their parents. This progressive process however was obstructed “by the 
fact that a large number of second generation migrants opts for a marital partner from 
the country of origin”, thus continuously importing new first generation migrants  16. 
The Dutch government proceeded to explain which family migrants in particular 
were cause for concern and why. It argued that “an important part of these [family 
migrants] has characteristics that are adverse to a good integration into Dutch society. 
Most prominent among these – also in scale – is the group of marriage migrants from 
Turkey and Morocco”. More than half of second generation migrants of Turkish and 
Moroccan background married a partner from their parents’ country of origin. Of 
these Turkish and Moroccan marriage partners, only 60% and 41% respectively had 
11 AN, plenary, 10 February 2004.
12 TK 29700 (6): 47, 6 December 2004.
13 TK 27083 (44): 6 & 9, 21 June 2004; TK 28198 (5): 6, 4 October 2002.
14 AN, plenary, 19 September 2007.
15 AN, Projet de loi No 57¸ 4 July 2007.
16 TK 29700 (3): 2-4, 21 July 2004; TK 29700 (6): 3, 6 December 2004.
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completed more than primary education. Unemployment of this population was three 
times higher than the native population. In addition, the government indicated that 
these migrants had few contacts with Dutch people, were strongly oriented towards 
their own group, identity and culture, and held “traditional opinions regarding 
[women’s] emancipation”. Given these research findings, these family migrants 
were deemed unlikely to integrate successfully into Dutch society both in socio-
economic and socio-cultural terms. Although the refugees’ situation and that of their 
family members was somewhat less well documented, the government stated that the 
available data indicated that “follow-up migration” among refugees in the Netherlands 
was a cause for equal concern  17. 
Both the facts that such detailed information about the socio-economic position 
and socio-cultural attitudes of particular ethnic groups was available and that the 
government did not hesitate to present this data to support its policy proposal, are 
in line with the “national models” representation of the Netherlands as pluralist. In 
Dutch policies and research since the 1980s, it has been common practice to examine 
and address the needs of different migrant groups separately and explicitly (Scholten, 
2007, p. 80-82). This contrasts with French practice, where reluctance to recognize 
particular group identities has led politicians to shy away from labelling immigrants as 
groups, both in discourse and in policy, and researchers from applying ethnic criteria 
in their studies (Amiraux & Simon, 2006). This “universalist” approach is clearly 
reflected in the debates about civic integration abroad. French government officials 
and parliamentarians speak about “immigrants” or “foreigners”. References to specific 
nationalities or regions of origin are rare and data about particular immigrant groups 
are absent. 
Thus, the pluralist and universalist “models” are clearly identifiable in the ways 
in which Dutch and French politicians present family migration as a policy problem. 
Whereas the Dutch explicitly and extensively argue why they consider the inflow 
of particular groups of family migrants highly problematic, the French discourse 
remains much more abstract and general, referring only to the size of inflows, not to 
characteristics or categories of family migrants. 
However, one episode in the French parliamentary debate reveals that the French 
government’s perception of “problematic” family migrants was very similar to the 
Dutch government’s perception. In the Senate, the submission of foreign spouses 
of French nationals to the integration abroad requirement was cause for lengthy 
debates. The Commission which prepared the plenary debates unanimously adopted 
an amendment eliminating this requirement. It argued that spouses of French citizens 
should benefit from a “presumption of integration” and that they would learn 
the language much more effectively in France with their French partner  18. In the 
Commission meeting, Socialist as well as UMP Senators declared that reunification 
with a foreign resident and reunification with a French spouse were distinct cases 
which should be subjected to different regulations  19. Thus pressured to defend his 
17 TK 29700 (3): 4, 21 July 2004; TK 29700 (6): 3, 5, 14-16, 6 December 2004.
18 Sénat, Rapport No 470, 26 September 2007.
19 Sénat, Commission des lois, 26 September 2007.
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proposal, Minister Hortefeux reverted to an extremely rare explicit reference to the 
regions of origin of family migrants. He emphasised that, while the Senators seemed 
to have spouses from Australia or Canada in mind, in fact 43,000 out of a total 60,000 
spouses of French citizens came from Africa, 12,000 of which from Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Hence, Hortefeux declared that application of civic integration abroad to these 
marriage migrants “indeed seems necessary to us”  20. The government proposal was 
saved by an amendment put forward by UMP Senator Del Picchia, exempting the 
foreign spouse of a French citizen residing abroad and wishing to return to France for 
professional reasons, from fulfilling the integration requirement. The Senator gave the 
example of a “young French executive sent abroad, who marries a local national” and 
who “wishes to return to France for professional reasons shortly after his marriage”. 
In such a case, the spouse should be “entirely exempted from the formalities of the test 
and course abroad”. This amendment solved the problem for the right-wing majority 
in the Senate and the integration abroad criterion for foreign spouses of French 
nationals was reintroduced. Arguments from the Socialists that “the marriage to a 
French citizen is, in itself, a sign of a will to integrate with regard both to language 
and to the Republican values” were of no avail  21.
Thus, it seems that the French government and right-wing Senators had two 
distinct cases in mind: that of a French expatriate, probably well-educated and 
professionally successful, meeting a partner abroad on the one hand, and that of a 
French citizen, probably of African background, marrying a partner from his country 
of origin on the other hand. It was the latter type of family migration which was 
considered problematic, not the first. The Socialist Senators were quick to point out 
that “the target of this bill is (…) the marriage of a young French man or woman 
whose family is of foreign origin with a foreigner from his or her parents’ country 
of origin”  22. The French supporters of civic integration abroad then, like the Dutch 
government, considered chain migration through marriage with French residents of 
migrant background as the problem that the integration requirement was intended to 
alleviate. 
Thus, it appears from our analysis thus far that “national models” have influenced 
the form of the debates in France and the Netherlands much more than its underlying 
purport and outcome. Explicit reference by the Dutch to the ethnic groups that civic 
integration abroad aimed to target and French reticence to do the same certainly reflect 
deeply rooted discursive and institutional structures which are country-specific. 
“National models” decisively shaped the limits of what politicians deemed proper 
to express and the lines of argument that they chose to use. Underlying these very 
different ways of naming the problem however was a highly similar definition of the 
group that politicians aimed to target, that is of the group that was considered to pose 
a problem. 
20 Sénat, plenary, 2 October 2007.
21 Sénat, plenary, 3 October 2007.
22 Sénat, plenary, 3 October 2007.
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	 Dealing	with	Otherness  23
French and Dutch modalities of civic integration abroad programs are crucially 
different even though their perception of the societal “problem” that civic integration 
abroad was designed to alleviate was very similar as were the legal definition of the 
target group and the underlying perception of which family migrants posed problem. 
In France, family migrants are obliged to participate in an evaluation of their 
knowledge of the French language and Republican values. Should this knowledge 
prove insufficient, they must attend a course before being granted entry into France. 
The courses are organised free of charge by a governmental agency. Admission is 
conditional on satisfactory participation in the evaluation and course not on achieving 
a certain result. In contrast, the Netherlands requires family migrants to prove basic 
knowledge of Dutch language and society by passing a test before granting them 
admission. The Dutch government does not provide the courses or learning material. 
However, it has compiled a practice pack available for 63.90€ including a film, a 
picture booklet about Dutch society, an exhaustive list of questions that may arise 
during the knowledge of society test, and a set of mock language tests. Applicants are 
charged 350€ each time they take the exam. In other words, the Dutch civic integration 
abroad policy is much more stringent than the French.
This difference is related to civic integration abroad objectives. In both countries, 
the government has indicated that the primary purpose was to improve the overall 
integration process of family migrants by ensuring that they entered the country well-
prepared. From there however, the objectives diverged significantly. In the eyes of 
the Dutch government, civic integration abroad was to ensure at the earliest possible 
stage, that both the migrant and his or her family member in the Netherlands were 
aware of their responsibility for the integration of the newcomer into Dutch society 
and of the active efforts that were expected of them  24. Moreover, the government 
explicitly presented its civic integration abroad criterion as a “selection mechanism”. 
The criterion would select migrants based not on education, income or origin as this 
would infringe on the right to family life guaranteed by the European Convention on 
Human Rights, but based on “motivation and perseverance”. Since the government 
would not assist applicants in preparing for the exam, a substantial investment of time 
and resources would be required of them. This was deemed not only acceptable but 
even recommendable since appealing to the “personal responsibility” of the persons 
concerned would “yield the best results”  25. Moreover, “the foreigner might also face 
difficulties in the integration process after arrival in the Netherlands which it will be 
up to him to overcome”  26. Those unable to attain the required level of knowledge 
through their own means while abroad were expected to “experience serious problems 
integrating once in the Netherlands” and would therefore “not be granted permission 
to settle in the Netherlands”. Although reduction of immigration was “not a primary 
23 This section is partly based on an article that I am writing in collaboration with Doutje 
Lettinga to whom I am indebted for fruitful exchange and inspiring ideas.
24 TK 29700 (3): 5-6, 21 July 2004; TK 29700 plenary: 4002, 22 March 2005.
25 TK 27083 (44): 24, 21 June 2004.
26 TK 29700 (3): 13-14, 21 July 2004.
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goal”  27, an expected “side-effect” of the new integration requirement was a decrease 
in family migration flows by an estimated 25%  28. The government welcomed this 
prospect. “A reduction of the inflow of migrants whose integration into Dutch society 
can be expected to lag behind will alleviate the problem of integration”  29.
The French government on the other hand emphatically presented the evaluation 
and courses abroad as a service offered to family migrants by the state for their benefit 
as an “additional means given to strangers who wish to settle in France to prepare 
their integration”  30. The UMP rapporteur explicitly stated that “our objective is not to 
limit family reunification”  31. The fact that there would be an obligation of effort, not 
of result, and that the courses would be offered for free, underpinned this presentation 
of civic integration as an integration provision rather than as a measure to control 
immigration.
Thus, we observe that while problematic Otherness was defined in very similar 
terms in France and in the Netherlands, the French and the Dutch opted for very 
different ways of dealing with this Otherness through civic integration abroad. A first 
explanation for this difference lies in the judicial constraints that weigh upon family 
migration policies in these two countries. In France, the “right to a normal family life” 
is considered a “principe général du droit”, the equivalent of a constitutional right, 
protected as such by the Constitutional Council (GISTI, 2002). This constitutional 
protection played a significant role in the parliamentary debates. In particular, members 
of the governmental majority in the Assemblée Nationale presented amendments that 
would have made the French civic integration abroad policy much more similar to the 
Dutch. Two UMP deputies proposed that admission be made conditional on passing 
the test rather than on mere participation in the evaluation and the course  32. Two 
other amendments were submitted by the UMP to the effect of charging applicants 
for the costs of the evaluation and course, possibly to be refunded after satisfactory 
participation  33. The government however advised against the adoption of these 
amendments, with regret, as “the Constitutional Council would most certainly censor 
a provision that would thus infringe upon the right to family reunification”. All four 
amendments were withdrawn  34. 
In the Netherlands, no such constitutional protection exists. The Dutch courts, 
in family reunification cases, refer to Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which guarantees the right to family life. Article 8, as interpreted by 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, does not grant a right to family 
reunification. However, it does oblige states to strike a fair balance between the interest 
27 TK 29700 (6): 43, 6 December 2004.
28 TK 29700 (3): 14-15, 21 July 2004.
29 TK 29700 (3): 6, 21 July 2004.
30 Sénat, plenary, 3 October 2007; cf. AN, plenary, 18 September 2007.
31 AN, plenary, 19 September 2007.
32 AN, Amendement No 64, 14 September 2007; AN, Amendement No 84, 17 September 
2007.
33 AN, Amendement No 70, 17 September 2007; AN, Amendement No 83, 17 September 
2007.
34 AN, plenary, 19 September 2007.
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of individuals in living with their family and the general interest of the host society. 
Thus far, the Court has granted states quite some leeway in defining and protecting 
this general interest (Van Walsum, 2004). The French Constitutional Council has a 
stricter interpretation of the obligations imposed on the state by the right to family life. 
Thus, the right to family reunification, although by no means absolute, enjoys a higher 
standard of protection under the jurisprudence of the French Constitutional Council 
than under the Court in Strasbourg (Labayle, 2007, p. 105-106, 111, 114). Therefore, 
the possibilities for the French government to impose obstacles to family migration 
were more limited than the Dutch. 
Beyond these distinct judicial constraints however, I discern patterns in the ways 
of speaking about civic integration abroad and its intended purposes, as well as in the 
policy choices that have been made which appear to have been shaped by “national 
models” of migrant integration. This may seem surprising at first sight. Indeed, the 
classic “national models” approach appears wholly inadequate to explain the fact that 
“multicultural” Netherlands has implemented a civic integration abroad policy that 
exerts more pressure on family migrants to adapt to Dutch language and customs 
than “assimilationist” France. To Joppke (2007, p. 2), current Dutch civic integration 
policy provides significant ammunition to his argument that “the notion of national 
models no longer makes sense, if it ever did”. While acknowledging that the notions 
of “multiculturalism” and “assimilationism” as defined by Castles (1995) yield 
little insight into the difference between Dutch and French civic integration abroad 
programs, I hold that country-specific discursive and institutional structures have in 
fact informed the decision-making process and shaped its outcomes.
In France, the government considered the French language “an essential 
component of national identity and a vector of adhesion” and knowledge of 
Republican values “in itself a guarantee of integration”  35. This reveals a belief in 
the universal attraction exercised by French culture and values, a belief wholly 
shared by parliamentarians from the Left to the Right which Brubaker (1992, p. 11) 
labelled “messianic universalism” and traced back to the Revolution and Napoleonic 
expansion. This explains in part why the French opted for an obligation of effort 
through their requirement to participate in a course rather than an obligation of 
result requiring successful completion of an exam. It was thought sufficient to put 
immigrants in contact with French language and values in order to arouse their 
adhesion. Furthermore, the active role adopted by the French state in organising and 
financing the courses reflects the strong social engineering role accorded to the state 
and its institutions in disseminating the values of French citizenship, of which the 
“internal mission civilisatrice carried out by the Third Republic’s army of school 
teachers” (Brubaker, 1992, p. 11) is a classic historical example. Finally, the reticence 
of French politicians to refer to specific ethnic or national groups of family migrants 
completes the picture of a country which is confident that any foreigner, regardless 
of her background, can be educated by Republican institutions to be a French citizen. 
In this “model” of dealing with Otherness, where citizenship is a state of mind or 
35 AN, Projet de loi No 57¸ 4 July 2007.
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practice based on shared universal values which can be acquired, it makes sense to 
design civic integration abroad as a tool to improve integration, not to bar entry. 
In contrast, in the Netherlands, politicians make constant explicit reference to 
particular ethnic groups of family migrants, providing detailed statistics about their 
socio-economic and socio-cultural integration. This reflects an approach which Rath 
(1991) has called “minorisation”: a process in which migrants are constructed as 
“problem groups” by politicians and researchers. Minorisation revolves around “non-
conformity”. Migrants are “represented as people with a way of life and mentality 
which deviates from the Dutch norm”. This non-conformity is considered to be 
problematic because it is associated with a weak socio-economic position (p. 112). 
Rath argues that “minorisation is a characteristic of Dutch social history” (p. 131). 
It goes back at least to the second half of the 19th century when so-called “asocials” 
were subjected to intensive state care and re-education. Like the migrants in later 
times, these members of the Dutch lower class were “problematised because of 
their socio-cultural “deviations”, in so far as these might affect their participation 
in society” (p. 132-143). Ghorashi (2006, p. 8-17) builds on Rath’s analysis by 
identifying “categorical thinking” as a crucial characteristic of the Dutch approach 
to migrant integration from the 1960s until today. This “categorical thinking” entails 
an essentialist conception of culture – where culture is considered an immutable 
characteristic of people instead of an ever-changing social construct. Gorashi traces 
this back to pillarisation when most realms of Dutch society were strictly divided into 
a catholic, protestant, socialist and liberal pillar. Pillarisation has left the Netherlands 
with a legacy of thinking in terms of immutable dichotomy between “Us” and “Them” 
which makes it “seem almost impossible to detach the individual migrant from his/her 
cultural and/or ethnic category”. Like Rath, Ghorashi argues that cultural difference 
has been considered problematic because it has been associated with – and in her view 
even seen to cause – a disadvantaged position in the labour market and the education 
and housing sectors. Thus, the Netherlands has a tradition of approaching migrants as 
“groups”, even “problem groups”, where the socio-cultural properties of the members 
of an immigrant group are thought to be essential and unchangeable and are thought to 
determine their chances for improving their socio-economic position in society. This 
conception of belonging sheds light on the decision to use Dutch civic integration 
abroad policies as a “selection mechanism”. While in France citizenship is seen as a 
property that can be acquired, in the Netherlands the properties of individuals tend to 
be seen as determined by their membership of a specific group. Since the Dutch do not 
share the French confidence in the capacity of state institutions to “create” citizens, 
they are inclined to regard group differences as lasting and irremediable. If difference 
is thus considered “sticky”, it makes sense to strive to keep out those believed to be 
problematically different. This would explain why the Dutch civic integration abroad 
program is designed to deny entry to those unable or unwilling to adapt to the Dutch 
ways. 
	 Conclusion
In recent years, both the Netherlands and France have implemented highly 
innovative policy reform. They have introduced integration requirements at entry 
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for family migrants. French and Dutch civic integration abroad programs have been 
designed to solve a problem defined in very similar terms: the disintegration of society 
into antagonistic groups due to past and present migration flows and failing migrant 
incorporation. Frequent references during parliamentary debates on issues related to 
gender, sexuality and family as well as church-state relations, reveal that the Muslim 
population is found to be the most problematically different. 
The legal definition of the target group of civic integration abroad is very similar in 
France and the Netherlands. Family migrants between 16 and 65 years old are subject 
to the integration requirement. However, the rationale of these two governments for 
targeting family migration, i.e. the construction of the family migrant as the problematic 
Other, is very different, at least in form. While the French government points only to 
the size of family migration flows and avoids reference to characteristics of family 
migrants or their region of origin, the Dutch government emphatically presents family 
migration as problematic both in quantitative and qualitative terms, painting a bleak 
picture of chain migration which causes marginalisation to be reproduced from one 
generation to the other, especially in the case of marriage migrants from Turkey and 
Morocco. This fits with the tendency, well documented in the “national models” 
literature, of the French to disregard the cultural, ethnic or religious background of 
migrants as irrelevant, and of the Dutch to acknowledge ethnic and cultural belongings 
and to define policy target groups along such criteria. However, beyond the form, 
i.e. beyond the terms and arguments employed in political debates, this analysis has 
shown that “problematic” family migration was in fact defined quite similarly in 
France and in the Netherlands. The “problem” is migration resulting from second 
or third generation migrants marrying partners from their (grand)parents’ country of 
origin, especially when they originate from Turkey, the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
or similar parts of the world. 
Thus, “national models” appear to have had little influence on the way in which 
the Other was defined in the debates about civic integration abroad. However, they 
have partially shaped the distinct ways in which France and the Netherlands have 
dealt with this Otherness through civic integration abroad. While the French program 
was presented as a service provided to immigrants to improve their integration, the 
Dutch program was designed to work as a “selection mechanism”. This difference 
should be partly considered the result of different judicial constraints, i.e. the 
protection of the right to family reunification by the French Constitutional Council, a 
constitutional protection which is absent in the Netherlands. In addition, I argue that 
historically rooted conceptions of citizenship and belonging have played a role. In 
France, “Otherness” is thought of as remediable. There is faith in the capacity of the 
Republic to transform a foreigner into a citizen. Hence the obligation to participate in 
the evaluation and course and not to pass a test, i.e. shaping civic integration abroad 
as an integration provision, not a tool of migration control. In contrast, migrants in 
the Netherlands are considered members of a group, permanently endowed with the 
characteristics of that group. Since Otherness is almost irremediable, those who are 
problematically Other should be kept out. Hence the obligation of result and the use 
of civic integration abroad as a selective migration tool. 
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“National models” in their classic definition offered by Castles (1995), i.e. 
multiculturalism in the Netherlands and assimilationism in France, yield little insight 
in the differences between the French and Dutch civic integration abroad programs. 
However, Joppke (2007) seems to throw away the baby with the bath water when he 
states that “national models” have lost their value as analytical tools. Incorporating 
country specific discursive and institutional structures in our analysis remains essential 
if we are to understand why different countries deal with Otherness in different ways.
chapter iv
Some foreigners more equal  
than others under EU law
Chloé Hublet
	 Introduction	
European Union (EU) competence for the construction of a European immigration 
policy  1 raises some questions regarding the application of the principle of non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality to third country nationals (TCNs)  2 for at 
least two reasons. 
First, the European Council’s political objectives allow for a comparison of the 
situation of TCNs and EU citizens and, eventually, an assessment of the proportionality 
of the remaining differences in treatment. Indeed, during the Tampere Council of 
October 1999, the European Council affirmed its will to approximate “the legal status 
of third country nationals to that of Member States’ nationals” (European Council, 
1999, § 21) granting TCNs legally residing in the EU for a certain period of time “a 
set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens” 
(European Council, 1999, § 21). The European Council repeated this intention during 
its meeting on 30 November and 1 December 2009 through the adoption of the 
Stockholm Programme. In fact, the Council affirmed that the EU “must ensure fair 
treatment of third country nationals legally residing in the territory of its Member 
states” and that TCNs should be granted “rights and obligations comparable to those 
of EU citizens” (European Council, 2009, § 6.1.4).
Secondly and in the opinion of many authors (Cholewinski, 2002, p. 40-41; 
Groenendijk 2006, p. 84; Bell 2001, p. 54), the material extension of the scope of 
application of EU law resulting from the Amsterdam Treaty to an area concerning 
TCNs (EU immigration and asylum policy, i.e. former Title IV of the Treaty on the 
1 Already introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (1992).
2 Nationals of non-member countries of the EU.
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European Community (ECT)) raises the question of the application of Article 18 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (former Article 12 ECT) 
to TCNs. This article prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Within 
the scope of application of EU law, could Article 18 TFEU be invoked to challenge 
differences in treatment among TCNs? For example, on the basis of Article 7 (2) of the 
Family Reunification Directive (Directive 2003/86)  3, Germany and the Netherlands 
have both conditioned the granting of a family reunification visa on the successful 
completion of an integration examination, testing host society language, history and 
culture. Certain nationalities are, however, exempt from this obligation. The result is a 
difference in treatment of TCNs on the basis of their nationality. Could that difference 
in treatment be challenged under Article 18 TFEU? Could Article 18 TFEU even be 
invoked to challenge differences in treatment between TCNs and European citizens 
within the scope of application of the Treaty? For example, as regards the right to 
family life, conditions for family reunification are very different if the sponsor is a 
European citizen or a TCN (Bribosia, 2003). Could the legitimacy of these differences 
in treatment be assessed in light of the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of 
nationality enshrined in Article 18 TFEU?
Article 18 TFEU was originally included in the 1957 Treaty of Rome to 
improve market integration  4. It was not included as a means to address human rights 
considerations. Most likely as a result of its economic rationale, and even after the EU 
was granted competence in immigration policy, Article 18 TFEU has classically been 
interpreted as applying only to differences in treatment amongst European citizens  5. 
This chapter will first discuss the legal arguments that could be advanced 
to challenge such a classic interpretation. The chapter will also discuss the recent 
unambiguous confirmation by European Court of Justice (ECJ) of this interpretation 
of Article 18 TFEU. The final section will analyze the consequences of this 
interpretation for the protection of TCNs against discrimination on the grounds of 
their nationality and will discuss other potential means of protection under EU law. 
Particular attention will be given to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
European Convention on Human Rights which according to the European Court of 
Justice should be considered general principles of EU law, and to the general principle 
of equal treatment. This chapter will also address the prohibition of indirect racial, 
ethnic or religious discrimination as an alternative way of protecting TCNs against 
nationality-based discrimination. As illustrated later in the chapter, none of these 
potential means of protection are an effective remedy for TCNs fighting discrimination 
on the basis of nationality.
3 Taken on the basis of Article 79 (2) (a) TFEU (former Article 63 (3) (a) EC)).
4 Prohibition of nationality discrimination is required in order for individuals to exercise 
freedom of movement.
5 Nationals of EU Member States.
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	 The	personal	scope	of	Article	18	TFEU:	an	evolution	at	last  6?
Article 18 TFEU reads as follows: 
“Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any 
special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality 
shall be prohibited. (...)”.
While the ECJ has been very generous in its interpretation of this provision in 
order to give full weight to the fundamental EU right of freedom of movement (Dony, 
1999; O’Leary, 1997, p. 105-136), it has done so only for the benefit of European 
citizens. According to Bell, this limited personal scope of application of Article 18 
TFEU could be explained by its association with the personal scope of freedom of 
movement (2002, p. 37-38) which has always been granted to European citizens 
only. This is exactly the reason why the ECJ has been unable, until now, to criticise 
cases of reverse discrimination (cases in which nationals of a Member State, having 
never made use of their free movement right, are disadvantaged by their own national 
State as compared to the situation of European citizens), given that prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality does not apply to purely internal situations 
(Dautricourt & Thomas, 2009), the “free movement element” being absent. Instead of 
providing some protection at the EU level, the ECJ has always relegated the solution 
of such discrimination to the national legal system. 
In a sense, this association could be perceived as logical since the need to be 
protected against discrimination on the basis of nationality can only arise when there 
is movement of an individual to a country other than his or her own, exposing him 
or her to potential discrimination on the basis of nationality. Nevertheless, arguments 
can be made against the association of the personal scope of application of Article 
18 TFEU with the personal scope of freedom of movement and, thus, against the 
resulting inapplicability of Article 18 TFEU to TCNs. 
As regards the right to freedom of movement, it is incorrect to assert that 
movement from one Member State to another is required in order for the principle 
of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality to be relevant. Rather, an element 
of “foreignness” is required but, as the case of reverse discrimination demonstrates, 
a national could be discriminated on the basis of nationality within his or her own 
country. As for TCNs, they have moved from their country of origin to the EU and, 
therefore, could potentially be exposed to discrimination on the basis of nationality 
without actually moving from one Member State to another within the EU.
Moreover, the scope of the right to freedom of movement is not cast in stone. 
Initially accorded only to European citizens who moved for work in another Member 
State, under certain conditions it has been extended to economically inactive citizens 
(Carlier, 2007, p. 58). Its scope has even been expanded to include TCNs. In addition 
to “privileged foreigners” (family members of European citizens, TCNs working 
6 This part is a summary of a previous publication: Hublet, C., 2009. The scope of Article 
12 of the Treaty of the European Communities vis-à-vis third-country nationals: evolution at 
last? European Law Journal, 15 (6), p. 757-774.
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for a European company providing services in another Member State, and those 
coming from a country which has signed a cooperation agreement with the EU), long 
term resident TCNs benefit, under very strict conditions, from a limited “freedom 
of movement” (Carlier 2007, p. 77) or more accurately, from a right to reside in 
another Member State (see Chapter III of the Long Term Resident Directive). One 
can reasonably expect that the personal scope of application of the right to freedom 
of movement will continue to evolve since it has already done so. An important 
indication that the scope of this right may eventually include TCNs is the fact that, 
while former Article 63 (4) EC referred to the right of TCNs who are legally resident 
in a Member State to reside in another Member State, Article 79 (2) (b) TFEU now 
refers to “the rights of third country nationals residing legally in a Member State, 
including the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other 
Member States”.
Furthermore, the association of the scope of the prohibition of nationality-based 
discrimination with that of the right to freedom of movement is not convincing. 
Indeed, Article 18 TFEU applies “within the scope of application of the Treaties” and 
this scope is not limited to the freedom of movement as the EU’s competences have 
broadened since 1957. In fact, the scope of application of EU law was extended by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (Articles 77-79 TFEU, i.e. former Title IV ECT) to immigration 
and asylum policies. Since these “new” EU policies apply principally to TCNs, the 
material extension of the scope of application of the Treaties creates an extension of 
the personal scope. There is a need for a link with the Treaties in order to fall “within 
the scope of application of the Treaties”. Without a doubt, a new EU competence 
constitutes such a link to EU law. Therefore, there is no legal reason to limit the 
personal scope of Article 18 TFEU to the personal scope of the right to freedom of 
movement. The extension of the material and personal scope of EU law, and the fact 
that Article 18 TFEU should not be limited to the scope of the right to free movement, 
strongly suggest the need for a reinterpretation of Article 18 TFEU such that it could 
apply to TCNs the moment they find themselves in a situation governed by EU law, 
for example within the scope of application of Articles 77-79 TFEU. 
If legal arguments plead for an application of Article 18 TFEU to TCNs, then the 
question of its range arises. Indeed, could it be applied to the differences in treatment 
between TCNs and European citizens, or, only to the differences in treatment among 
TCNs? Some authors suggest that, since Article 18 TFEU applies “without prejudice 
to any special provisions contained [in the treaties]”, it could not, in any way, be 
applied to the differences in treatment between European citizens and TCNs (De 
Bruycker, 2003, p. 46; Cholewinski, 2002, p. 41). Indeed, in this opinion, former Title 
IV ECT (Articles 77-79 TFEU) on immigration policy would have to be understood 
as such a special provision because it is based on the very distinction between TCNs 
and European citizens. However, if immigration policy is indeed based on the 
distinction between the national and the foreigner, it must be stressed that it is not 
based on their discrimination. Distinction or difference in treatment as such do not 
constitute discrimination. Discrimination is an unjustified difference in treatment (not 
having a legitimate aim or using disproportionate means). In reality, as the ECJ has 
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explicitly stated in Cowan  7, the special provisions referred to in Article 18 TFEU are 
implementations of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality in 
a particular area  8. In fact, several provisions of the Treaty put the general principle 
of Article 18 TFEU into practice in a particular area, for example with regard to the 
freedom of movement of workers. Once a Treaty article implements the principle 
in a particular area, and in a particular way, that article will be applicable. The 
identification of the applicable provision has consequences on the justifications that 
can be offered for the differences in treatment based on nationality. Thus, for example, 
Article 45 (2) TFEU prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality within the 
area of free movement of workers. Article 45 (3) TFEU limits the justifications that 
can be invoked in order to justify a difference in treatment among workers of the 
Member States. In cases where the right to free movement of workers applies, only 
reasons relative to public order, public security or public health can be invoked to 
justify a difference in treatment (Schergers, 2004, p. 98-99). Could it be claimed that 
application of Article 18 TFEU “without prejudice to any special provisions of the 
Treaties” means that the principle of Article 18 TFEU does not apply the moment the 
Treaties create discrimination on the basis of nationality? Martin (1995, p. 22) rightly 
states that it should not. Indeed, the contrary would deprive the principle of much of 
its useful effect, as it would apply only as far as the authors of the Treaty wanted it to 
apply, i.e. most likely not in sensitive situations, including the migration field. What 
would be the value of a principle that could be so simply eluded? Besides, given the 
general character of the principle of equality in EU law (see infra), it seems reasonable 
to stipulate, at the very least, that the exception to the principle of non-discrimination 
on the basis of nationality must be explicit (Constantinesco et al., 1992, p. 67-68). 
Articles 77-79 TFEU do not include the possibility for discrimination against TCNs, 
only the possibility for differences in treatment, which is not the same. 
Until recently, the ECJ did not explicitly contradict the potential application of 
Article 18 TFEU to TCNs. Its position was rather vague. In fact, many cases dealing 
with Article 18 TFEU concerned European citizens. If the Court did not extend the 
principle to TCNs, it was simply because they were not involved in these cases. 
Moreover, various cases referred to in the literature as illustrations of the classic 
interpretation of Article 18 TFEU did not, in reality, deal with Article 18 TFEU but 
with one of the special provisions or regulations of EU law implementing the principle 
contained in Article 18 TFEU and applying explicitly to European citizens only. For 
example, Denis Martin (1995, p. 24) relies on the Buhari Haji case  9 to justify the 
classic interpretation of Article 18 TFEU as only applying to European nationals. But, 
in reality, this case dealt with the application of Regulation 1408/71, which stated, in 
Article 2 §1, that it applied only to persons who were citizens of a Member State. It 
can therefore be argued that this restricted personal scope of application is not ipso 
7 ECJ, Case 186-87, Ian William Cowan v. Trésor public, (1989) ECR 195, § 14.
8 See, for example, Articles 45 TFEU (free movement of workers), 49 TFEU (freedom of 
establishment), and 56 TFEU (freedom to provide services).
9 ECJ, Case C-105/89, Ibrahim Buhari Haji v. Institut national d’assurances sociales pour 
travailleurs indépendants, (1990) ECR I-4211.
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facto destined to define the personal scope of application of Article 18 TFEU in other 
fields of application of the Treaty. 
	 The	ECJ’s	position	in	Vatsouras and Koupatantze
In June 2009, in its case Vatsouras, the ECJ affirmed very clearly that Article 18 
TFEU was not meant to be applied to TCNs  10. The case concerned two Greek nationals 
who had come to Germany for work. Mr Vatsouras had worked for almost a year before 
being unemployed for five months after which he found another job. The wage earned 
during his first job was, however, not enough to assure him a minimum standard of 
living resulting in a successful request for a supplement from German social security. 
This supplement was, however, withdrawn upon his dismissal. Mr Koupatantze, on 
the other hand, had been working for a much shorter period before being unemployed 
for reasons independent of him. He then requested an unemployment allowance 
which was also granted. Four months later, however, this allowance was withdrawn 
retroactively. Six months after his dismissal Mr Koupatantze found another job. 
In both cases the withdrawal of social benefits were justified on the basis of 
section 7, paragraph 1, second sentence of Book II of the German Code of Social Law 
regarding benefits for job-seekers (Sozialgesetzbuch II), which states that “foreign 
nationals whose right of residence arises solely out of the search for employment, 
their family members and those entitled to benefits under Paragraph 1 of the 
Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (Law on the benefits to be granted to asylum-seekers)” 
are excluded from those benefits. Both Vatsouras and Koupatantze challenged the 
withdrawal of benefits before the national social court. Section 7, paragraph 1, 
second sentence of the Sozialgesetzbuch II had been amended when transposing the 
Union Citizens Directive (Directive 2004/38). Citing Article 24 (2) of the Directive, 
allowing Member States to make exceptions to the principle of equality in matters 
of social security for persons other than workers (Minderhoud 2009, p. 225-227), 
the Sozialgesetzbuch II introduced that exclusion. The national judges identified a 
question of conformity with EU law and referred a preliminary ruling to the ECJ 
including three questions. The questions sought to confront the validity of Article 24 
(2) of the Union Citizens Directive with the principle of equal treatment.
This chapter will not focus on the first two questions (see Fahey, 2009 on this 
matter) but only on the third one which is of particular interest. Indeed, the third 
question asked whether the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality 
enshrined in Article 18 TFEU precludes national rules which exclude nationals of 
Member States of the EU even from the receipt of the social assistance benefits which 
are granted to irregular immigrants.
It did not receive much attention from either the Advocate General or the Court, 
each of whom dedicated only a few paragraphs to their response. 
Indeed, the answer to the question was not necessary for the solution of the case. 
In my opinion, it was meant not so much as a question but rather as an additional 
argument for the national judge pleading for the non-conformity of Article 24 (2) of 
10 ECJ, Joined cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, Athanasios Vatsouras and Josif Koupatantze v. 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) Nürnberg 900, (2009) ECR I-04585, § 52.
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Directive 2004/38 with primary EU law. Most likely, he wanted to highlight the fact 
that social assistance could be denied to European citizens while “even” irregular 
migrants were afforded some assistance.
Nonetheless, the question was answered by both the Advocate General and the 
Court. It is interesting to note that this question poses the issue from the opposite 
angle than the one referred to in the introduction of this paper. Here, in the eyes of the 
German judge, European citizens are placed in a more disadvantageous position than 
TCNs. However, there is no reason to think that the Court’s response would have been 
different had the disadvantageous position been occupied by a TCN. Indeed, the Court 
formulated its response in a very general way making it difficult to argue from then 
on, that, when appropriate, Article 18 TFEU could be applied to TCNs. The Court 
reformulated the question in § 50 of its judgment in a more general way by asking 
“whether [Article 18 TFEU] precludes national rules which exclude nationals of 
Member States from receipt of social assistance benefits in cases where those benefits 
are granted to nationals of non-member countries”. Following the conclusions of its 
Advocate General, the Court replied that Article 18 TFEU does not prohibit excluding 
European citizens from the benefits of social allowance afforded to TCNs (§ 53) 
because:
“[Article 18 TFEU] concerns situations coming within the scope of Community 
law in which a national of one Member State suffers discriminatory treatment in 
relation to nationals of another Member State solely on the basis of his nationality 
and is not intended to apply to cases of a possible difference in treatment between 
nationals of Member States and nationals of non-member countries” (§ 52). 
The classic interpretation of Article 18 TFEU was thus confirmed. It can only be 
applied to European citizens and can therefore only be invoked by them. 
After such an unambiguous and general statement, it is hardly arguable that Article 
18 TFEU could still potentially be applied to TCNs. This ECJ statement is welcomed 
for its clarity, as, to my knowledge, it is the first time the Court looks at the application 
of Article 18 TFEU to TCNs without a more specific provision of the Treaty being 
invoked at the same time. This statement raises further questions however. 
It is striking that no explanation of the Court’s interpretation is given in the 
reasoning of either the Court or the Advocate General. It seems that the original 
economic rationale of Article 18 TFEU, namely assuring market integration, still 
remains powerful enough to justify the fact that only European citizens can rely on 
the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, even at a time when the 
EU is trying to strengthen its legitimacy by developing a political integration process 
respectful of human rights.
It can also be asked whether the Court’s ruling can be explained by the fact that the 
social benefit at stake, the one afforded to TCNs, was not within the material scope of 
application of the Treaty. The Advocate General’s brief reasoning concerning the third 
question could be utilized to plead in such a direction. Indeed, in § 66 of his opinion, 
he states that “Community law does not provide rules for resolving issues of difference 
in treatment between Community citizens and citizens of non-member countries who 
are subject to the law of the host Member State”. However, it is indisputable that 
TCNs are not always governed by national law. They are sometimes subject to EU 
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law as, for example, within the scope of application of the European asylum and 
immigration policies (Articles 78 and 79 TFEU). It can therefore be argued that in the 
situation at hand, Vatsouras and Koupatantze were not within the scope of application 
of European law but were governed by German social assistance law. If this is the 
case, the Court’s affirmation could be different in a situation concerning TCNs falling 
within the scope of application of EU law. However, the general character of the 
affirmations by the Advocate General and the Court makes it difficult to support such 
a view. If the reason for the non-application of Article 18 TFEU to TCNs was that 
the issue was outside the material scope of application of the treaty, the Court would 
have said so. On the contrary, it intentionally answered the third question with a 
general statement that Article 18 TFEU is “not intended to apply to cases of a possible 
difference in treatment between nationals of Member States and nationals of non-
member countries”. General statements are meant to be applied in any situation, even 
when a difference in treatment arises in a situation whereby both the European citizen 
and the TCN are within the material scope of the treaty.
Finally, the Court’s statement does not make it clear if Article 18 TFEU could be 
applied to differences in treatment among TCNs. While it is certain that differences in 
treatment between European citizens and TCNs cannot be challenged on the basis of 
Article 18 TFEU, the potential to challenge differences in treatment amongst TCNs 
is not definitively exhausted. Indeed, while asserting that Article 18 TFEU concerns 
situations in which a national of one Member State suffers discriminatory treatment in 
relation to nationals of another Member State, it concludes by affirming that it is not 
intended to apply to differences in treatment between European citizens and TCNs. 
This conclusion leaves the door open for the possibility of applying Article 18 TFEU 
to differences in treatment among TCNs.
As this case illustrates, there is a huge reluctance to apply the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality to TCNs. The fact that Article 18 TFEU 
has been interpreted so widely and generously to the benefit of European citizens 
helps to explain this reluctance. In addition, the fact of its eventual application to the 
domain of immigration and asylum policy (Articles 77-79 TFEU in which TCNs are 
indisputably within the scope of application of European law) seems to frighten not 
only policy-makers but also the Court. There is however no reason to be frightened 
of the application of the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality to 
TCNs. The “only” consequence of such an application is to provide a manner to assess 
differences in treatment in order to abolish discrimination, not the justified differences 
which could remain in place (Boeles, 2005, p. 502).
	 The	consequences	of	Vatsouras	on	the	protection	of	TCNs	against	
discrimination	on	grounds	of	nationality
As ECJ case law is fixed for now until such time as it is overturned, TCNs cannot 
rely on Article 18 TFEU to challenge differences in treatment based on nationality, 
at least not in any case between them and European citizens. One can ask whether 
TCNs are therefore deprived of any protection under EU law. If so, they would have 
to appeal to national and international legal orders in order to be protected against 
discrimination on the basis of nationality. In my opinion, the application of Article 18 
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TFEU to TCNs could have increased their protection from discrimination because it 
has “direct effect” (it does not need to be implemented in national legislation before it 
can be invoked before national judges) and can be seen as a direct way to access legal 
control over the differences in treatment they face. But other means can be mobilised 
at the EU level to protect TCNs. These means should be elicited from human rights 
law, in particular from the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the general principle of equality, and the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic origin and religion. 
The European Charter of Fundamental Rights, now mandatory as a result of 
the TFEU, includes an article prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
Article 21 (2) stipulates that “within the scope of application of the Treaties and 
without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any discrimination on grounds 
of nationality shall be prohibited”. It is a repetition of Article 18 TFEU and the 
Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly mention that 
it “must be applied in compliance with that Article”. Although those explanations 
do not have the status of law, they are meant to be the authoritative interpretation of 
the Charter. As a result, the Charter’s Article 21 (2) must be interpreted as applying 
under the same conditions as Article 18 TFEU, with the same classic limited personal 
scope. This is quite disappointing considering the Charter is clearly aligned with the 
objectives of fundamental rights for all human beings. One could have expected the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality to have a broader personal 
scope than that of Article 18 TFEU, which is more clearly aligned with economic 
objectives. The Charter might be considered as an added argument in favour of 
detaching Article 18 TFEU from its economic rationale in order to give the human 
rights dimension of the protection from discrimination its full range. Meanwhile, it 
remains that Article 21 (2) of the Charter will only be applicable to TCNs if Article 18 
TFEU is also applicable to them. As discussed above, this is not the path that the ECJ 
chose to take. Thus, the Charter will most likely not be of fundamental interest to the 
protection of TCNs against nationality-based discrimination.
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is another possible means 
by which TCNs can be protected against discrimination on the basis of their nationality 
as it prohibits discrimination in Article 14. As the ECHR is part of EU law  11, 
protection afforded by the ECHR can be seen as protection under EU law. Concerning 
the differences in treatment on grounds of nationality, the European Court of Human 
Rights requires “very weighty reasons” in order for differences in treatment to be 
justified  12. Therefore, any differences in treatment undergo strict scrutiny, making 
them a priori unjustified. Nevertheless, the Court has been very keen in accepting 
all the differences in treatment resulting from the construction of the EU as justified 
by the existence, between Member States, of a “special legal order”  13, “which has, 
11 Even if the EU has not yet ratified the ECHR, the ECJ considers that its content, being 
common to the constitutional traditions of the Member States, can be regarded as general 
principles of EU law, i.e. unwritten rules of law.
12 Eur. Ct. H.R., Gaygusuz v. Austria, 31 August 1996, § 42; Eur. Ct. H.R., Andrejeva v. 
Leetonia, 18 February 2009, § 87.
13 Eur. Ct. H.R., Moustaquim v. Belgium, 18 February 1991, § 49.
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in addition, established its own citizenship”  14 (for a critique of this case law see Van 
Drooghenbroek, 1997, p. 8-12; Bribosia, 2004, p. 13.4/5-7). Since the Court did not 
explain why this special legal order could justify the particular differences in treatment 
at stake in those cases, it can be said that it does not operate any effective control over 
the differences in treatment between European citizens and TCNs, abdicating before 
the EU legal order. Therefore, TCNs will not find any solution from the European 
Court of Human Rights.
The ECJ has recognised the existence of a general principle of equality, which 
“requires that similar situations shall not be treated differently unless differentiation 
is objectively justified”  15. General principles in EU law are unwritten rules of law 
compulsory for European institutions and for Member States implementing EU law, 
established by the ECJ. This general principle of equality could be argued to imply 
a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality under EU law, 
which could have a broader personal scope of application than the principle enshrined 
in Article 18 TFEU. However, the Court has as yet not recognised a general principle 
of non-discrimination, and still less, a general principle of non-discrimination on the 
basis of nationality. In reality, today there is no certainty of the existence of a general 
principle of non-discrimination, its precise difference with the general principle of 
equality, or the criteria that would be covered by such a principle (Martin, 2008, p. 425, 
427). In 1976, the ECJ recognised the existence of a general principle prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of gender (Bribosia 2008, p. 38) by affirming in Defrenne 
II that the “principle of equal pay forms part of the foundations of the Community”  16. 
However, the Court refused to recognise such a general principle on grounds of sexual 
orientation  17 while it acknowledged it on the basis of age in Mangold  18 before denying 
it again in Bartsch  19 (Martin, 2008). It nevertheless recently reaffirmed Mangold case 
law, affirming the existence of a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of age  20. As Martin highlights, Advocate Generals are taking pro and contra positions 
on the existence of such a principle (2008, p. 426-427). Recently, Advocate General 
Sharpston affirmed the existence of a general principle of “equal treatment or non-
discrimination” in EU law  21 according to which the Dutch distinction of the resource 
requirement for family reunification based on whether the family relationship arose 
14 Eur. Ct. H.R., C. v. Belgium, 7 August 1996, § 38.
15 ECJ, Joined cases 117-76 and 16-77, Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. and Hansa-Lagerhaus 
Ströh & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen ; Diamalt AG v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe, (1977) 
ECR 1753, § 7.
16 ECJ, Case 43-75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne 
Sabena, (1976) ECR 455, § 12.
17 ECJ, Case C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd, (1998) ECR 
I-00621, § 48.
18 ECJ, Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm, (2005) ECR I-09981, § 75.
19 ECJ, Case C-427/06, Birgit Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) 
Altersfürsorge GmbH, (2008) ECR I-07245.
20 ECJ, Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, 19 January 2010, 
§ 21 and 50.
21 ECJ, Advocate General’s Opinion, Case C-578/08, Rhimou Chakroun v. Minister van 
Buitenlandse Zaken, 10 December 2009, § 40.
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before the sponsor’s entry into the Netherlands or later was not justified  22. In its 
judgment of 4 March 2010, the Court followed its Advocate General in its conclusions 
but did not refer to any general principle of non-discrimination  23. 
By analogy to the Court’s reasoning in Defrenne II, some arguments plead for 
the existence of a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, 
namely, the long and well established principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality in EU law (but for the benefit of European citizens only) and the direct 
effect of Article 18 TFEU. If such a general principle were to be recognised by 
the ECJ, its scope of application should be determined. It could be useful only if it 
had a broader material and personal scope of application than Article 18 TFEU. If 
so, it could be applied to TCNs. But why would the ECJ recognise such a general 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality applicable to TCNs when 
it has affirmed that Article 18 TFEU does not apply to them? The Court has not yet 
explicitly recognised the existence of a general principle of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality applicable to TCNs and there is little hope that it will do so in 
the future given the Vatsouras case law. Once again, nationality-based discrimination 
faced by TCNs could hardly be challenged on this basis.
Finally, it can be argued that there is no “waterproof” frontier between the criteria 
of race, ethnic origin, and religion on the one hand and the criterion of nationality on the 
other hand (De Schutter, 2009, p. 20-23). As a consequence, a difference in treatment 
on grounds of nationality could be challenged, when appropriate, as an indirect 
difference in treatment on the grounds of race, ethnic origin or religion. This could 
be the case, for example, when the migrant population of one country is constituted, 
primarily, of one particular ethnic group. Thus, measures targeting “foreigners” could 
intentionally or unintentionally have a particular disadvantage for this ethnic group 
and could constitute indirect discrimination if there is no reasonable justification. 
However, it should be stressed that Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78, prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic origin and religion in various areas  24 
and adopted on the basis of Article 19 TFEU  25 (former Article 13 ECT), explicitly 
mention in their common Article 3 (2) that discrimination on grounds of nationality is 
excluded from their scope of application. This common Article 3 (2) goes even further 
when it excludes conditions related to the entry of TCNs into the EU and the residence 
of TCNs within the EU from the directives’ scope of application. More generally, 
this article also excludes any treatment arising from the legal status of TCNs  26. This 
22 Ibid., § 42-43.
23 ECJ, Case C-578/08, Rhimou Chakroun v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 4 March 
2010, § 64.
24 Only with regard to employment for the criterion of religion.
25 Provision giving some capacity to act to the EU with regard to discrimination on the 
grounds of, inter alia, race, ethnic origin, and religion.
26 Common Article 3 (2): “This Directive does not cover difference of treatment based on 
nationality and is without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry into and 
residence of third-country nationals and stateless persons on the territory of Member States, and 
to any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless 
persons concerned”.
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exclusion has not yet been interpreted by the ECJ but it should be narrowly interpreted 
in order to give effective effect to Article 19 TFEU and to the directives’ objectives. 
As one of the directives’ objectives is to prohibit indirect discrimination, the exclusion 
should be construed as not covering discrimination on grounds of nationality when it 
can be demonstrated that this discrimination constitutes an indirect discrimination on 
the grounds of race, ethnic origin or religion (Hublet, 2009, p. 764-767). At the very 
least, the exclusion cannot be used to hide racial discrimination behind the criterion 
of nationality, which is supposedly “neutral” since it is not targeted by the directives. 
If TCNs can hope to be protected from nationality-based discrimination through the 
prohibition of racial, ethnic and religious discrimination, once again, there is some 
uncertainty as to the range of the exclusion of the criterion of nationality from the 
directives’ scope of application, and thus as to the concrete protection they can expect.
Apparently, TCNs are in fact not properly protected against discrimination on the 
basis of their nationality under EU law. They will have to turn to the national legal 
order (De Schutter, 2009, p. 55-75) and to the international human rights legal order. 
Indeed, Member States must respect their obligations undertaken with respect to 
human rights. In international human rights law, as well as in the ECHR, the criterion 
of nationality is becoming more and more a suspect criterion (De Schutter, 2009, 
p. 43, 49, 52). This means that judges are applying a strong level of scrutiny when 
evaluating the justification afforded for differences in treatment based on nationality. 
However, it has been illustrated that the European Court of Human Rights has not 
applied any effective appreciation of the differences resulting from EU integration. 
For its part, the Human Rights Committee  27 qualified this position in its case Karakurt 
v. Austria in 2002 stating that: 
“Although the Committee had found in one case (N° 658/1995, Van Oord v. 
The Netherlands) that an international agreement that confers preferential treatment 
to nationals of a State party to that agreement might constitute an objective and 
reasonable ground for differentiation, no general rule can be drawn from there to the 
effect that such an agreement in itself constitutes a sufficient ground with regard to the 
requirements of article 26 of the Covenant. Rather, it is necessary to judge every case 
on its own facts” (HRC, Karakurt v. Austria, 2002, § 8.4).
This seems a much more correct way of assessing the differences between 
European citizens and TCNs, looking at each specific case to see if the difference at 
stake pursues a legitimate aim and uses proportionate means to achieve it.
	 Conclusion
The “new” EU competence regarding immigration policy could have led the ECJ 
to a new construction of Article 18 TFEU, which prohibits discrimination on grounds 
of nationality, so that it would apply to TCNs. Indeed, as far as it applies “within 
the scope of application of the Treaties”, it should apply to TCNs when they are in a 
situation governed by EU law, for example inside EU immigration policy.
27 The body in charge with the monitoring of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.
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However, the ECJ took an opposing position in the Vatsouras case. With no further 
explanation, it confirmed the classic interpretation of Article 18 TFEU stipulating that 
it is “not intended to apply to cases of a possible difference in treatment between 
nationals of Member States and nationals of non-member countries”. The question 
remains whether it could be applied to differences in treatment among TCNs.
Other possible means of protection for TCNs against nationality-based 
discrimination in EU law exist though they are not as straightforward as the application 
of Article 18 TFEU could have been. Article 21 (2) of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality but must be 
applied under the same conditions as Article 18 TFEU, i.e. with the same limited 
personal scope of application. Therefore, it will not be of any assistance to TCNs. 
The same can be said for protection under the ECHR, which is not efficient since 
the European Court of Human Rights does not operate any real control in concreto 
of the differences in treatment resulting from EU integration. Furthermore, a general 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality has thus far not been 
recognised by the ECJ. And, given the ECJ’s position on the application of Article 
18 TFEU to TCNs, there is little hope that the ECJ will recognise such a principle. 
The prohibition of racial, ethnic and religious discrimination and the porous frontier 
between these criteria and the one of nationality seems a more efficient way for TCNs 
to challenge differences in treatment on grounds of nationality. This approach is quite 
weak however. Indeed, the criterion of nationality is explicitly excluded from the 
scope of application of Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78 prohibiting racial, ethnic 
and religious discrimination in various areas, with the consequence that nationality-
based discrimination cannot be challenged on the basis of the prohibition of racial, 
ethnic and religious discrimination, or, in the best case, only the nationality-based 
discrimination constituting indirect racial, ethnic or religious discrimination.
As it stands, there is a gap in the protection of TCNs from discrimination on the 
basis of their nationality. Legally speaking, the gap could have been filled by EU law, 
as there is room for a new construction of the personal scope of application of Article 
18 TFEU. Unfortunately, the ECJ moved in another direction with the Vatsouras case. 
This gap could be filled at the ECHR level but that would require the European Court 
of Human Rights to turn around its Moustaquim and Chorfi cases. Hopefully, the gap 
will be covered at national and international levels. It remains that the message sent 
to TCNs by the ECJ’s Vatsouras decision is exclusive of TCNs rather than moving in 
the positive direction of comprehensive integration of TCNs into European society.

chapter v
Borders and security:  
the different logics of surveillance in Europe 
Didier Bigo, Julien Jeandesboz, Francesco Ragazzi and Philippe Bonditti
	 Border	and	security:	decolonising	the	understanding	of	border	 
from	a	security	approach
The concept of border, even when limited to a geographical sense, is subject to 
many discussions that are related, first to the relevance or not to have a different 
conception of the border, irreducible to the territory and to political order, and 
secondly, to the relationship between the techniques of control of mobility and the 
location where the verification of identity takes place and where the right to visit or 
stay in a given state is established.
The definition or more precisely the categorisation of “Otherness”, in this 
perspective is not the result of philosophical discussions about values and their 
possibility of convergences, it is the result of these techniques of governing 
populations – techniques that abnormalise some while normalising others as different 
but compatible, and thus constitute a way to construct the former as “undesirable”, 
by reframing logics of passage and borders as location of exchange into borders as 
filters, as locks blocking some undesirable or unwanted persons while staying opened 
for other “desirable” persons. 
This approach, which is different from seeing borders as a way to stop and to block, 
insists to the contrary on the fluidity of border, and takes its references in constructivist 
and postmodern discourses. Rather than stopping or blocking, the emphasis is on 
filtering, on sorting out people and banning the undesirable more efficiently. These 
practices have been coined in recent years as “smart border technology”. They are 
presented as a way to speed up travels and to facilitate freedom of circulation. But, 
even if this perspective is different from traditional military security, this way of 
thinking re-colonises borders as security institutions or as surveillance institutions 
(Vicki Squire, 2010).
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From this distinction between different security modalities, emerges the unease 
towards many contemporary debates. In our view, the way borders are used to securitise 
and to filter people is often very far from the noise and complaints around borders as 
barriers, as military walls, as lines of defense, as fortresses, that the professionals 
of politics (and some academics) put at the forefront of their debates – either to 
favour such a discourse of closure in the name of a better integration of the people 
already present, or to criticise this discourse by creating an analogy with a war against 
migrants, and a neo fascist type of exclusionary practices grounded into racism.
Certainly, the “homeland security strategy” of 2002 devised in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2001 bombings and prior to the invasion of Iraq, is by no means a 
new form of associating borders and security, but a return to a very old-fashioned 
approach of borders as a ring of (electronic) steel which has been favoured by the 
military. This approach, however, has been blocked as early as 2003 as non practicable 
and replaced by an understanding of borders coming more from Europe (and its 
Schengen experiment) and from neo liberal economists understandings of borders 
where borders are considered as fluid and dispersed. The paradox of many critiques 
has been to misunderstand this double move and to continue to describe the policy of 
the different governments as fortress America or fortress Europe – and to call for more 
fluidity, a demand which coincided exactly with what the governments were doing 
by setting up a system where surveillance is not located at the physical borders of the 
state, but at any point of travel of each individual who can be traced by obliging him to 
pass through different procedures, depending on the level of “trust” he has acquired.
So, contemporary practices of exclusion come from a more modern vision of 
borders as “smart” instrument, as “fluid”, as “locus of information and communication”. 
And far from a classic military thinking, they adjust to a virtualisation of the borders, 
through which a securitisation of borders is a way to govern populations on the move, 
to trace them, to sort them out “smoothly”, without hurting them (too much or too 
visibly). The visibility of coercion at the borders is then often limited, and the violence 
is relocated into bureaucratic procedures of categorising, profiling and tracing people. 
As the critics are still often looking to the old borders locations and the detention camps 
nearby the borders, they fail to understand borders are not where they are supposed to 
be, i.e., at the territorial edges of the state. They are at the fault lines of circulation of 
power between elite and bureaucratic groups defining and re-categorising what borders 
and territory mean in Europe and in a world of globalisation through what they call 
“security imperatives”. They are disseminated into an archipelago of places which 
vary along the different travel routes  1. They are often integrated into databases and 
their categorisations appear more neutral and technical than before. Discrimination 
is based on statistics, profiles and prediction built by software and human specialists 
(including criminologists and sociologists) who insist that they are against criminals, 
terrorists, but not ethnic minorities.
The coercion is then relocated through the selection of computerized data, through 
the elaboration of profiling softwares claimed to have predictive capacities concerning 
1 See the map designed by MIGREUROP: www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/carte-en.pdf 
[Visited 15/10/2010].
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human behaviour, through the systematic nature of biometrics identifiers and their 
retention in electronic format for a long period in order to refine the profiles of the 
next wave of suspects, and through the distribution of places where such devices can 
manifest their power in action (consulates for those who needs visa, travel agencies 
and air line companies for those travelling far, camps far away from the physical 
demarcation of interstate relations and their border guards, boat or foot travels afar for 
the authorised check points, places to get social benefits and so on).
	 Technology	and	EU	bordering	:	not	stopping	people	;	enhancer	of	freedom	
of	circulation	or	surveillance	mechanism	speeding	up	their	travel?
Technology plays a growing role in the contemporary transformations of 
bordering processes. A widening number of studies have sought to highlight how the 
use of technological systems such as biometrics, databases and information exchange 
systems, are progressively changing the ways in which borders are controlled and 
experienced (Amoore 2006; Bonditti 2004; Salter 2004; Muller, 2008) (For the EU 
context, see Broeders, 2007; Engbersen 2001; Jeandesboz, 2008).
In the EU, furthermore, one might argue that it is through the question of borders 
and mobility (in the context of Schengen) that a transnational system of surveillance 
supported by ICT has actually come into being (Mathiesen, 2001). Louise Amoore 
(2006) surveys the recourse to biometric technology in the context of the reshuffling 
of US border management organisation (particularly the VISIT programme of the US 
Department of Homeland Security  2), and highlights that the use of such technical 
systems result in the inscription of the border (or rather, of multiple boundaries, 
including socio-biological ones) in the very body of the individual on the move. 
Bordering processes sustained by ICT further operate on the traces left by persons in 
movement: traces that they leave in the course of their bodily travel, but also traces 
of their transactions (e.g. credit card references when buying airplane tickets online), 
which in some cases, should these transactions fit into a risk “profile”, can lead to 
the banishment of individuals from the circuits of mobility before they have actually 
started their journey.
In this perspective, the notion of a “borderless world”, as advocated by some 
commentators, is contradicted by a consistent accumulation of findings that all point 
to the persistence of bordering processes. This becomes all the more evident when 
one actually reconsiders the way in which borders are studied, and seeks alternatives 
to the classical, state-focused understanding of bordering processes. This, however, 
does not preclude the fact that bordering processes have undergone significant 
transformations, at the very least since the end of the bipolar period. This has to do in 
part with the re-evaluation of mobility as one of the fundamental stakes and values of 
the contemporary period.
Borders, in the experience of individuals as well as in the way they are rationalised 
in governmental processes, have been dislocated and displaced, generating 
differentiated patterns of mobility: for some, borders materialised by checkpoints 
and border guard officials have all but become invisible; others might actually not 
2 See http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/usv.shtm [Visited 15/10/2010].
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even reach such checkpoints, for lack of visas and/or adequate economic, social and 
symbolic resources. Individuals can be moved in between borders, in the interstitial 
spaces of waiting zones and airport transit areas, without actually entering anywhere 
(Makaremi, 2008). New modalities for sorting out individuals and separating 
“legitimate” forms of mobility from “illegitimate” ones thus emerge, functioning not 
so much according to the formal geographical partition of political communities, but 
operating through mobility itself. In the process, state sovereignty is challenged: while 
even in the EU, border management is still formally a domain of national competence, 
the displacement of border surveillance and border security, through the increasingly 
transnational articulation of the practices of professionals of security narrows down 
the room for manoeuvre of national agencies and services.
Thirdly, in this perspective, the processes of European construction might actually 
stand as a key crucible for such transformations on an international scale. While 
many commentators, including in the media and among professionals of politics, are 
currently pointing at the problematic evolution of US border control practices (e.g. 
MEPs on the issue of exchanges of Passenger Name Record (PNR) information), the 
EU, through the Schengen/ Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) process, 
the creation of databases such as EURODAC or SIS, the “externalisation” of border 
management, migration, refugee or visa policies, seems in many respects to be leading 
the way, rather than resisting the trend (Basaran, 2010) .
	 Mobility	and	its	government	:	speed	instead	of	freedom
What is the relationship between mobility, security and government? Whereas 
this question was rather marginal in the social sciences until a few decades ago, the 
growing mobility of populations (or the perception of an increase), and in particular 
migration flows, as well as expressed concerns for the effects of “globalization” 
have pushed scholars in disciplines as diverse as anthropology, sociology, political 
science or international relations to take a stance. This very large literature, split 
between various subfields including migration studies, diaspora studies, security and 
surveillance studies, can be roughly distributed between three, conflicting threads of 
argument.
For some, processes of globalization, the increase of migrant flows, the 
generalization of cheap air travel and fast telecommunications have brought about 
the possibility of an alternate form of social existence: transnational communities 
and diasporas (Anteby-Yemini, Berthomière et al., 2005; Cohen, 1997; Cohen 
and Vertovec, 1999; Dufoix, 2003; Portes, 1999; Sheffer, 2003). These groups, 
conceptualized as distinct social forms, are said to bring with them the promise of a 
more cosmopolitan world. They are conceived as alternatives to the modern nation-
state (Cohen, 1996; Schnapper, 2001), as locales of hybridization and métissage 
(Gilroy, 1993, 1994; Hall, 1990), bearing in their very nature the impossibility of the 
exclusionary politics of the modern, Westphalian nation-state (Clifford, 1994). In this 
optic, mobility is understood as the possibility of escaping the practices of control and 
surveillance of the states of origin and populate a new, ungoverned transnational space 
(Tölöyan, 1996). These studies, usually published shortly after the end of the bipolar 
period, are consistent with the most enthusiastic narratives about the advantages and 
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new opportunities created by the neoliberal globalization. They are also the corollary 
to one-sided European narratives on the newly acquired freedom of movement, the 
possibilities of a post-national European citizenship (Jacobson, 1996; Soysal, 1994, 
1996) and cosmopolitanism in Europe (Beck, 2006; Beck et al., 2007). This literature 
covers, of course, much more than issues of mobility and security. Questions of 
migration, transnational identity formation, integration and long-distance mobilization 
are at the center of most of the debates. Yet it relies on sometimes acknowledged, often 
untold common assumptions about the relation between security, mobility and the 
practices of government. The common feature of most of this literature is to consider 
mobility as the equivalent of freedom, and the absence of mobility as the condition of 
subjection to surveillance and practices of security.
Unsurprisingly, the most optimistic of these authors have been largely criticized 
for their naivety and for painting a partial picture of the actual processes at stake. 
Broadly speaking, scholars have gathered around two alternate stances taking a 
much more sceptical look at the relation between mobility and security. The first of 
these alternate positions has been to admit the novelty of post-Cold War mobility of 
populations and transnational social formations, while considering this phenomenon 
not as emancipation from security practices, but rather as a source of insecurity in 
itself. Here we find the most common move of (in)securitization of mobility as a 
possible threat and/or risk. While this position has been a common tendency for 
some EU institutions and EU governments over the past 15 years, a substantial body 
of literature has concentrated on explaining the possible interconnections between 
mobility and insecurity from an academic standpoint: be it the dangerousness of the 
newcomers in terms of criminality, economy, national identify (Rudolph, 2003), for 
their role as foreign policy lobbies (Huntington 1997, 2005; Smith, 2000) or for the 
roles they could play in fueling conflicts in their country “of origins” (Loescher, 1993; 
Posen, 1996; Weiner, 1993; Zolberg, 1993).
A third body of literature has also developed in reaction to the optimistic 
transnationalists. It broadly shared their starting point of a hope for an increased 
freedom of movement, but it takes a more pessimistic stance on what is taking place. 
Scholars in this thread of reflection have pointed out how optimistic transnationalists 
have failed to see the immense restrictions on migration and movement that have 
taken place in the contemporary period, and to account for the emergence of new 
borders and frontiers in parallel to the abolishment of the old ones. The view that far 
from the promises of globalization, but also far from the alleged dangers of migration, 
the current situation can be summarized as a proper “war on migrants” comes mostly 
from the pro-immigration NGO sector (Blanchard et al., 2007) and has been taken 
over by some scholars (Palidda, 2003, 2005; Perrouty, 2004). For this brand of 
literature – which often draws on the work of Agamben (1998, 2005) and the Foucault 
of Surveiller et Punir (1975), what we are witnessing is a process of exceptionalisation 
of migration, namely a situation in which the detention camps across Europe are the 
ultimate symbol of the will to reduce the unwanted to a fixed, confined, bare life. The 
main point here has therefore been to refute the argument that anything has substantially 
changed since the end of the bipolar period, and to argue that what has happened is 
only the redeployment and the reinforcement of established structures of control. In 
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this sense, these scholars have taken the optimist transnationalist argument and turned 
it upside down: arguing that security practices were in fact still largely controlling and 
limiting the current push for mobility. Here, the equivalence of mobility as freedom, 
opposed to non-mobility as security has been maintained. The outlook has just been 
more pessimistic in terms of the possibility of mobility to prevail as an emancipatory 
movement away from security and governmental control.
We therefore see three positions emerging, that we could define the “transnationalist 
optimistic”, the “traditional securitarian”, and the “pessimistic libertarian”. These 
three points of view broadly take for granted the equivalence of mobility and freedom, 
opposed to non-mobility and security. Freedom of movement and security are put in a 
balance, as two point of the spectrum in a zero-sum game. The position we intend to 
develop here is sensibly different, and aims at breaking commonsensical assumptions 
about the balance of liberty and security in the context of mobility.
Against the transnational-cosmopolitan argument, drawing on the responses that 
have already been formulated in the literature at the time (Basch, Glick Schiller, et al., 
1994; Glick-Schiller, Basch et al., 1992; Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Kastoryano, 
2003, 2006), we argue that the “transnational” is not a separate, unruled, social space, 
but a new social territory of contention in which traditional logics of inclusion and 
exclusion are at play. Transnational communities and diasporas are as much – if not 
more, since they are contended by several governments – the object of government 
as national populations are. In this sense, transnational social formations are often 
caught up in a web, or a matrix of sovereignties (Huysmans, 2003). The idea of the 
transnational as a “third” space, or an “interstitial space” located in between territorial 
states is a conceptualization that blatantly overlooks the necessarily territorialized 
condition of transnational communities and diasporas (Koopmans and Statham, 1999, 
2001). 
The second “securitarian” position will not be excessively discussed as it has been 
intensively debated in the 1990s through discussions about the social construction 
of immigration as a threat and the dangers for governments and scholars to engage 
in such practices (Bigo 1998, 2002, 2005; Huysmans 1995, 2000; Waever, 1993, 
1995, 1998; Waever and Buzan, 1993). More interestingly perhaps, in response to the 
“pessimistic-libertarian” position, we agree on the dim look on the “abnormalisation” 
of the mobility of certain unwanted groups, yet we differentiate ourselves on the 
following fundamental points.
In our analysis of contemporary practices of security in Europe, surveillance 
and control are not opposed to freedom and mobility. Contemporary modalities 
of government are in fact exactly the opposite of this vision: they operate through 
freedom and circulation. Following in this the analysis of Michel Foucault (Foucault, 
2004) on the question of governmentality we intend to argue that the modern practice 
of government is not mainly operating through law or through discipline – as it could 
have been in the past – but through what the late Foucault defined as regimes of 
security, or governmentality. In this late configuration of relations of power, linked 
to the material conditions of possibility of acceleration of the mobility of financial, 
commercial but also human flows, power essentially operates this very mobility and 
circulation. As Foucault showed, modern liberal regimes do not govern against, but 
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through regimes of liberties, freedom and hence, circulation (Bigo, 2008, p. 107; 
Basatan, 2010). The art of government is not anymore the art of enforcing what is 
allowed and what is forbidden, nor is it to mould bodies into workers, soldiers or 
reformed prisoners. It is to work through the apparent or imagined natural specificities 
of population characteristics, rendered visible through statistical tools, and separate 
a majority from the margins. Contemporary forms of security are destined at 
guaranteeing the highest possible security and freedom to majority and segregate 
it from an “abnormal” minority to be controlled and watched. But the principle of 
circulation and movement is never sacrificed to these practices of control.
In this sense, contemporary practices of security in Europe should not be 
analyzed as a dispositif of disciplining bodies and forbidding movement – as the 
“pessimistic libertarian” stance in the literature, often stuck in the imaginary of the 
Benthamian panoptic model described by Foucault, would argue – but as a specific 
modality of government (Huysmans, 2006) which operates through different forms 
of demarcations. Foucault is here the victim of the popularity of certain books over 
others. In his 1977-78 and 1978-79 lectures at the Collège de France he had in fact 
moved from the disciplinary, panoptic moment whose end he locates in the end 
of the 19th century towards the emergence of the new form of government we are 
describing. In this sense, as it has already been pointed out (Bigo, 2008, p. 107), 
Zygmunt Bauman’s criticism of Foucault in his 1998 essay Liquid Modernity largely 
ignores the fact that Foucault himself had already moved to a position very similar 
to Bauman’s (Bauman, 1998, p. 22). As many in the “surveillance studies” literature 
have pointed out, the current practices of surveillance in the European Union are 
not about a territorializing, spatially fixing dystopia of generalized control – as it 
could have been potentially in the discipline rationality of government, pushed to its 
extreme in the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century– it is about governing through 
freedom and circulation, in a way in which the management of the unwanted never 
hinders the principle of movement. The analysis of contemporary practices of security 
in Europe is therefore not so much the analysis of borders and frontiers as devices 
aimed at stopping mobility or fixing populations, but as devices through which 
unwanted, marginalized and abnormalized mobilites are to be overseen, traced and 
computed (Bigo, 2008). The focus of the analysis should therefore be on the following 
areas, drawing on the work that has already been undertaken in these directions: first, 
the modalities and the technologies through which the “normal” form of mobility is 
constituted in opposition to the “abnormal” one (profiling, risk assessment) (Aradau 
and Van Munster, 2007; Bigo, 2008; Bonditti, 2004); second, the points through 
which these technologies are deployed (points of entry and exit, “zones” of the border 
not necessarily located at the geographical border, etc.) (Cuttitta, 2007; Salter, 2007); 
third, the modalities and technologies through which the “abnormal” is identified 
(identification cards, biometric passports) (Salter, 2004; Torpey, 2000b), fourth, the 
modalities and technologies through which the “abnormal” is followed, traced and 
surveilled (Bonditti, 2004, 2008; Salter, 2008). 
This theoretical stance overturns the traditional idea of balance between freedom 
and security. Security is the by-product of the reframing of the limits of liberties. 
And it is central to ask why if we have security studies, and even critical security 
84     the others in europe
studies, International relations for the moment lack an analysis of freedom and its 
contemporary reconfigurations; freedom of movement reframed as speed of movement 
under control, freedom not of individuals, but of a collective group, to which is 
assigned a core “identity” recognised as the embodiment of the nation, freedom as 
essentialisation of a democratic state that cannot have illiberal practices, freedom as a 
form of protection against other ideas and practices, and freedom to deliver as a forced 
education and a tutelage for all the non free men (Bigo, 1996, 2005, 2006b; Bigo and 
Carrera, 2010).
	 Border	management	practices	in	the	EU
Notwithstanding the fact that the European field of security professionals is not 
homogeneous, EU security agencies and services share a certain number of orientations, 
a doxa or common sense, particularly when discussions about “EU borders” are 
involved. They tend to focus not so much on borders as a “line of defence” (which is 
the traditional narrative of the military), but on “the targeted control of populations and 
the tracing of individuals” (Bigo et al., 2008, p. 7). They also share a focus on global, 
regional or transnational (in)security, as opposed to local manifestations of violence, 
and a reliance on technical and technological solutions as opposed to diplomatic or 
political ones (Ibid.). Accordingly, the question of “informational prerogatives”, of 
access (direct or indirect) to, and ownership of, databases, has emerged as a crucial 
stake in the European field of security professionals (Ibid., p 8). In this regard, 
previous research has highlighted the growing centrality of intelligence-led rationales 
and profiling in the practices of EU security professionals. Concomitantly, then, the 
policing of EU borders, both internally and externally has turned into one of the most 
important sites for the current transformation of security practices, and the study 
thereof (Basaran, 2010).
What is at stake in discussions about EU borders among security professionals, 
then, is less the enforcement of a territorial “line of defence” than the surveillance of 
populations and individuals on the move (Bigo and Guild, 2005). While EU borders 
remain important in the discourses of professionals of politics, the actual checks and 
surveillance related to border management happen both “inside” the EU, at major 
airports and train stations as well as in random border police and customs controls (e.g. 
Faure Atger, 2008), and “outside”, through assistance projects and joint operations 
between the Union and third countries, as well as in the consular offices in charge of 
delivering visas, and so forth (Bigo and Guild, 2003, 2005). This “de-differentiation” 
of internal and external security (Bigo, 2006a) also comprises a temporal dimension: 
the objective claimed by EU as well as Member State security agencies and services 
is to anticipate on potentially threatening developments, to act on them before they 
actually happen (Bigo et al., 2010). Technologies, particularly databases as well as 
systems of data-mining, data-surveillance, and automated analysis, have become in 
this respect a particular stake.
A striking illustration of these processes is provided by the setting-up and 
subsequent as well as envisaged evolutions, of the Frontex agency. Frontex was 
set-up as a Community body, with the key objective of coordinating operational 
cooperation between the border guard agencies and services of EU Member States 
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(Carrera, 2007, 2010; Jorry, 2007). While its formal competence lies with EU borders, 
almost all of the agency’s activities in its now four years of existence have dealt 
with the regulation of mobility, and particularly with the control and surveillance 
of immigration. Furthermore, Frontex has been significantly involved in the issue 
of border surveillance technologies, with the publication of two feasibility studies 
(MEDSEA and particularly BORTEC  3) on the technological monitoring and 
surveillance of the EU’s so-called “southern maritime borders”, and the realisation 
of a study on automated border crossing systems in airports (FRONTEX, 2007). 
Additionally, Frontex officials have been very keen on highlighting the importance of 
intelligence, information exchanges, and risk analysis in the management of borders, 
and the role that their agency could and should play in this process.
This focus has been made obvious in the “border package”, consisting of three 
communications and their accompanying documents, tabled in February 2008 by the 
European Commission (European Commission, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e). 
The first two communications (European Commission, 2008a, 2008d) lay down 
proposals for developing the role and competences of Frontex, while the third one, 
on “Preparing the next steps in border management in the EU” contains in particular 
suggestions for the establishment of an EU “entry/exit” system for individuals 
subject to visa-requirements for entering the EU, of an electronic system of travel 
authorisation for individuals benefiting from visa-waiver programs, together with a 
possible automated border crossing system for EU citizens. The envisaged evolutions 
concerning Frontex comprise in particular the establishment of a European border 
surveillance system (Eurosur), which would, at its latest stage, combine existing 
national surveillance and maritime monitoring systems into a “system of systems” 
(sometimes dubbed FIS or “Frontex information system”), of which Frontex would 
be the main coordinator. Eurosur, as presented in the communication, would allow 
for the handling and exchanging in real time of information from a wide range of 
sources, including personal data, with the aim of establishing a so-called “pre-frontier 
intelligence picture” (For further elements, see Jeandesboz, 2008). The communication 
on the “next step in border management in the EU”, in this respect, would also entail 
the creation of a new database, as well as the interconnection of existing or upcoming 
information systems (potentially SIS-II and VIS), and the systematic collection of 
personal biometric data of all individuals travelling to and within the EU (For further 
elements, see Guild et al., 2008; Guild 2010).
These proposals are heavily reliant on technology: information exchange and 
surveillance devices, on the one hand, including in the case of Eurosur new types of 
sensors, satellite monitoring and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and on advanced 
biometrics as well as automated border checks systems, on the other hand, for the 
“entry/exit system” like the European Entry and Exit system Project cat copying the 
ESTA of the US. They also highlight the change in security practices, at the heart of 
the EU developments, i.e. the increased reliance on “intelligence-led” surveillance, 
3 These two documents are not publicly available in full. See Council of the European 
Union (2006) for the declassified elements of MEDSEA, and Annex 7 of European Commission 
(2008e) for a declassified summary of BORTEC.
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risk management, and profiling, which stand as core challenges for envisaging and 
understanding the ethical and political implications of security technologies.
	 Ethical	and	political	implications	of	security	technologies	in	Europe
Security technologies have evolved into a major stake for EU policy-makers. 
However, their ethical and political implications have hardly attracted as much attention 
as their development and deployment. This, as we will develop, is problematic in 
the sense that the current evolution of security technologies has participated in the 
transformation of security practices, with an emphasis on proactivity, profiling and 
prevention, which threatens to render obsolete the existing provisions for the safety of 
the individual as regards the practices of security agencies and services (Bigo, 2007).
In the activities analysed previously, two main threads of justification are visible 
as regards the recourse to and investment in security technologies. Firstly, it is 
presented as a necessity in a context characterised by “new threats” which are deemed 
unpredictable and less visible. Security technologies, and particularly ICT, are 
claimed to provide predictability in a context of fluid insecurity, not only to enhance 
the reactivity of security agencies and services, but also to allow for the anticipation 
of insecurities and their countering even before they are actualised. Secondly, the 
support to the development of such technologies, particularly in the private sector, is 
framed as an economic necessity, as a contribution to the maintenance of an industrial 
basis in the EU and to the goal of establishing a thriving “knowledge-based economy” 
(in the words of the Lisbon agenda). In the process, however, very little attention is 
paid to the ethical and political implications of the development and use of security 
technologies.
This is due to the fact that the dominant argument on the implications of security 
technologies and their use for individual freedoms and rights is the idea that there is a 
“right to security”, and that steps taken in the field of security technologies are justified 
because they will ultimately contribute to the protection of EU citizens. Underpinning 
this point is the notion that security can be equated to other fundamental freedoms and 
rights, and that in the name of a “right to security”, the latter can be encroached upon 
should the circumstances prove necessary.
We do not claim, however, that fundamental freedoms and rights are never taken 
into account in discussions about security technologies. But the perspective under 
which they are considered is biased. The final report of the ESSTRT consortium  4, 
one of the projects funded under the European Commission security research funding 
program PASR, is illuminating in this respect. The report notes, quite soundly, that: 
“Technology can help considerably in the fight against terrorism (...) Legal and 
ethical considerations are, however, important. Some technologies arouse concerns 
about invasion of privacy; reliability – the risk that people could be wrongly identified 
as security threats; social exclusion; damage to humans and the environment; and 
difficulties of regulation” (ESSTRT, 2006, p. 20-21). 
4 The ESSTRT consortium is a project funded by the European Commission under the 
PASR 2004 Programme. It is composed of Thales Research and Technology (TRT), UK and 
Thales e-Security (TeS), UK; the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), UK, and 
the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), Finland.
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At the same time, however, these concerns are framed in the logic of the 
“balance” between liberty and security highlighted previously: “Achieving the right 
balance between civil rights and security is challenging. A broad democratic debate 
on threats and responses offers the best guarantee that tougher security measures and 
enhanced powers conferred upon intelligence services and police forces have public 
consent” (ESSTRT, 2006, p. 20). But, for the report, “[a]nother factor to be taken into 
consideration is the relative efficiency of technologies. For example, facial recognition 
systems at present are very unreliable” (ESSTRT, 2006, p. 20).
Several points need to be discussed in the light of these comments. While 
democratic debates on European security policies and their implications for the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals are certainly necessary, they are 
by no means sufficient, for some of the contemporary practices that are related to 
the technological management of insecurities fall beyond the scope of democratic 
investigation and scrutiny. Furthermore, the dominant viewpoint, as asserted in the 
ESSTRT report, frames the issue of privacy in terms of a choice between effective 
intrusiveness and non-intrusive inefficiency. The underlying assumption is that 
intrusiveness is a requirement for efficiency, and that privacy undermines efficiency 
(and thus enhances potential insecurities). Finally, the report favours the notion of 
“privacy-neutral” prospects, over the possibility of “privacy-enhancing” ones (which 
are however mentioned previously). Such a perspective by all means impoverishes 
the scope of discussions related to the ethical and political assumptions and effects of 
security technologies. In the logic of the ESSTRT report (among others), technological 
devices are then considered as mere add-ups to existing practices, as technical fixes to 
a particular practical problem.
Discussions framing the ethics and politics of security technologies in terms 
of efficiency shadow the transformations that the availability of such technologies 
has sustained in the management of insecurities. Indeed, in a historical perspective, 
there is for instance nothing really new about the use of biometrics as means of 
identification: dactylographic and photographic technologies have been in use for 
surveillance purposes ever since the end of the 19th century (Mattelart, 2007). The 
same holds true for documents such as identity cards (Piazza, 2004) or passports 
(Torpey, 2000a), which have been central to the state’s “embrace” (in the words of 
Torpey) of individuals, its monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement, and 
indeed its very construction. Scholars, however, have noted how the use of security 
technologies, particularly ICT, has transformed the legitimisation, meaning, practices, 
and implications of security and surveillance, by endorsing a shift from a logic of 
protection and reassurance to a logic of “risk management” (Amoore and De Goede, 
2005; Araday et al., 2008; Beck, 2002; Bigo, 2007).
The notion of risk and logic of risk management are not specifically associated 
with security in the first place. Risk, in the argument of Beck (1997), is associated 
with the evolution of modern societies: 
“‘Risk’ inherently contains the concept of control. Pre-modern dangers were 
attributed to nature, gods and demons. Risk is a modern concept. It presumes decision-
making. As soon as we speak in terms of ‘risk’, we are talking about calculating the 
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incalculable, colonizing the future” (Beck, 2002, p. 40; see also Ewald, 1986, with the 
notion of “insurance states”). 
What constitutes a risk and how it should be controlled, of course, is socially 
constructed, and subject to evolutions (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). Hence, 
while the notion of risk in economics for instance, is considered a positive dynamic, 
associated with the notion of trust, in the context of security practices and policies 
aiming at countering terrorism and other alleged “threats”, risk has come to take 
another meaning: 
“The perception of terrorist threats replaces active trust with active mistrust. It 
therefore undermines the trust in fellow citizens, foreigners and governments all over 
the world. Since the dissolution of trust multiplies risks, the terrorist threat triggers 
a self-multiplication of risks by the de-bounding of risk perceptions and fantasies” 
(Beck, 2002, p. 44, original emphasis)”.
In the shift of security practices towards risk management, another element of 
the dominant standpoint on security technologies is made evident: security and the 
“right to security” of EU citizens are reliant on anticipation. As such, the possibility 
to be seen as doing something becomes tied to the capacity of security professionals 
to claim that, much like the “precog” mutants of Philip K. Dick in his Minority 
Report novel, they can “see the future” (Ragazzi, 2004). The constitutive factors 
of this claim at anticipation, and the underlying assumption about the capacities 
of technologies harnessed in contemporary security practices, are the notions of 
proactivity, profiling and prevention (previous and following suggestions drawn from 
Bigo, 2007). Proactivity involves the activity of following the traces, in particular the 
electronic ones, left by individuals and/or groups which are the target of surveillance: 
proactivity can be territorially focused but most often concentrates on populations 
and movements of populations. Profiling constitutes the technique through which 
the data gathered through surveillance is integrated in a pre-determined analytical 
framework (e.g. the EU’s “Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model”, CIRAM – see 
Carrera, 2007), which is expected to produce an image of the present but also to 
build scenarios of future trends (so-called “risk analyses” or “threat assessments”): 
profiling as a policing technique takes security practices beyond the realm of criminal 
justice, where it is the past which is investigated, towards the prediction of the future. 
Prevention, finally, stands as the ultimate goal of proactivity and profiling: “[T]he 
idea is not to recover from an event or to respond to it, or even to be protected from 
it by previous measures, but to assess a future threat and to prevent the event from 
happening” (Bigo, 2007, p. 11).
The proactivity/profiling/prevention framework is highly dependent upon 
technology, in its concrete operations, but even more stringently as part of its symbolic 
economy. In order to ground the claim that they can know the future, security 
professionals must justify that they have access to knowledge that others do not 
have, such as secured databases, personal data including details about one’s private 
life or biometric information. They must also claim a specific know-how (profiling 
techniques, risk analysis) which is not readily available, but which is also reliant on 
technological devices (e.g. data-mining, data-integration or analysis software). In 
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this respect, furthermore, access to sophisticated technology becomes a major asset, 
since they are considered as a means to know more. This knowledge imperative, 
finally, leads to a significant growth in the number of actors involved in security 
practices. The surveillance practices of banks, credit card and insurance companies, 
are increasingly harnessed for security purposes (e.g. for the “fight against terrorist 
financing” – Amoore and De Goede, 2005), also making possible the outsourcing of 
“dataveillance” to private companies.
While technologies such as advanced biometric identifiers and sensors or systems 
of information exchanges are not the main reason for the contemporary transformations 
of security practices, then, their availability, correlated with the evolution of the doxa 
of security professionals towards an anticipative stance, becomes a key stake. The 
combination of a claim to know the future, and an increased capacity to scrutinise 
and render individuals more “transparent” to the overview of security professionals, 
particularly, is a cause for concern. Due to these transformations, the landscape of 
relations between liberty and security is changing rapidly: the available modalities for 
making individuals more transparent to security practices are evolving rapidly, raising 
questions of reliability (e.g. in the case of face-recognition devices), of privacy, but 
also of social justice (Bigo et al., 2010). 
One major change is what Beck calls “active mistrust”, where individuals are 
intrinsically considered as potential perpetrators, and thus subject to categorisations 
which, since they rest on predetermined models, are prone to failures: the problem, 
here, lies with the effect of such practices on the presumption of innocence. Another 
element is that the proactivity, profiling and prevention framework is underpinned by 
the assumption that by knowing more, better anticipation is possible. Such a stance 
leads to a vicious circle: it is impossible to know everything about everybody, but 
attempts at doing so potentially trigger an endless expansion of the scope and volume 
of the information that is gathered. Here the issue is clearly privacy, and the capacity 
of individuals to know of the kind of data that is being collected, by whom, and 
when. Furthermore, in this context, some individuals and groups, because they are 
particularly emphasised in analytical models, become more exposed to surveillance 
and its possible consequences. The issue, in this respect, is social justice and the fact 
that individuals and groups who are already vulnerable become even more so.

chapter vi
Reasonable accommodation of religious 
diversity in Europe and in Belgium:  
Law and practice 
Emmanuelle Bribosia, Andrea Rea, Julie Ringelheim and Isabelle Rorive
The religious landscape in Europe has been considerably diversified as a result of 
post-colonial immigration. This has had an important impact on the evolution of the 
relationship between state and religious communities in European countries. However, 
pluralisation of religious practice also has implications for other areas of social life 
and legal regulation including first and foremost, labour relations. In particular, in 
most countries the organisation of labour has to a certain extent, albeit implicitly, 
traditionally taken the specificities of the dominant religion into account. This is 
epitomized in the choice of non-working days which usually reflect the holidays of 
the majority religion. What happens when workers following a minority religion ask 
for adaptations in regulations enabling them to practice their faith? How do employers 
react to such demands? And what does the law require in such case? 
In United States and Canada law, these issues have long been dealt with under 
the notion of “reasonable accommodation” (Bribosia, Ringelheim and Rorive, 2009 
and 2010). This concept first appeared in US law in 1972 when Congress modified 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which prohibits discrimination based on religion 
and adds a duty for private or public employers “to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business” (§ 701 (j); Oleske, 2004, p. 
532). As a result of this provision, employers have been required, for instance, to 
provide exceptions to clothing rules, changes in working hours which do not entail the 
payment of overtime or the infringement of other employees’ rights, and authorisation 
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of selected absences for religious festivals (Engle, 1997, p. 387-406; Rosenzweig, 
1996, p. 2517-2522; Eisgruber and Sager, 2007, p. 87-108)  1. 
However, the concept of reasonable accommodation has been most developed 
in Canada. Introduced in the 1980s by courts specialised in the interpretation of the 
Canadian Human Rights Act  2, the concept was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 
Ontario Human Rights Commission (O’Malley) v. Simpson-Sears Limited, decided 
in 1985 (see Woehrling, 1998, p. 329; Bosset, 2007, p. 3-28). Drawing on principles 
of equality and non-discrimination, the Supreme Court ruled that employers have a 
duty of reasonable accommodation. Constructed as a corollary to the prohibition of 
discrimination, and especially indirect discrimination, the obligation of reasonable 
accommodation means that the author of a provision or policy, which de facto 
disadvantages an individual on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination, 
must use all reasonable means to adapt the provision or policy to the special needs of 
that individual so as to protect him/her from its discriminatory effects. Importantly, 
the obligation does not only concern religion. Any kind of discrimination may 
potentially give rise to a duty to accommodate (Bosset, 2007, p. 13-14)  3. In the 
US, by contrast, the duty of reasonable accommodation has only been extended to 
disabilities  4. In US law, as in Canadian law, the obligation to accommodate has a 
limit. The accommodation must be “reasonable”. It cannot impose a disproportionate 
burden – an “undue hardship” –, on the person bearing that burden, whether it be an 
employer, any other private economical actor or a public authority (Bosset, 2007, p. 
10). According to the Canadian Supreme Court, the “reasonable” or “unreasonable” 
character of an accommodation must be assessed within the context of each case and 
with flexibility, taking into account such factors as the limited financial resources of 
the organisation, impairment of third party rights and the efficiency of the company or 
the institution (Brunelle, 2001, p. 248-251). 
In Canada, reasonable accommodation granted for religious reasons has to some 
extent become an instrument for negotiating cultural and religious plurality. In this 
regard, it is part and parcel of the Canadian notion of multiculturalism and Quebec’s 
concept of interculturalism (Crépeau and Atak, 2007). This was precisely the view 
1 Besides anti-discrimination legislation, a lively debate exists in American constitutional 
theory on whether federal and state legislators have a duty of accommodation which can be 
derived from the right to the freedom of religion as established by the First Amendment of the 
United States’ Constitution, the so-called Free Exercise Clause. See Greenawalt, 2006, p. 15 
and Novit Evans, 1997, p. 204-227. 
2 These are laws enacted at the provincial or federal level whose main aim is to combat 
discrimination based on certain grounds and whose implementation is guaranteed by specialised 
institutions created for that purpose. As opposed to the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms of 1982, these laws impose obligations on both public authorities and “horizontally” 
between private parties. 
3 As regards religion, the duty of reasonable accommodation may have another basis 
than non-discrimination. Canadian judges have inferred a similar obligation from the right 
to religious freedom as established by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (Article 3) (Woehrling, 1998, 369 ff; 
Woehrling, 2006a, 12 ff).
4 Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
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taken by the Advisory Commission on the practices of accommodation relating to 
cultural differences created by Quebec’s prime minister in 2007 in response to the 
controversy arising in the province of Quebec after some instances of formal or 
informal accommodations generated tremendous media attention (Bouchard and 
Taylor, 2008, p. 53-58; Gaudreault-Desbiens, 2009, p. 151-175). After a year of 
research and consultation, the “Bouchard-Taylor Commission”, sharing the names of 
its two presidents, historian and sociologist Gérard Bouchard and philosopher Charles 
Taylor, concluded that, contrary to what certain media suggested, there had been no 
sudden increase in demands for adjustment or accommodation and that all in all, such 
demands were managed efficiently by public institutions. Interestingly, the Bouchard-
Taylor report highlights that, aside from a small number of accommodations imposed 
by court, a wide range of adjustments were negotiated amicably by public or private 
actors. The report thus proposes to limit the phrase “reasonable accommodations” to 
accommodations obtained through legal means and to distinguish them from what it 
terms “concerted adjustments”, meaning accommodations arising and handled outside 
the courts, regardless of whether there is, legally speaking, a duty to accommodate 
(Bouchard and Taylor, 2008, p. 64-65). Taken together, these accommodations practices 
assume various shapes. They may consist in a mere exemption from the application 
of an indirectly discriminatory rule (i.e. the decision of the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police to exempt Sikhs willing to serve in its ranks from the obligation to wear the 
traditional Stetson hat  5) or in the creation of a special regime (i.e. in the famous 
Multani case, a Sikh pupil was allowed to wear the traditional dagger or kirpan at 
school, provided that it be worn under his clothes; that it be carried in a sheath made of 
wood; and that it be wrapped and sewn securely in a sturdy cloth envelope, to prevent 
any risk of it causing injury  6). An accommodation may also consist of the provision 
of infrastructures or of particular services in favour of those affected, such as specific 
meals in hospitals or prisons. The focus on contextualisation leads to a large variety 
of accommodations which are, most of the time, identified on a case-by-case basis. 
What is the relevance of these developments for the European context? So 
far, no legal instrument adopted at the European level has expressly recognised a 
duty of reasonable accommodation for religious reasons. This however does not 
mean that there is no room for this concept in European countries. First, following 
the Canadian example, the question may be raised as to whether an obligation for 
reasonable accommodation could be drawn from the general prohibition of indirect 
discrimination based on religion. Such prohibition is enshrined in both the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Union (EU) Employment 
Equality Directive, passed in 2000  7. Another potential source for such a duty would 
be the right to freedom of religion, as guaranteed in Article 9 ECHR. Second, at the 
national level, one may identify isolated instances of adaptations of general rules 
granted by law to take into account special needs of certain religious minorities. 
5 Grant v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 1 F.C. 158. 
6 Canadian Supreme Court, Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeois, 
[2006] 256 and Woehrling, 2006b, footnote 45.
7 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Framework 
for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation (OJ 2000 L 303/16).
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Moreover, in practice, employers across Europe face demands from employees 
belonging to minority faiths to accommodate their religious specificities, which they 
must deal with in one way or another. 
Against this background, this article seeks to consider the relevance of the 
concept of reasonable accommodation as a device for handling religious plurality 
in European labour relations. The first part discusses the state of European law as to 
whether a legal duty to provide accommodation for religious reasons may be derived 
from antidiscrimination and/or religious freedom norms. It considers both EU law 
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The second part uses Belgium 
as a case-study to explore national laws and policies regarding accommodation 
of minority religious practices. First, we emphasise that whereas Belgian law, 
like the law of most other EU countries, does not expressly recognise any right to 
reasonable accommodation for religious reasons, some instances of adaptation of 
general legislation already exist which take the special needs of religious minorities 
into account. Second, we trace the emergence of the concept of “reasonable 
accommodation” in the Belgian public debate. Third, taking a sociological approach, 
we enquire as to what sorts of adjustments are de facto asked for in the employment 
sector and how employers cope with such demands. Here, we highlight that despite 
the absence of any clear right to reasonable accommodation, informal practices of 
negotiated accommodation or, in the words of the Bouchard-Taylor report, “concerted 
adjustments”, can be observed in various employment settings. 
	 Reasonable	accommodation	in	Europe:	The	legal	framework  8
European law, at present, does not expressly provide for a right to reasonable 
accommodation for religious reasons. Yet, arguably, such a right could be derived 
from existing provisions on antidiscrimination and religious freedom, either from 
the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights or from the 
2000 EU Employment Equality Directive, which prohibits both direct and indirect 
discrimination based on religion.
 European Court of Human Rights case law
ECHR institutions have frequently had to deal with cases whereby a demand 
similar to a request for reasonable accommodation for religious reasons was at stake 
(Evans, 2001, p. 168-199; Stavros, 1997, p. 607-627 and Ringelheim, 2006, p. 167-
169 and p. 323-338). In the context of Article 9 (freedom of religion), this concept 
could a priori find support in the criterion of proportionality which determines the 
compatibility of a measure impairing freedom of religion with the Convention. Article 
9 (2) provides that a restriction on religious freedom is only permitted if it is prescribed 
by law and is necessary in a democratic society to achieve one of the legitimate aims 
listed in the same provision. The concept of “necessary in a democratic society” has 
been interpreted by the Court as implying the requirement of proportionality between 
the means used and the envisaged ends. In a number of cases, the Court has held 
8 This part of the paper is a revised version of Part II of Bribosia, Ringelheim and Rorive, 
2010.
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that the proportional character of a measure entails that amongst the various means 
of achieving a certain end the authorities should opt for those least impairing rights 
and freedoms (Van Drooghenbroeck, 2001, p. 190-219). Accordingly, the case can be 
made that if a provision, which is justified by a legitimate objective, infringes upon 
the religious freedom of certain individuals and that an accommodation would allow 
avoidance of such an impairment without at the same time compromising the intended 
aim, this second solution should be favoured as it represents the least restrictive 
solution to achieve the objective. 
Yet, the Court and the Commission refused to follow that path when interpreting 
Article 9. An example of that position is the decision of the former European 
Commission of Human Rights, dated 12 July 1978, rejecting the application of a 
British citizen of Sikh religion claiming that the law requiring the use of a helmet to 
drive a motorcycle impaired his religious freedom because he was thereby compelled 
to remove his turban. The Commission simply holds that the measure has a legitimate 
aim with respect to Article 9 (2), namely the protection of health  9, and did not find it 
useful to proceed with a proportionality analysis to see whether an alternative measure 
guaranteeing the protection of health while allowing the Sikhs to conform to their 
religious practice was available. 
There have also been a number of complaints to the Commission by employees 
concerning their leaves of absence. In the famous case X. v. United Kingdom decided 
in 1981  10, a primary school teacher in a London public school complained against the 
refusal by the school authorities to accommodate his working hours so as to allow 
him to take 45 minutes off at the beginning of the afternoon on Fridays to go pray 
at the Mosque. While the Commission admits that Article 9 may entail for the State 
“positive obligations inherent in an effective “respect” for the individual’s freedom 
of religion” (§ 3), it nonetheless holds that the facts before it did not reveal any 
interference with the applicant’s freedom of religion. In the eyes of the Commission 
the decisive element was that: 
“[the applicant] of his own free will, accepted teaching obligations under his 
contract with ILEA [the Inner London Education Authority], and that it was a result of 
this contract that he found himself unable to work with the ILEA and to attend Friday 
prayers” (§ 9). 
This reasoning has been widely criticised by commentators for its formalism 
(Velaers and Foblets, 1997, p. 292-293; Evans, 2001, p. 130-131; Gunn, 1996, 
9 Eur. Comm. H.R., X. v. United Kingdom, 12 July 1978 (Appl. No. 7992/77), D.R. 14, 
p. 234. An older decision, dated 5 March 1976, concerned the application by a Jewish prisoner, 
who complained that he did not have access to kosher food and that no Jewish service was held 
in prison. Here, the Commission judged that the demand was unfounded because the prisoner 
had received kosher food, had had contacts with a secular Jewish visitor and the initiatives 
by the authorities had been approved by the Grand Rabbi. Hence, the authorities “had done 
everything possible to respect the applicant’s beliefs” (Eur. Comm. H. R., X. v. United Kingdom, 
5 March 1976 (Appl. No. 5947/1976), D.R. 5, p. 8).
10 Eur. Comm. H.R., X. v. United Kingdom, 12 March 1981 (Appl. No. 8160/78), D.R. 22, 
p. 27.
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p. 312). By deeming that the teacher’s freedom of religion had not been impaired, 
the Commission was able to dodge the determination of whether such a measure 
is necessary in a democratic society. A similar determination would have meant 
verifying whether the authorities had legitimate motive to refuse accommodating 
the applicant’s work hours to avoid the conflict with his freedom of religion, for 
instance because such an accommodation would have led to an infringement of other 
individuals’ rights or because it would have excessively upset the functioning of the 
school. The Commission also rejected the complaint based on the violation of Article 
14 (non-discrimination clause). The applicant argued that as opposed to Muslims, 
Christian workers had no difficulty to reconcile their professional obligations with 
the practice of their religion since the dates of official holidays overlap with the main 
Christian festivals. The Commission only observed that “in most countries, only the 
religious holidays of the majority of the population are celebrated as public holidays” 
(§ 28) Thus, the Commission seems to acknowledge, if implicitly, that the challenged 
regulation has a different impact on an individual’s freedom of religion depending 
on whether one belongs to the majority religion or to a minority one. However, the 
Commission did not find it helpful to question the legitimacy of this difference or 
to ponder the possibility of putting accommodations in place which might mitigate 
the discrimination suffered by adherers of a minority religion simply because this 
situation seemed totally “natural” for the simple reason that it corresponded to the 
norm established in numerous countries. 
In this respect, the Grand Chamber decision Thlimmenos v. Greece, dated 6 
April 2000, marks a turning point in the Court’s jurisprudence on the basis of 
Article 14. Until then, the Court had held that the principle of non-discrimination 
enshrined in Article 14 only prohibited the State from treating people who were in 
analogous situations differently without any objective and reasonable justification. 
In Thlimmenos, the Court recognises for the first time that the non-discrimination 
principle has another facet: it also prohibits the State from failing to “treat differently 
persons whose situations are significantly different” without an objective and 
reasonable justification  11. The applicant, a Jehovah’s Witness, contended that, in spite 
of having successfully passed the relevant exam, the Greek authorities had refused to 
appoint him to a chartered accountant’s post, on the grounds that he had been convicted 
of a serious crime five years earlier for having refused to do military service due to 
religious reasons. The authorities justified their decision because of existing legislation 
prohibiting any person convicted of a crime to become a chartered accountant. While 
acknowledging that such legislation pursues a legitimate objective, namely to prevent 
dishonest or untrustworthy people from this profession, the Court declared that, as 
applied to Mr Thlimennos, it lacked any pertinent and reasonable justification. His 
conviction for being a conscientious objector is considerably different from that of 
other convicted criminals because his motivations do not “imply any dishonesty or 
moral turpitude likely to undermine the offender’s ability to exercise this profession” 
(§ 47). Nevertheless, Greece replied that since the legislation had general application 
Mr Thlimmenos could not be exempted. But the Court rejected this argument: it is “by 
11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber), Thlimmenos v. Greece, 6 April 2000, § 44.
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failing to introduce appropriate exceptions to the rule barring persons convicted of a 
serious crime from the profession of chartered accountants” (§ 48)  12 that the Greek 
State violated the applicant’s right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of 
his religion. 
Thus, the Thlimmenos decision establishes two principles. First, the rule of non-
discrimination enshrined in Article 14 of the Convention is violated when a State 
does not treat differently persons whose situations are different without objective and 
reasonable justification. Then, in order to avoid such discrimination, the State can be 
asked to modify a general rule, if necessary by establishing appropriate exceptions. 
Even though these terms are not explicitly used, this second principle can be compared 
to the duty of reasonable accommodation (Arnardottir, 2003, p. 101; De Schutter, 
2005, p. 53). 
Since Thlimmenos, however, the Court has not added new applications of this second 
consequence of the non-discrimination principle in relation to freedom of religion, 
even though it recognised and developed the notion of indirect discrimination  13. A 
number of decisions even seem to step back from this jurisprudence. Thus, in Kosteski 
v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, dated 13 April 2006, the Court seems 
to adhere to the precedents established by the Commission in matters concerning 
leaves of absence  14. The El Morsli v. France decision of 4 March 2008, also based 
solely on Article 9, further illustrates the reluctance of the Court to infer a right to 
reasonable accommodation from freedom of religion. Here the Court declares the 
application of a Muslim woman inadmissible. This woman complained that she was 
denied access to the French Consulate in Marrakech when trying to deposit her French 
visa application in order to be able to reunite with her husband in France because 
she refused to remove her headscarf for an identity control. The applicant held that 
she had been willing to remove her headscarf in the presence of a female agent and 
that she could thus have been identified. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that regardless, 
refusal to provide a female agent for Mrs El Morsli’s identification did not exceed the 
State’s margin of appreciation in matters of security controls. 
The argument of respect for the national margin of discretion is also put forward 
by the Court to dismiss the issue of reasonable accommodation in six decisions dated 
12 Our emphasis.
13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber), D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic, 2007.
14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (3rd Chamber), Kosteski v. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
2006, § 37. In fact, the laws of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia allow employees of 
Muslim faith to take leaves of absence for recognised Muslim festivals, whereas the Christian 
festivals, Christmas and Easter, are declared official holidays for all citizens. If the applicant 
had received disciplinary sanctions for not coming to work during Muslim festivals, it was 
because the employers doubted his being Muslim. They accused him of abusing the right to take 
leaves of absence during those specific dates granted to the believers of that religion. However, 
the Court after reminding the abovementioned case law by the Commission used this occasion 
to declare that it was not persuaded that the sanction against an employee who had taken off 
to celebrate a religious festivity could be considered an impairment of his freedom of religion.
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30 June 2009  15 concerning the exclusion of Muslim or Sikh students from high 
schools in France pursuant to the application of the 2004 Act prohibiting the wearing 
of ostentatious religious signs in public schools  16. Some students affected by the 
measure proposed an alternative solution so as to be able to keep attending school, 
namely to wear a cap or a bandana instead of the headscarf or a keski instead of the 
Sikh turban. These signs they argued were discrete and had no religious connotation. 
The Court held that since the prohibition contained in the 2004 French Act does not 
violate the Convention’s Article 9, it is the State’s discretion to determine whether the 
alternatives suggested by the students are “ostentatious” religious signs. 
Yet the logic of reasonable accommodation has re-emerged in the Court’s case-law 
on Article 14 in the context of disability. In Glor v. Switzerland (2009), the applicant, 
a diabetic, complained that he had been declared unfit for military service and ordered 
to pay a military-exemption tax because he was only afflicted with a minor disability 
(diabetes), while persons suffering from a major disability were not subject to this 
tax. The Court here insists that a measure which interferes with an individual’s rights 
can only be considered proportionate and necessary in a democratic society if no 
alternative measure, less invasive of the rights at stake, would enable the same end  17. 
In the case at hand, rather than forcing the applicant to pay the tax when he was 
actually willing to do his military service, it would have been possible to implement 
particular forms of military service or alternatives adapted to people in his situation. 
Hence it was possible to achieve the objective with a measure less impairing of the 
applicant’s rights (§ 95). Accordingly, the Court finds a breach of the right not to be 
discriminated against combined with the right to privacy.
This overview of the European Court of Human Right’s case law allows a 
nuanced conclusion. Whereas freedom of religion, as interpreted by the Court to this 
date, does not provide fertile grounds for the development of a duty of reasonable 
accommodation, the rule of non-discrimination established by Article 14 seems 
more promising. Indeed, since the Thlimmenos decision, the Court has, in principle, 
recognised that there can be discrimination when the State, without any reasonable 
and objective justification, refrains from adapting a general rule, if necessary by 
introducing exceptions, to avoid affording the same treatment to people who are 
differently situated where such treatment disadvantages people practicing a certain 
religion. 
15 These judgments were issued on 30 June 2009 by the Fifth Chamber of the Court: Aktas 
v. France, Ghazal v. France, Bayrak v. France and Gamaleddyn v. France (concerning the 
prohibition to wear the headscarf at school), Jasvir Singh v. France and Ranjit Singh v. France 
(concerning the prohibition to wear the Sikh turban). See also Eur. Ct. H.R. (5th Chamber), 
Dogru v. France (Appl. No. 27058/05) and Kervanci v. France (Appl. No. 31645/04), decisions 
of 4 December 2008, § 75. The facts at issue in these two cases arose before the 2004 Act 
prohibiting the wearing of ostentatious religious signs in public schools was adopted. It 
concerned two Muslim girls who had been expelled from school because they refused to take 
off their headscarf during sports classes but who had proposed to replace the headscarf with a 
cap.
16 Act No. 2004-228 of March 15, 2004, JO, No. 65, 17 March 2004, p. 5190.
17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1st section), Glor v. Switzerland, 30 April 2009, § 94. 
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 European Union antidiscrimination law 
The concept of reasonable accommodation is not unknown to European Union 
law. The 2000 “Employment Equality Directive”  18 which establishes a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation without discrimination 
based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, does lay down a duty 
to provide reasonable accommodation but only in favour of disabled people and in the 
employment sector. It could be extended, on behalf of the disabled, to the domains of 
social security, education, access to goods and services if the Commission’s proposal 
for a directive presented on 2 July 2008  19 is approved by the Council. 
In contrast, EU law does not recognise a duty of reasonable accommodation as 
such when religion or belief, instead of disability, is at stake. The question whether 
such a duty exists may nevertheless arise when deciding certain cases of indirect 
discrimination. Under EU law:
“[indirect discrimination] shall be taken to occur when an apparently neutral 
provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a particular religion or 
belief (...) at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons unless that 
provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the 
measure to achieve that aim are appropriate and necessary (...)” (Article 2 (2) (b) of 
the Employment Equality Directive).
Initially, this principle was established by the European Court of Justice to 
guarantee the effectiveness of the principle of equal pay between men and women  20. 
The concept of indirect discrimination is indeed based on a substantive view of equality; 
it acknowledges that an apparently neutral provision may have discriminatory effects 
towards a certain category of protected individuals. 
While directly discriminating against an individual on the grounds of religion 
is completely illegal, except, within certain limits, for “churches” and “ethos-
based organisations” (Article 4 (2) of the Employment Equality Directive), indirect 
discrimination based on religion can be justified by referring to the classical criteria 
framing the violation of a fundamental right, i.e. the legitimacy of the pursued objective 
and the proportionality between the means and the ends. Now, in proceeding with 
such a proportionality analysis, the issue of a possible reasonable accommodation 
may arise. Does a measure entailing a specific disadvantage for people of a certain 
religion, but pursuing a legitimate aim, pass the proportionality test if it can be shown 
that a reasonable accommodation would avoid the harm caused to these individuals? 
For instance, a regulation in a chemical laboratory may prohibit the wearing 
of any headdress and require the wearing of a special apron for security reasons. 
18 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Framework 
for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation (OJ 2000 L 303/16).
19 Articles 3 (Scope) and 4 (Equal treatment of persons with disabilities) of the Proposal 
for a Council Directive presented by the Commission on implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation 
(COM(2008) 426 final). 
20 See ECJ, Case C-96/80, Jenkins, 31 March 1981, (1981) ECR, 911 and ECJ, Case 
C-170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus, 13 May 1986, (1986) ECR, 1607.
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This “apparently neutral” regulation has the effect of placing Muslims wearing a 
headscarf at a disadvantage. While it undoubtedly pursues a legitimate objective, 
is it “appropriate” and “necessary” if the wearing of a fireproof headscarf would 
allow reconciling the security mandate with the practice of religion? In other words, 
when the possibility of a reasonable accommodation occurs, could it neutralize the 
justification of the indirect discrimination (Vickers, 2006, p. 20-22)?
The issue is delicate and the indications from the European Court of Justice’s case 
law are few. As of today, only the 1976 decision in Vivien Prais is directly relevant to 
the topic  21. Here, Ms Vivien Prais had presented her candidacy for an open competition 
organised by the Council of the European Communities to hire translators. Once she 
had been informed of the date on which the written test would take place, she notified 
the Council that this coincided with the first day of the Jewish holiday Shavuot, a date 
on which the religious commands prohibited her from travelling and writing. After 
her request to take part in the open competition at another date was rejected, she filed 
an action with the European Court of Justice claiming that this decision violated the 
clause in the Staff Regulations according to which candidates are chosen without 
distinction of race, religion or sex. While rejecting the claim, the Court acknowledged 
that it is “desirable that an appointing authority informs itself in a general way of dates 
which might be unsuitable for religious reasons, and seeks to avoid fixing such dates 
for tests” (§ 18). The Court also reiterated that a written test must be identical and 
take place under the same conditions for all candidates (§ 13). Hence, the appointing 
authority must not accommodate other dates for the test unless it has been notified 
before the other candidates have been invited. The Court seems to make implicit 
reference to the concept of reasonable accommodation: in order to avoid (indirect) 
discrimination, the European institutions must as much as possible accommodate the 
dates of the tests to religious observances. The concept of reasonable accommodation 
was therefore present between the lines in European law prior to the Employment 
Equality Directive and this in the context of religious discrimination. 
	 Reasonable	accommodation	in	Belgium
Until recently, the concept of reasonable accommodation for religious diversity 
was practically absent from Belgian discourse  22. Only in 2009 did it appear in the 
public debate as evidenced by the explicit reference to the concept in the latest annual 
report of July 2009 by the Centre pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte contre le 
racisme (the Centre for equal opportunities and the fight against racism, hereinafter, 
21 ECJ, Case C-130/75, Vivien Prais, 27 October 1976, (1976) ECR, 1589.
22 In the 2005 survey concerning the “active manifestation of religious or philosophical 
beliefs in the public sphere” commissioned by the Centre pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte 
contre le racisme, the term “accommodation” only appears every now and then. Moreover, 
no theoretical approach to the concept is proposed. Les expressions actives de convictions 
religieuses ou philosophiques dans la sphère publique. Situations – pratiques – gestions, 
March 2005 (under the supervision by Professors M.-C. Foblets and M. Martiniello), available 
at the Centre’s website at the following address: http://www.diversite.be/?action=publicatie_
detail&id=83&thema=2).
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the Centre or the CECLR)  23. Additional evidence can be found in the public debate 
on the subject in newspapers  24 and during conferences  25. The lively controversy 
generally opposes two groups of people and associations. On the one hand, there are 
those defending a narrow definition of secularism which often refers to the French 
concept of laïcité and the legal prohibition of the wearing of a headscarf in schools. 
On the other hand, there are those who are in favour of accepting the possibility of 
certain accommodations in the name of cultural diversity. At the same time the federal 
minister for equal opportunities, Joëlle Milquet, has inserted this topic into the five 
priorities of her equal opportunities’ programme  26.
Together with the debate opposing the Belgian political-linguistic communities 
(Flemish and Walloons) on federalism and Belgium’s future, the controversy 
concerning cultural and religious diversity causes a major stir in the Belgian political 
arena, including the political institutions themselves (Parliament, Senate, political 
parties, etc.) 
	 Specific	normative	recognitions
Under Belgian law, public or private institutions have no explicit general duty 
to grant reasonable accommodation on the basis of religion  27. Neither does such an 
obligation seem to be recognised in current case law. Interestingly though, Flemish 
authorities have adopted the definition of reasonable accommodation contained in 
the Employment Equality Directive without restricting its application to disability. 
Hence, this 2002 decree also applies inter alia to other grounds of discrimination, 
including religion  28. To our knowledge, however, this decree has not produced any 
23 Centre pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme, Annual Report 2008, 
Discrimination / Diversité, available at the Centre’s website at the following address: http://
www.diversite.be/?action=publicatie_detail&id=106&thema=2. On this subject see the 
developments infra.
24 Libre Belgique on 18 May 2009, op-ed entitled “‘Raisonnables’, les accommodements?” 
(“Are accommodations reasonable?”. This article seems to be attributable to the members of 
Rappel (Réseau d’actions pour la promotion d’un Etat laïque, the network of actions for the 
promotion of a secular state). See also the debate organised in Le Soir, on 20 and 21 May 2009, 
p. 20-21, on the topic “Faut-il accepter les particularismes?” (“Must one accept particularism?”).
25 One-day seminar organized on 22 May 2009 by “Bruxelles laïque” and the Centre 
Bruxellois d’action interculturelle on the topic “Accommodements raisonnables: une voie 
possible vers une laïcité interculturelle?” (Reasonable accommodations: a possible way towards 
an intercultural secularism?). For more details see the website of Bruxelles laïque (www.
bxllaique.be). One-day seminar Les nouveaux défis à la laïcité dans les sociétés à identités 
plurielles (The new challenges to secularism in societies with plural identities), organized the 6 
March 2010 by the association “La Morale Laïque”.
26 Intervention by the Minister during the conference “Actualité du droit de la non-
discrimination”, organized at the Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis de Bruxelles, on 19 May 
2009.
27 See in this sense, the above-mentioned Annual Report 2008 by the Centre on p. 60.
28 Article 5 (4) of the Decree dated 8 May 2002 concerning the proportional participation 
in the employment market (Décret du 8 mai 2002 relatif à la participation proportionnelle dans 
le marché du travail (MB, 26 July 2002), as modified on 9 March 2007 (MB, 6 April 2007)). 
The Decree dated 10 July 2008 establishing the framework of the Flemish policy for equal 
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formal application of that concept beyond the domain of disability. By not establishing 
any general right to reasonable accommodation, Belgium does not distinguish itself 
from other European Union Member States. One of the rare exceptions is Sweden 
where the employers’ obligation to adopt positive measures aiming at adapting the 
workplace for individuals belonging to specific ethnic and religious communities is 
sometimes presented as deriving from the necessity of reasonable accommodation 
(Bell, Chopin and Palmer, 2006, p. 41).
However, the novelty of the question of reasonable accommodation needs to 
be put into perspective as pertains to European law. An old debate in legal doctrine 
exists concerning religious objection (exception de conscience) to the execution of a 
contract and especially of employment contracts (Christians, forthcoming). Moreover, 
in various cases the legislator takes religious specificities into consideration. Under 
written Belgian law, the 1978 Act on employment contracts maintains a provision 
already existing under the Act of 10 March 1900 which imposes the obligation “to 
grant the employee the necessary time to fulfil his religious obligations as well as the 
civil obligations imposed by the law”  29 (Christians, forthcoming). More recently, as in 
other Member States, written Belgian law has introduced modalities in various sectors 
which de facto function like reasonable accommodations (Réseau UE d’experts 
indépendants en matière de droits fondamentaux, 2005, p. 35-37; Dassetto, Ferrari 
and Maréchal, 2007, p. 43-51 and p. 56-59). In order to grasp this evolution, it is 
necessary to look beyond employment and also take into account measures that have 
been adopted in other fields. Thus, as in most other European countries, Belgium has 
an exception to the general rule according to which animals can only be slaughtered 
after they have been dazed. This rule does not apply to slaughters prescribed by a 
religious ritual  30, provided that they are performed according to conditions established 
by royal decree. In particular, such slaughters can only be performed pursuant to 
the Jewish or Muslim ritual and by specialised butchers authorised by the Belgian 
representative organs of the Jewish religion (the Consistoire central israélite) and 
of the Muslim religion (the Exécutif des Musulmans)  31. In addition, since 2002, the 
general instructions for prisons guarantee inmates the possibility of obtaining meals 
which take their religious requirements into account “as long as they do not have to 
opportunity and equal treatment (Décret du 10 juillet 2008 portant le cadre de la politique 
flamande de l’égalité des chances et de traitement (MB, 23 September 2008) characterises the 
“refusal of reasonable accommodation for disabled people” as a discrimination (Article 19). 
This decree further establishes that in the employment context these provisions do not apply 
in those cases of discrimination described in the 2002 decree concerning a proportional 
participation in the employment market (Article 20 (2)). 
29 Article 20 (5) of the Act dated 3 July 1978 concerning employment contracts (Loi du 3 
juillet 1978 relative aux contrats de travail (MB, 22 August 1978)).
30 Article 16 (1) of the Federal Act dated 14 August 1986 relating to the protection and 
well-being of animals (Loi du 14 août 1986 relative à la protection et au bien-être des animaux, 
MB, 3 December 1986).
31 Article 2 (1) of the Royal Decree dated 11 February 1988 relating to certain slaughtering 
prescribed by a religious rite (Arrêté royal du 11 février 1988 relatif à certains abattages 
prescrits par un rite religieux, MB, 1 March 1988). 
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be prepared according to formal rituals”   32. Hence, Jewish or Muslim prisoners can 
obtain the same type of meals as those delivered to all other prisoners but without 
any pork. But they cannot demand prison authorities to provide kosher or halal meat, 
i.e. meat butchered according to the rites prescribed by their religion. However, they 
can receive meals prepared outside of the prison according to formal rituals if their 
religious community covers the additional costs. Moreover, prisoners can, at their 
request, receive their meal at times other than the regular hours if their religious 
beliefs so require  33. This provision allows Muslims to receive their meals after sunset 
during Ramadan. 
Official holidays represent another example of reasonable accommodation for 
religious grounds under written Belgian law. This issue is closely linked to the fact 
that the main Christian holidays correspond to public holidays while this is not the 
case for other religions (Commission du dialogue interculturel, 2005, p. 77). In 2003, 
a decree by the Flemish government authorised nursery and primary school pupils to 
take a day off so as to celebrate “in conformity with the pupil’s philosophical beliefs 
as recognised by the Constitution”  34. In contrast, in the French community where no 
such provision exists, pupils must rely on ad hoc measures. Thus, in December 2008 
when the Muslim festivity of Aïd el Kebir (Festival of Sacrifice) coincided with the 
exam period in primary and secondary school, the schools’ practices in the region of 
Brussels varied from school to school: some accepted to postpone the exams by one 
day, sometimes even organising a pedagogical day on that date. Others asked that 
pupils justify their absence for family reasons pursuant to a strict application of school 
regulations. 
Regarding the employment sector, the issue of flexible work arrangements 
depending on the employee’s choice, in particular on religious or philosophical 
grounds, has recently been placed onto the political agenda. Upon request from 
the Employment Minister, the National Employment Council (Conseil national du 
travail) avoided taking a clear stance on the point. It basically placed the ball into the 
companies’ court, holding that they are better equipped to manage issues related to 
the labour organisation of such a system  35. While declaring that “it understands the 
reasons for wanting to offer employees the possibility to take advantage of flexible 
days off” the National Employment Council nevertheless considered that “it is not 
32 Article 87 of the Ministerial Decree dated 12 July 1971 containing the general guidelines 
for penitentiary establishments (Arrêté ministériel, du 12 juillet 1971, portant instructions 
générales pour les établissements pénitentiaires, MB, 10 August 1971), as modified by Article 
12 of the Ministerial Decree, dated 15 April 2002 (Arrêté ministériel du 15 avril 2002, MB, 
11 May 2002). 
33 Ibid.
34 Article 10ter (2) (f) of the Decree by the Flemish government dated 12 November 1997 
concerning the registration of nursery and primary school pupils (Arrêté du Gouvernement 
flamand du 12 novembre 1997 relatif au contrôle des inscriptions d’élèves de l’enseignement 
fondamental, MB, 6 January 1998, p. 136), as modified by the Decision by the Flemish 
government dated 21 March 2003.
35 Opinion n. 1687 concerning the “Flexible holiday at the employee’s choice” dated 6 
May 2009, p. 3 (Avis n° 1687 relatif au “Jour férié flottant au choix du travailleur”).
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advisable to introduce an additional paid legal holiday or to designate an existing one 
for that scope”  36. Regarding the hypothesis of replacing a Sunday or a regular holiday, 
the Conseil reminds us that the system introduced by the Act dated 4 January 1974 
concerning holidays, “permits the establishment of a substitute day through collective 
bargaining either by the social partners or directly within the companies themselves”. 
It therefore recommends that the labour relation commissions and companies “take 
advantage of this possibility to replace a holiday with a working day at the employee’s 
choice in order to take into account the multiple realities of their employees’ religious 
and philosophical beliefs”  37. This opinion illustrates the social partners’ determination 
(management and trade unions) not to regulate by general rule but to leave the 
negotiations up to labour relations and companies, thus adopting a more pragmatic 
rather than principle-driven approach. 
 Emergence of the issue of reasonable accommodation  
in Belgian public debate
The issue of reasonable accommodation was addressed only indirectly in the 2005 
report by the federal government’s Commission of Intercultural Dialogue (Rapport de 
la Commission du Dialogue Interculturel). That Dialogue’s objective was to “take 
stock of the issues related to a multicultural society as it develops in Belgium (...) 
neither avoiding the “tough” questions nor becoming blind due to media hype around 
certain elements (headscarf, terrorism, international context...) which, even though 
important, sometimes hides the daily reality of “living together””. The report covers 
numerous topics related to “living together” in a multicultural society. As far as the 
active manifestation of religious beliefs in the public sphere is concerned, it focuses on 
religious signs (Commission du dialogue interculturel, 2005, p. 54-56 and Annex 3), 
but avoids deciding on the controversies which arose within the Commission and 
which echoed the intense debates which took place in the Belgian public on this issue 
(Bribosia and Rorive, 2004; Delgrange, 2008 and forthcoming; Van Drooghenbroeck, 
2010 and forthcoming). The term “reasonable accommodation” never appears in the 
report. However, some concrete proposals for taking religious diversity into account 
reflect a logic corresponding to the concept of reasonable accommodation. This is 
the case for the recommended measures in the civil service area allowing “all civil 
servants to live their culture and religion (for example with regards to festivals and 
dietary practices) while respecting the State’s functions and the necessity of neutrality” 
(p. 69) as well as for the recommendation “to the public powers to study the possibility 
of choosing one’s holidays” on the basis of the “basic individual right to benefit from 
the holidays most important in his/her eyes” (p. 77). 
Since 2008, the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism has 
explicitly tackled the concept of reasonable accommodation on the grounds of 
religion, especially through exchanges with the French Anti-Discrimination High 
36 Recommendation No. 21 addressed to the labour relation commissions (commissions 
paritaires), to the social partners and to companies with regards to the possibility of introducing 
a flexible holiday at the employee’s choice as a replacement for a Sunday or another regular 
holiday, dated 6 June 2009, p. 2.
37 Ibid.
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Authority (Haute autorité française de lutte contre les discriminations, the HALDE) 
and the Quebec Human Rights Commission (Commission des droits de la personne 
du Québec) on the topic of intercultural harmonisation  38. The results of those contacts 
became reflected mainly in the 2008 Annual Report “Discrimination/Diversity”, 
published on 8 July 2009, in which the Centre explicitly refers to the concept of 
reasonable accommodation (p. 98). It begins by stating – in our opinion too decidedly 
– that “reasonable accommodation for religious reasons is not recognised as a right 
under Belgian legislation” and that “there is no legal obligation to respond to such 
kind of claims” (p. 60). However, the Centre thereafter summarises the findings on 
reasonable accommodation and practices of intercultural harmonisation contained in 
the Bouchard-Taylor report and highlights the utility of studying the way in which 
other countries deal with problems also faced by Belgian society (p. 62-63). The 
informational tool concerning the so-called “belief signs” (signes convictionnels)  39 
posted by the Centre on its website in Autumn 2009  40, represents another manifestation 
of the growing interest for the concept. This document seeks to provide an overview 
of the provisions in force in the employment, public and education sectors as 
well as proposing general recommendations by the Centre in this domain. One of 
the thematic highlights is specifically dedicated to “reasonable accommodations/
negotiated adjustments” (p. 49). After explaining that the concept was established by 
anti-discrimination legislation pertaining to disability, the Centre asks if it should be 
extended to religion or culture and also questions the most appropriate terminology: 
“reasonable accommodations” (accommodements raisonnables), “practices of 
harmonisation” (pratiques d’harmonisation) or “negotiated adjustments” (ajustements 
concertés)? Elsewhere in the same document, the Center insists on the importance of 
promoting of a “common life based on the intercultural harmonisation and on the 
respect for everybody’s convictions”, highlighting at the same time that “intercultural 
and interbelief harmonisation must follow the path of negotiated adjustments as much 
as possible. The civic path based on negotiation and compromise is preferable to the 
judicial or the legislative path” (p. 4). 
At the political level, the concept entered the agenda of certain political parties in 
2009. Amongst the French speaking ones, Ecolo (the Green party) explicitly inserted 
the development of the practice of reasonable accommodations into its programme 
for the June 2009 regional elections. In the name of its objective to create a “truly 
38 These contacts were further strengthened during a closed seminar organized by the 
Halde on 11 and 12 September 2008 on the topic “France, Québec and Belgium: the challenge 
of secularism and reasonable accommodation on the basis of religion”.
39 The notion of “belief sign” is defined as meaning “any object, image, clothing, symbol 
more or less visible which expresses the belonging to a religious, political or philosophical 
belief for those who ‘send’ the sign or for those who ‘receive’ it, p. 6. See http://www.diversite.
be/signes (last visited on 18 June 2010).
40 Centre pour l’égalité des chances, “Les signes d’appartenance convictionnelle. Etat des 
lieux et pistes de travail”, November 2009. This document can be consulted on the Centre’s 
internet website at the following address: http://www.diversite.be/signes. Pdf version: http://
veruiterlijkingen.diversiteit.be/hoofddoeken/files/File/Signes%20convictionnels.pdf (last 
visited on 18 June 2010).
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intercultural” society, this party, basing itself on the Quebec experience, advocates 
for the rapid institutionalisation of this mechanism. This proposal, however, no longer 
appears in its 2010 federal election programme. The other French speaking parties 
seem divided on the issue even though the Brussels socialist party also referred to 
the Quebec model of management of intercultural conflicts through reasonable 
accommodation as a source of inspiration in the fight against discriminatory practices 
in its programme for the June 2009 regional elections  41. The Flemish parties rarely 
politicise this issue which nevertheless receives positive responses from private and 
public actors. 
The interest in reasonable accommodation shown by the Centre as well as by 
most associations in the intercultural domain certainly has favoured the introduction 
of this issue by the federal minister for equal opportunities, Joëlle Milquet (Cdh), 
into the Rountables on Interculturality’s agenda whose objective it is to propose 
recommendations to the government on matters relating to the management of 
diversity  42. These Roundtables were convened in 2009 and their closure was planned 
for September 2010 before the government fell and new federal elections were held 
on 13 June 2010. The “definition of a policy of ‘reasonable accommodations’ in 
matters of interculturality” appears in the (open) list of 13 covered topics. In this 
context the Centre has commissioned a university study to establish an appraisal of 
the harmonisation practices and of the reasonable accommodations in employment 
(see infra). Thus, the Centre followed an earlier recommendation by researchers 
(Bribosia, Ringelheim and Rorive, 2009). 
	 Demands	and	practices	of	reasonable	accommodation	in	the	workplace
Until today there has been no real coverage of the demands or practices of 
reasonable accommodation in the workplace in Belgium. However, two sources can 
be relied upon: consultation organised by the Centre and research conducted within 
the framework of the Roundtables on Interculturality. The objective of the consultation 
concerning the “active manifestations of religious or philosophical beliefs in the public 
sphere” organised by the Centre in 2005 was to “feel the pulse of decision-makers 
who are sometimes prompted to concretely manage cultural and religious diversity, 
by means of a relatively systematic consultation organised throughout the country 
and in different sectors of activity” (CECLR, 2005). Without entering into details of 
the results for each sector (CECLR, 2005, p. 19 ff), the survey reveals a great variety 
of attitudes ranging from a general prohibition to the conditional acceptance of active 
manifestations of religious beliefs, namely ostentatious signs, specific attitudes and 
behaviours, or specific requests related to religious or philosophical rules. The report 
contains no express reference to a right to reasonable accommodation but one can 
find indications of actors searching for “accommodations” “as far as possible” or “as 
long as the labour organisation is not made too difficult” (p. 13). The report illustrates 
41 Brussels Federation of the Socialist Party, “Programme des socialistes bruxellois pour 
les élections régionales du 7 juin 2009 – Chapitre 8”, p. 72-73, available at: http://www.ps.be/
Source/PageContent.aspx?MenID=18344&EntID=1 (last visited on 18 June 2010).
42 Agreement of the federal government dated 18 March 2008. For more details see the 
internet website at: http://www.interculturalite.be/Les-assises-2009,3?lang=fr
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a “proliferating pragmatic creativity to resolve sometimes complicated situations 
the Belgian way, intended in the best sense of the term” (p. 6). Whereas a major 
part of the consulted contact persons were reluctant to introduce a general regulation 
and preferred a pragmatic case by case approach, others wished nonetheless for 
“the formulation of guide posts or of a framework of reference allowing to limit the 
concerned manifestations” (p. 11). 
Moreover, the Centre’s practice of attempting dispute resolutions in reported 
cases of discrimination based on religious beliefs also reflects an approach oriented 
towards solving issues through compromise by finding reasonable settlements for 
religious diversity  43.  
Within the framework of the Roundtable on Interculturality’s activities, the 
Centre commissioned a university field study (Adam & Rea, 2010) which seeks to 
take an inventory of harmonisation practices and of reasonable accommodations in 
the employment context. 
This is an extension of the consultation begun in 2005 which attempts to obtain a 
more precise picture in a specific domain, employment, where the debate seems to be 
more discreet than in that of education. 
Due to budgetary and time constraints this research was limited to five 
domains in the public sector (education, health, administration and “parastatal” (or 
semi-public), immigration and integration) and four domains in the private sector 
(wholesale, banking & insurance, alimentary industry, cleaning). Without claiming 
to be an exhaustive investigation or a representative overview of the situation on the 
employment market, methodologically, the research consisted of the interrogation 
of private and public or semi-public sectors where the descendants of Moroccan or 
Turkish migrants are most present. The rationale for this was that there would be more 
demands for reasonable accommodation in those domains based on a principle of 
probability. All of the companies in the concerned domains were contacted as well as 
management and trade unions and the new actors in charge of the management of some 
of these issues in companies including the diversity managers present particularly in 
Flanders. However, not all of the companies responded and some had not experienced 
such situations. The inquiry was based on individual interviews and focus groups. 
The interviews were structured to assess the demands for reasonable accommodation 
formulated for cultural or religious reasons, the provided answers, the procedures put 
in place to reach that answers, and the degree of satisfaction with the results from 
the different involved parties. The situations are both numerous (more than 400) 
and contrasting. Though this research did not look for representativity, it did try to 
highlight the typical demands and modes of resolution adopted by the organizations.
What is known today as the issue of reasonable accommodation represents an 
ongoing topic of discussion within companies often having nothing to do with religious 
or cultural questions. Two of the most frequent accommodations concern either weekly 
working hours or the duration of holidays. Requests for an accommodation of weekly 
working hours is made by parents who share the care of their children. Requests for 
changes in the duration of holidays assumes that an employee may take a longer 
43 For some examples see: Bribosia, Ringelheim and Rorive, 2010, p. 38.
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annual vacation than legally prescribed and concerns either individuals who wish to 
embark on an extended travel or individuals, especially of foreign origins, who would 
like to visit their family in their country of origin. These requests are frequent and are 
directly dealt with between the employees and those in charge of personnel, either at 
the management or local level with the foreman.
Thereafter, as far as demands related to the practice of a minority religion are 
concerned, it should be noted that this is not a new phenomenon. For instance, spaces 
for prayer were made available for Muslim workers in a number of steel companies 
in Wallonia and Flanders during the 1970s and 1980s. The same happened in some 
mines in Limburg. During a time when employment immigration was in high demand, 
private employers easily complied with the demands by immigrant Muslim workers. 
This seems to have changed now that policies seek to halt or limit immigration. Even 
though this is not a Belgian example, one can cite the strike at the Talbot-Citroën 
plant in 1982 (Tripier, 1990) where the demands by immigrant workers initiating 
the movement were not limited to eligibility at social elections but also included the 
possibility to pray during working hours and the provision of a room for that purpose. 
The 2010 field study has highlighted a number of categories of demands for 
accommodation, depending on whether they concern dress code, diet, space for prayer 
or holidays for religious festivals. The following paragraphs will outline the different 
situations for each of these categories before providing a first and brief analysis of the 
responses given. 
 Demands for accommodation concerning the dress code
One situation is predominant regarding the dress code: the use of headscarves 
by female employees. Wearing a long beard, a natural characteristic associated with 
the Salafi movement, is often mentioned without however being problematized in the 
same way. No prohibition has been proposed concerning this matter which leads in 
some ways to a gendered differential treatment if not outright discrimination towards 
women. In a cleaning company (company A) where Belgians of foreign origins were 
numerous, a female employee asked whether she could wear the headscarf during 
working hours. She directly asked her foreman who, pursuant to consultation with 
the construction manager, allowed the piece of clothing. This solution was achieved 
without the intervention of the human resources’ department. However, the employee 
was forced to take off her headscarf on one of the construction sites on which she 
was working because the client – i.e. the company where the cleaning company was 
operating – demanded her to do so. 
The situation is more nuanced in the hospital sector. For instance, in one public 
hospital (B) the persons in charge of human resources refused to allow a woman to 
wear the headscarf. Generally employee neutrality in public hospitals is provided as 
a justification even though at times the reasons are more generic. Some argue for 
example that the wearing of a headscarf represents a risk when performing certain 
tasks. Indeed, this distinctive sign is often associated with values and positions that are 
viewed as not conforming to the law or to the philosophical or political orientations 
of public hospitals (contraception, abortion, euthanasia, in vitro fertilisation, etc.). In 
Flemish and French-speaking Catholic hospitals (C) the requests by female workers 
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to wear the headscarf were accepted by means of an agreement concerning the type of 
headscarf. Thus the human resources management proposed a company headscarf for 
any person wishing to wear a headscarf, based on a time in which some of the nurses 
were nuns. This authorisation was inserted into the employment regulations. Since 
this is a company with “religious background”, there is no mobilisation around the 
principle of neutrality in the discourse. 
In some hotels, rooms are cleaned by hotel employees and not by outsourced 
personnel. Generally the accommodation takes place on the workplace with the person 
in charge of organising the work. Nevertheless, a difference appears with regards to 
the standing of the hotel. In 2 or 3 star hotels the headscarf seems to be more tolerated 
than in 4 or 5 star hotes where it is more likely to be prohibited. 
Confronted with a large personnel turnover at the reception and at the cash 
register, the management of a furniture wholesale company (company D) called the 
employees charged with the replenishment of the shelves to solve this labour shortage. 
In that case the company realised that certain female employees refused to work at 
the reception or at the cash registers because that implied taking off their headscarves 
which, on the contrary, was accepted in the warehouse. The company appealed to an 
imam and thereafter to a permanent trade union representative of Moroccan origins 
belonging to the Christian trade union (CSC). Following these meetings and two 
meetings by the workers’ council, the management accepted that the employees could 
wear a headscarf in the company’s colours, blue and yellow, at the reception and at the 
cash registers. This negotiation is certainly also due to the specificity of this Swedish 
company which is very attached to questions concerning cultural diversity and whose 
Brussels location is in a neighbourhood inhabited by multiple ethnic minorities. 
In a municipal administration (E), a female employee presented herself with the 
headscarf the day of her contract signature. The person in charge of the personnel 
told her she could not be hired unless she took it off, invoking the neutrality of public 
service and the fear that this situation might spark conflicts amongst the employees. In 
another municipal administration (F), on the contrary, the request by female employees 
to wear the headscarf was accepted, provided that this would occur in the back office 
whereas at the front desk it was prohibited. In these two municipal administrations the 
responses were given by the person in charge of human resources. This position can 
be found in other companies, in particular in a large wholesale company where the 
diversity manager played an important mediating role. 
 Demands for dietary accommodation 
As far as food is concerned, the most important requests concern the possibility to 
propose meals that do not exclusively consist of pork or that also offer halal meat in 
company canteens. In the banking sector two types of situations have been observed. 
In historical Belgian banks (G) employee’s requests not to have only pork-based meals 
have been accommodated. However, the management refused to integrate halal or 
kosher meals for the personnel due to the excessive costs of those demands, which had 
been supported by the Christian trade union. On the contrary, in an American bank (H) 
all the requests were accepted. The management of the bank provided vegetarian meals 
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and thereafter ordered meat in halal and kosher butcheries. This open-mindedness can 
basically be explained by similar practices existing in the United States. 
In one cleaning company (I) in Brussels where the majority of the trade union 
delegates are of Moroccan origin, the meals served during the workers’ council 
consisted exclusively of halal meat. Thereafter Belgian employees asked that pork 
should also be served. In that interesting case the contrasting demands originated from 
trade union representatives of different origins wishing ultimately for the offering of 
a choice of meals.
The desire to offer a variety of food taking into account the employees’ requests 
also occurred in an agro-food business (J) where during a personnel party all the 
dietary obligations were taken into consideration (halal, Spanish-Italian and Belgian 
meals). In order to ensure maximum participation of personnel to a similar party, a 
semi-public transportation company (K) took the initiative to propose a halal meal for 
the entire staff before any formal request was made. 
In one hospital (L), Muslim employees complained that the company canteen only 
offered one meal at night which was often composed of pork meat. These employees 
demanded that only halal meat should be served. The management agreed but in the 
workers’ council the trade union representatives opposed that solution and asked that 
two different meals be proposed. Due to the excess costs associated with two different 
meals, the management decided nonetheless to offer halal meat only at night. A 
similar situation arose in a hospital (M) where Muslim employees asked for food 
which would be more in line with their religious beliefs. The request was addressed 
to human resources who in turn referred it to the trade union representatives. The 
demand was not met because it was not representative of the entire staff and would 
have created a cost to be shouldered by all the employees. 
 Demands for accommodation concerning prayer space
Demands for prayer space involve both authorisation to pray at the workplace 
and the provision of a suitable space for that activity. In a public company (N), a 
foreman found an employee praying in a space accessible to the public. This situation 
gave rise to a debate amongst the team which consisted mainly of Muslim employees. 
Even though the foreman deemed that in the name of neutrality of public institutions, 
this practice should be prohibited, in particular in a space accessible to the public, 
it was decided by common agreement that the employees (park caretakers) could 
pray in the locker rooms during their break. In another semi-public company (O), 
domestic garbage disposal, the employees asked to pray during working hours. The 
owner of the company, who became personally involved in the solution, invited an 
imam who convinced the employees to pray after work, based on the rationale that the 
Quran authorises individuals to catch up on their prayers after the prescribed hours 
for work reasons. Thus the employees agreed to postpone their prayers. In yet another 
semi-public company (P) the employees of a private cleaning company use a room 
reserved exclusively for the use by its employees for prayer. This practice is tolerated 
in particular since the foreman and the inspectors of that company are themselves 
Muslim and appear to be more open to this request. Thus, in these two companies 
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these practices are possible due to the proximity between the employees without the 
involvement of the human resources department. 
In one hospital (Q), the management planned to provide a space for prayer to 
its employees. Personnel were offered the use of the devotional room initially 
reserved to patients as there were not many requests. The employment regulations 
of a transport company (R) formally prohibit the practice of prayer in the name of 
the neutrality principle but sometimes tolerate it in the field with the knowledge of 
the human resources department, especially when supervision is decreased, such 
as break time for busdrivers. Nevertheless, prayer is not accepted in spaces for 
collective use such as locker rooms though it is not prohibited in the work space, in 
that case, the bus. In a wholesale company (S), the management had signed a charter 
of diversity which authorised employees to pray in the workplace but only during 
their break. The employees must organise amongst themselves without disturbing the 
organisation of labour and without any specific space having been allocated to them. 
Last but not least, the practice of prayer has been authorised during break time in a 
municipal administration (T). The demand had been advanced by two employees who 
negotiated the allocation of a specific space with their hierarchical superior. However, 
following complaints by other employees who viewed this as a favourable treatment 
incompatible with the principle of neutrality, the accomodation was reversed. 
 Demands for accommodations concerning holidays
Demands concerning holidays for religious festivals are of two different kinds. 
The first is quite widespread and concerns the festival at the end of Ramadan and 
that of Eid al-Adha. The second one concerns the organisation of labour during 
Ramadan. Without entering into the details of specific practices, two different types 
of treatment emerge depending essentially on the size of the company and the number 
of employees. As far as the two specific festivals are concerned, a major part of 
the employees take the day off based on the principle of personal preferences. The 
problem arises in companies where the number of Muslim employees is high. In that 
case either the company accepts to work with reduced personnel, if that is possible, 
or it anticipates those holidays in its planning of the organisation of labour. These 
demands presuppose an arrangement between employees, particularly in public sector 
companies where continuity of service has to be guaranteed. In the Flemish speaking 
educational system a paradoxical situation can be observed. Whereas the pupils have 
the right to stay home during religious festivals, the (Jewish and Muslim) religion 
teachers do not have that choice. Requests to extend this right to teachers have been 
made. However, they have been unsuccessful so far because they raise the issue of 
equality with the other Jewish or Muslim teachers who teach different subjects. As far 
as Ramadan is concerned there is no fixed rule given that the time period is longer. In 
this case it is working time arrangements amongst employees that are most common. 
 Analysis
The examples above demonstrate the multiplicity of situations and responses. 
In both the public and private sector, the number of employees of Muslim origins 
in the workforce determines the explicit formulation of demands as well as the 
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necessity to solve them, whether by recognition and negotiation or inconspicuously 
and informally. On the basis of Boltanski and Thévenot’s theory on the economies 
of worth (1991) it is possible to oppose two principles of justice to the expressed 
demands. One takes place in the private sector and the other takes place in the public 
(and semi-public) sector. In the private sector the principle of efficiency predominates 
whereas in the public sector the principle of representativity is dominant. Indeed, in 
the former domain decisions to tolerate the employee’s demands, often under certain 
conditions, are taken in the name of efficiency. This efficiency relates mostly to the 
management of the labour organisation. In companies with a particularly high number 
of personnel of Muslim origin (cleaning, transport, agro-food), production depends 
on the employees’ presence and motivation. Hence, for the sake of convenience, 
attempts at accepting the employees’ demands are made in order not to destabilise the 
production and team organisation, a fact that becomes particularly evident with regard 
to the demands for holidays coinciding with religious festivals. On the contrary, in 
public companies and at times in semi-public ones, the principle of neutrality of the 
public service is often invoked. 
However, it seems there are some exceptions to these principles. As noted before 
(Rea  and Ben Mohamed, 2000), tolerance for headscarves in both private and public 
companies, for example, can be limited on the basis of the criterion of visibility. Thus 
the headscarf can be accepted in the back office but rejected at the front desk. In that 
case, the argument of economic efficiency prevails in the private domain (company 
A), in other words the desire not to frighten the client. For the public domain tolerance 
consisting of the suspension of the principle of neutrality can be limited by the 
fear of complaints by customers (company F) or of conflict with other employees 
(company E). 
It is important to stress that these demands for reasonable accommodation in the 
workplace do not simply oppose employees on one side and employers on the other. 
As a number of situations show, the position of other employees and trade union 
representatives is also important. In fact, rejection of demands is often the result of 
opposition by other employees and certain trade union representatives (companies 
E, I, L, T). On this point, it seems clear that these issues cause debates even within 
employees’ collectives and with their representatives which is why it is difficult to 
expect a unified response from trade unions. It is equally clear that the issue of diversity 
is more openly addressed in the Christian trade union (CSC) than in the socialist trade 
union (FGTB). Moreover, it should be noted that in international companies (D and H) 
which are particularly attentive to diversity issues, the resolution modes are based on 
an entrepreneurial culture of multiculturalism management. Similarly, in companies 
with religious backgrounds (company C), a functional solution is often proposed. 
Far from the political and media debate, a certain pragmatism seems to dominate 
in the employment context even though, in certain circumstances, especially with 
regard to the headscarf, political and philosophical discourses around the principle of 
neutrality of public, and sometimes private, services influence the responses provided 
to demands for reasonable accommodation. 
Aside from this, reasonable accommodations are relatively contingent and 
dependent on the involved actors and the combination of actors. Undoubtedly, these 
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demands are most often solved by means of “local justice” (Elster, 1992). The foreman 
and the intermediary middle management have significant discretionary powers. Most 
examples show that the employees only rarely address themselves to the people in 
charge of human resources.
Proximity is fundamental in formulating the demands and in providing a response 
that is often only temporary at this level. This local justice is essentially elaborated for 
issues relating to food or to prayer at the workplace. Thus, the discretionary power of 
the foreman leaves ample spaces for arbitrariness. The response heavily depends on 
that person’s beliefs. Where the foremen are Muslims themselves it is proximity that 
prevails whereas when they are non-Muslims the argument of reverse discrimination 
can be invoked. 
This local justice also depends on the combination of the involved actors. Three 
different typical situations emerge. In a first case, negotiation is completely local 
and reasonable accommodation occurs between the requesting employee and his/her 
closest foreman. The proposed solutions in that case are relatively unstable given that 
they can change due to the intervention from external (clients or users) or internal 
actors (hierarchical superiors). In the second case the reasonable accommodation is 
achieved thanks to the mediation by a traditional actor such as the trade union delegate 
or representative. This triangular configuration often ensures a stable accommodation. 
Sometimes intermediaries, other than traditional figures in industrial relations, 
(diversity manager, imam) intervene as mediators (companies D and O) pursuant 
to requests from the management or human resources. The intervention of those 
intermediaries implies an increased formalisation of requests and the involvement of 
the company’s hierarchy. Finally, reasonable accommodation can lead to formalisation 
in employment regulations or in the company’s diversity charter. In these situations, 
human resources departments often act preventively. 
As regards the entire study, whereas numerous demands were registered, a 
majority of the actors, whether employers or trade unions, were adamant that 
this topic remains discreet. In fact, trade unions fear the influence of this issue in 
negotiations with employers on topics which they deem to be more important such 
as salaries, accommodation of working times and careers. Employers share the same 
point of view even though they are not as categorically opposed. Like the National 
Employment Counsel (Conseil national du travail), employers and trade unions 
fear any legislative initiative on the subject and prefer practices of local negotiation, 
namely by the company. Most actors in the employment sector prefer the absence 
of publicisation of this issue. These same actors are suspicious of mobilisation for 
a cause by actors external to the employment sector (associations) because they 
want to remain in control of the agenda and of the mode of historically constructed 
autonomous negotiation (Alaluf, 1999). Eventually this leads to another issue, namely 
the representativity of employee representatives, in particular in public service where 
employees, and even more so their representatives, rarely belong to ethnic minorities. 
	 Conclusion
The development of European anti-discrimination law has led to the emergence 
of the concept of “reasonable accommodation” in European legal and political 
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vocabulary. The European Employment Equality Directive of 2000 only recognises 
the duty of accommodation in favour of disabled people. However, the introduction 
of this concept unavoidably poses the question whether, as under Canadian law, a 
similar duty for religious grounds can be deducted from existing provisions or, in 
the absence of such provisions, whether it would be advisable to provide for such 
a mechanism through written law, as in the American case. The answer to the first 
question is less evident than would seem at first sight. While no duty of reasonable 
accommodation on the basis of religion is explicitly established under European 
Union law, the prohibition of indirect discrimination might be interpreted by the 
European Court of Justice or by Member State jurisdictions as requiring, in certain 
cases, that the author of a provision or of a rule of general application adapt that 
measure to avoid discriminating indirectly against certain individuals because of 
their religion. The European Court of Justice implicitly adopts a similar reasoning 
in its decision Vivien Prais – a decision admittedly decided prior to the adoption of 
the Employment Equality Directive and which remains unconfirmed. In any case, 
European Union law does not prevent Member States from defining the obligation of 
reasonable accommodation more broadly than the Employment Equality Directive. 
Besides, since the Thlimmenos v. Greece ruling, the European Court of Human Rights 
recognises that, as a result of the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 
14 of the Convention, the legislator may, under certain circumstances, be asked to 
introduce appropriate exceptions in legislation to avoid disadvantaging people 
practicing a certain religion, without any objective and reasonable justification. 
The relative novelty of reasonable accommodation should not lead us to forget 
some older practices that this concept builds upon in the European context. For 
example in Belgium during the 1970s and 1980s demands, such as those for a prayer 
room, formulated by immigrant employees often received an affirmative answer of 
a pragmatic nature, especially in private companies for production reasons. Today, 
as demonstrated by the study conducted in the framework of the Roundtables on 
Interculturality, the desire by employees to have some of the constraints related to 
practice of a minority religion – generally Islam – recognised in the employment sphere 
gives rise to a number of cases where local and informal solutions were negotiated 
by actors in the labour market without reference to any legal obligation. One can 
nevertheless observe different attitudes depending on whether one looks at the private 
sector or the public sector on the one hand, or at the type of demands on the other 
hand. For instance, adjustments in meal composition as well as demand for holidays 
during religious festivals seem to cause little opposition even if they sometimes clash 
with practical or financial obstacles. This is not the case for demands concerning 
headscarves or space for prayer in the workplace. Here, employers, particularly public 
employers (but not only), are much more reluctant to accommodate demands although 
some examples of accommodation exist in those cases as well. 
Obviously, these determinations do not imply that recognition of a legal obligation 
of reasonable accommodation for religious reasons in Europe is not relevant. 
First, conceptually, reasonable accommodation expresses an important idea in the 
evolution of the principle of equality. If individuals belonging to certain minorities 
have difficulty accessing employment or services, the problem does not necessarily 
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lie in the characteristics these individuals have with regards to the majority but it 
can also be the result of an environment conceived without bearing their situation 
in mind. By inviting reflection as to how this environment might be modified, this 
concept purports to guarantee equal opportunities to disabled individuals or to those 
practicing a certain religion and to ensure their integration in social, economic and 
cultural life. From this point of view, not only people must adapt to their environment. 
Equality demands that the environment itself, as far as this is possible, be altered 
in ways which allow everyone to fully participate in society regardless of their 
specific characteristics. Second, from a practical standpoint, recognition of a right to 
reasonable accommodation in the employment or other contexts would reinforce the 
individual’s position vis a vis the authority upon which the duty rests. Indeed whether 
demands for accommodation on the basis of religion will be taken into account or 
not will not depend on the employer’s discretionary power along with all the risks of 
arbitrariness that it entails. Employers would be obligated to search for a reasonable 
solution within the limits established by law or by the courts. Thus by establishing 
common rules applicable to all companies and other related sectors, the “legalisation” 
of accommodation practices could contribute to guarantee legal certainty and the 
equality of individuals in the treatment of their demands. 
However, the introduction of a legal duty for reasonable accommodation could 
also cause some inconveniences. One can fear that the possibility of new demands 
for justice would also lead to increased conflicts within companies, not only between 
employees and employers but also amongst employees, where the legitimacy of 
recognizing religious specificities is sometimes called into question. One consequence 
is the potential for employers to develop strategies which seek to avoid hiring Muslim 
employees, fearing that they might then invoke the right to reasonable accommodation. 
Losing the discretionary power to reject demands for accommodation might therefore 
shift discrimination to the moment of hiring. Another difficulty highlighted by the 
American and Canadian experience is faced by the judges whenever a religious 
rule invoked by the applicant for accommodation is contested within the concerned 
religious community. The Bouchard-Taylor Commission report nevertheless puts 
these risks into perspective. According to the authors, the Canadian experience of 
“reasonable accommodations” is generally positive. As a whole, Canadian institutions 
and economic actors have successfully integrated the mechanism of reasonable 
accommodation.
It is maybe too early to determine whether recognition of a legal duty of reasonable 
accommodation would be the most appropriate instrument to guarantee the right to 
non-discrimination by religious minorities in Europe. But one can already envisage a 
middle ground between the recognition of a general right to reasonable accommodation 
on the basis of religious grounds in the workplace and the preservation of the status 
quo. This would consist of introducing certain specific accommodations for employees 
as specified by the legislation. In the Belgian context a sufficiently strong convergence 
of opinion allows for a legislative intervention which would guarantee the same rights 
to all employees while keeping in mind the constraints of companies: holidays for 
religious festivals and adjustment of meals to meet religious prohibitions. On other 
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topics such as headscarves, on the contrary, it seems currently difficult to build a 
consensus whereby the issue could be regulated for the entire employment sector. 
chapter vii
The social construction of Otherness  1
Didier Fassin
The relation to others as a means for the construction of the self certainly 
corresponds to the elementary form of life in society. As social scientists, we know, 
however, that who the others are and what the self is cannot be taken for granted. As 
a consequence, the social construction of otherness, and correlatively of identities, 
should be viewed as a priority by both anthropologists and sociologists. This is 
precisely what “The Others in Europe” is about. My contribution is a reflection based 
on the collective research for “The New Frontiers of French Society” (Fassin, 2010) 
which I have coordinated over the last four years. 
	 From	borders	to	boundaries
As regards contemporary Western Europe – and although I refer here mainly 
to the French case, I believe many observations can be generalized to this broader 
spatial and political context – a central hypothesis regarding the social construction 
of Otherness can be phrased in the following manner. In the last two or three decades, 
Otherness has shifted significantly from the outside to the inside. We used to think 
of Otherness mostly in terms of immigration and we are increasingly approaching it 
in terms of racialization. Traditionally, limits between the self and others essentially 
involved external, territorial, and juridical borders; however, they have progressively 
become internal, cultural, and social boundaries. From borders to boundaries: one can 
illustrate the evolution through this simple formulation. Interestingly, the opposite 
has occurred in other places, most notably in the United States where the question 
1 This text is based on a research conducted thanks to a grant of the French National 
Research Agency (ANR). I am grateful to Saskia Bonjour for her remarks and suggestions and 
to Andrea Rea for associating me to this collective reflection.
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of internal boundaries is intrinsic to the history of the country and where its external 
borders have recently become a major issue with the appearance of millions of 
undocumented immigrants into the public space. 
Having suggested such a radical transformation, I would like to avoid any 
misunderstanding by adding that obviously the shift from an external other to an 
internal other does not imply that we are casting aside anxieties about immigration 
and borders. The obsessive focus on illegal aliens, asylum seekers, and statistics of 
deportations; the paranoiac development of detention centres, airport waiting zones, 
and camps inside and outside Europe indicate, on the contrary, that these issues 
remain a crucial political question. However it is not so much the otherness of those 
who are now considered unwelcome that is at stake as the otherness of those who are 
now among us. In effect, new others have appeared who are not outsiders but insiders. 
They are not as different as foreigners coming from abroad and are only distinct on 
ethnic, racial and often religious bases. They form minorities which are discriminated 
against by the majority. They often see themselves as not entirely or not legitimately 
belonging to the nation despite the fact that they are formally recognized as citizens.
Indeed, immigration and racialization are not independent. On the contrary and 
as illustrated by Paul Silverstein (2005), they are intimately linked – historically 
and even genealogically. Immigration is definitely racialized (not all immigrants 
are unwanted, not all descendants are required DNA tests to confirm their kinship 
relations, and an African experiences more complications at the French border than 
an American). Correspondingly, those who are racialized in the poor outskirts of 
France’s large cities are of immigrant descent (most of them are the direct descendents 
of men and women from former colonies). The intellectual challenge is therefore to 
articulate the questions of borders and boundaries rather than to oppose them. From 
this perspective, the reluctance of most European governments to admit Turkey into 
the Union is interesting. Beyond the less controversial arguments of human rights or 
economic destabilization, it is increasingly evident that this is an issue of both border 
and boundary. It concerns redefining not only the geographical frontier of Europe (not 
so long ago Turkey was one of the most important powers on the continent) but also 
the ontological imaginary of Europe (as white, Western and Christian).
To expand on my main proposition I have added a secondary hypothesis. I am 
interested in a political transformation which involves not only a question of a change 
of perspective in the definition of otherness (from the immigrant other to the racialized 
other) but which also simultaneously involves a change in sentiment towards this 
other (from indifference to disquietude). The social construction of otherness is 
increasingly mobilizing representations of danger and ideologies of fear. Until the mid-
1970s, immigration was perceived as a “solution” to economic and even demographic 
problems; immigrants remained largely invisible in their shantytowns or their hostels. 
Since then, immigration has appeared as a “problem” necessitating new solutions. 
Initially it was viewed as an economic threat in the context of growing competition for 
work and resources. Later it became a concern for public security particularly during 
the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Similarly, racialization 
has been increasingly linked to issues of public order including ordinary delinquency 
or urban riots, more specifically in France and Britain. Racialization soon became a 
the social construction of otherness     119
justification for the routinization of racial profiling, a practice condemned until the 
1990s and which is now generalized. But again, this dangerous other is not only seen 
as such in terms of economic competition and public security. It is also, though less 
openly, regarded as a menace to European and national identities which are presented 
as what many implicitly hold them to be: white, Western, Christian and formally 
democratic as opposed to Blacks or Arabs, Asians or Muslims and supposedly non-
democratic, disrespectful of human rights and oppressors of women.
My argument so far – the edification of new barriers, the racialization of 
immigration, the culture of fear and the resulting rejection of others – gives a rather 
pessimistic tone to my analysis of the social construction of otherness. This impression 
should, however, be mitigated by the non-contradictory observation that even in this 
obsessive and paranoiac mode, Europe is definitely discovering that it is changing or 
rather that it has already changed. This is a point that most commentaries miss from 
both the right and the left sides of the political spectrum. The former denounces the 
threat of alien and racial others while the latter criticizes the xenophobic and racist 
turn. However, neither sees that profound transformations are taking place. In fact 
it is precisely because these changes are taking place that tensions arise. Whatever 
resistance exists, it cannot reverse the phenomena that are now a part of our history 
including the presence of numerous families from former colonies living mostly in 
underprivileged housing estates; the diversification of skin colours and patronymic 
consonances in all social strata, even if it is much more visible in lower classes; and 
the demographic development of Islam as the second religion. Significantly, France 
now has a Black movement embodied in the Conseil Représentatif des Associations 
Noires, and recently began building mosques so that Muslims are not relegated to 
praying in basements. It took a century for France to realize that it had been constituted 
through immigration (social scientists themselves where not very active in integrating 
this idea which remained absent from most historical works until recently). Thus it 
should not be too much of a surprise that it might take one or two more decades before 
the French (including the intellectuals) accept the reality of their racial and religious 
diversity.
	 From	reluctance	to	recognition
Public recognition of the evolution being examined here – with the reformulation 
of immigration and racialization issues – is quite recent. France is a good illustration of 
how profound change can long remain ignored, yet suddenly become almost dazzling 
in its presence. In this respect, the 2005 riots represented a brutal discovery by most 
French people as well as political leaders of facts they had ignored until then. President 
Jacques Chirac’s speech after the riots subsided was quite revealing from this point of 
view. He admitted the failure of the social contract that the Republic was assumed to 
offer when he acknowledged the existence of racial discrimination. However, he also 
demagogically associated the violent outbursts with illegal immigration despite the 
fact that the great majority of the rioters were citizens often born in France. 
To bring a personal note to my analysis, I can cite an anecdotal but significant 
observation. A year before the riots, I organized a series of conferences with Eric 
Fassin (2006) on racial issues. I remember my own lexical embarrassment at that time 
120     the others in europe
since, until then, I would never have used words like “Blacks” or “Arabs”, much less 
“race”. I also recall that as we embarked on this academic initiative some colleagues 
expressed understandable discomfort. After all, were we not lending some legitimacy 
to words and questions that were considered not only scientifically illegitimate but 
also politically dangerous? One year later, “race” had become a rather common and 
generally accepted interpretation of the riots. Some denounced unassimilated ethnic 
groups as developing anti-White racism; others conversely saw the events as the 
consequence of racial exclusion or inequality. Either for bad reasons (stigmatization) 
or superior reasons (recognition of discrimination), the concept of “race” had become 
commonplace in the public sphere. Thus, whereas I had initially been suspected of 
dangerously introducing a racial lexicon, after the riots I began to call attention to the 
risk of categorizing the rioters in racial terms. Let us consider this anecdote for what 
it tells us of the changes taking place.
Until very recently, France has seen itself and was often seen by others as colour-
blind. Even the French academia, from Gérard Noiriel (1988) to Dominique Schnapper 
(1991), was reluctant to open what most intellectuals and scientists saw as Pandora’s 
box. Discussing race, other than to denounce racism (one of the few questions that 
sociologists and anthropologists, along with philosophers, could only approach in 
normative and moral terms) was considered potentially performative and therefore 
dangerous. It made race real (or at least gave consistency to its possible existence and 
legitimacy to the use of this vocabulary). This self-proclaimed French exceptionalism 
should not be taken for granted, since in many countries – including the United 
States and contrary to what is often assumed in France – the discourse on race is 
controversial. However, one cannot deny that several historical factors contribute to 
the reluctance of French society to see itself as racializing and discriminating.
Three factors should be considered in particular. First, the imaginary of the 
Republic has been a severe obstacle to the recognition of the Republic’s failure to 
implement its principles, the equality principle in particular. The idealization of the 
State as being related directly – and equally – to citizens remained intact in spite of 
the many discrepancies between affirmed values and observed facts, particularly in 
the colonies. Successive Constitutions mandated that there could be no differentiation 
in the “human family” and in 1958 the Fifth Republic proclaimed “no distinction 
of race”. Second, the ideology of the Nation produced a deep belief that the natural 
destiny of all those who resided on French territory was to become French, both 
culturally as a result of the process of assimilation that the education system provided, 
and legally as a consequence of the jus soli allowing the individual born in France 
with at least one parent born in France to become French. This model has certainly 
facilitated integrating aliens and making differences less visible although studies 
show that, independent of the acquisition of citizenship, distinctions often continue 
to exist, here again as a distant echo of the colonial period. Third, the referential of 
Class, especially in social sciences, has worked as a powerful obstacle to admitting the 
possibility of determinations other than socioeconomic. French statistics rely almost 
entirely on a classification of professional categories, which is a proxy of social class, 
for their analysis of difference and inequality, whereas even the parents’ nationality, 
as an imperfect proxy of race, is forbidden in official data.
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The combination of these three factors – the imaginary of the Republic, the 
ideology of the Nation, and the referential of Class – concerns the dominant majority. 
But their efficacy has been reinforced by objective and subjective conditions of the 
dominated minority. On the one hand, objectively, immigrant individuals and families 
were marginalized. Men in their hostels were often transported back and forth to the 
factory and families lived in slums and sometimes even in camps. Exploitation of 
the former and exclusion of the latter left them outside of society. On the other hand, 
subjectively, these immigrants and their families internalized the illegitimacy that 
was imposed upon them. They knew that they were tolerated as long as their labour 
was useful but they also understood that they could not claim rights or denounce 
injustices, except in isolated cases when, for instance, they went on strike. In fact, 
many considered it necessary to tolerate this situation for the future of their children 
and to sacrifice their generation for improved conditions for the next generation. 
Tensions arose the moment these expectations were not fulfilled.
The famous 1983 March for Equality and Against Racism (often referred to as 
“La Marche des Beurs” despite rejection of this moniker by many protestors) was a 
first sign of change. However, it is significant that the March was still grounded on the 
paradigm of immigration. The protest’s two principal demands concerned the creation 
of a ten year residency permit for immigrants and the right to vote for foreigners of 
which only the former was obtained. Nothing was said at that time of what began to be 
called the “second generation”, that is the descendants of immigrants who were often 
not immigrants themselves. The dominant discourse was that of “integration” and the 
economic insertion of the parents guaranteeing the social inclusion of their children 
was emphasized. Fifteen years later, when the first official report on discrimination 
was made public in 1998, this promise remained unfulfilled. Racial discrimination 
had resulted in segregation, unemployment and impoverishment. As such this reality 
was not new. What was new was the fact that these phenomena concerned French 
people born in France whose only differences with other French people born in 
France was their skin colour, name, origin, or religion. The sentiment of injustice 
culminated when two children, chased by the police for an act they had not committed 
but were suspected of, precisely because of who they were racially, died in an electric 
transformer where they had hidden. The 2005 riots started that same night and lasted 
more than a month. By that time, the racialization of French society could no longer 
be ignored.
	 From	notion	to	concept
So far I have referred to the notion of racialization without questioning it. But 
what does it mean? Or rather in which sense can we speak of racialization? Of course 
much has been written on racialization. Michael Banton (1977) introduced it to the 
social sciences and restricted its use to discourses mentioning race explicitly while 
Robert Miles (1989) extended its meaning to implicit reference to racial differences. 
Stephen Small (1994) believed that it avoids the reification of race while David Theo 
Goldberg (2002) suggests that the inflation of its use makes it an empty concept. My 
point is certainly not to summarize the sometimes heated scientific and ideological 
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debates about the word and its meanings but simply to indicate what may be its 
heuristic value, i.e. what could turn the notion into a concept.
Let us start with a negative definition and explain what racialization is not. 
Racialization is not about race and it is not about racism. First, discussing racialization 
does not imply the existence of races as biological, phenotypical or even cultural 
entities. On the contrary, it suggests that races are social constructs with social 
efficacy but without existence as such. Irish and Italians have been racialized in 
the United States; Romani, and even more so Muslims, are racialized in Europe. 
None of these groups correspond to a particular race. Second, racialization is not 
equivalent to racism even though some mistakenly reduce it to that level. Certainly 
those who racialize others often do it for racist reasons in order to discriminate 
against or even exterminate them. But racialization exceeds racism. One may have 
racially discriminatory practices in employment selection without being racist, simply 
anticipating clients’ racism and therefore not hiring a Black or Arab worker. One can 
also define oneself on a racial basis sometimes precisely to combat racism. Speaking 
of racism almost always implies a moral judgment but analyzing racialization consists 
of accounting for a social phenomenon.
If racialization is not about race or racism, what is it about? There are two ways 
of understanding the concept. On the one hand, racialization refers to a process. It 
corresponds to the imposition of a racial interpretation on social groups or social facts. 
It means that groups or facts which were not seen as racial come to be regarded as such 
as the result of an ideological process that Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1986) 
call racial formation. On the other hand, racialization signifies a problematization. It 
corresponds to a manner of viewing society in order to make sense of it and especially 
to define what is relevant as a problem. According to Michel Foucault (2001/1984), 
it defines a historical moment when the language of race becomes socially prevalent 
or when society poses itself questions in these terms. As a process, racialization is a 
social production resulting from interactions between individuals, generally within 
relations of power. As a problematization, racialization is a social construction by 
which an account of the world is given, principally within relations of description. 
The two meanings are not exclusive but correspond to distinct realities apprehended 
through distinct levels of reading. They can even be dissociated: for instance, until the 
late 1990s in France, racialization existed as a process (immigrants were racialized, 
in particular) but not as a problematization (the problem was not posed as such in the 
public sphere).
But which forms does racialization take in everyday life? How does it become 
manifest? Where can we recognize it? Since it has often been seen as more or 
less equivalent to racism, its meaning has been considerably restricted. Empirical 
observations suggest, however, a diversity of significations which may be 
conceptualized as grammatical persons. As the first person, I racialize you. In other 
words I ascribe you to what I see as a racial group or as racial characteristics. As the 
second person, you racialize yourself; generally in response to my first move which 
means that you recognize yourself as what you have been imputed to be. As the third 
person, the individual present on the racialization scene provides an account, either 
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through narratives, statistics, or analyses. Let us examine each configuration in more 
detail. 
The first move – both logically and chronologically – is ascription. Race is 
imposed on a person or a community. It can take different forms, such as biological, 
phenotypical, or cultural, but the common denominator is the essentialization and 
radicalization of difference, as Colette Guillaumin (2002/1972) has emphasized. 
Racial ascription is a reification of otherness. The racialized person or community has 
no option to accept or reject the definition or qualification that is given. Schematically, 
the moral intention linked with this ascription can take two orientations. On the one 
hand, it can be negative which implies a hierarchy of worthiness or a differentiation of 
sentiments. Those who are racialized are either despised or hated which in turn leads to 
attitudes of discrimination (and even exclusion) or rejection (and even extermination). 
This is the most frequently documented case and corresponds to the classic form of 
racism. On the other hand, it can be positive which implies a distinction and often 
an argument of protection. Those who are racialized are supposedly separated, and 
even segregated, for their own good. Certain ethnopsychiatric and more generally 
culturalist practices have thus pleaded for different health, social or even juridical 
systems (culturalist hell is always paved with good intentions). In this case, one could 
speak of benevolent racism. Whatever its moral basis, racial ascription does not 
recognize the right of the person and the community to define and qualify themselves 
– and therefore escape racial ascription.
The second move – in the sense that it is usually, but not always, consecutive to 
the first – is the recognition of oneself through the imposed racialized language. Frantz 
Fanon provided a remarkable illustration of this phenomenon with the insult “dirty 
nigger!” through which he indicates he discovered his blackness. Racial recognition 
is a self-identification. The person or the community ascribed to a certain racial 
definition or qualification identifies with it in order to reverse the stigma. In France, the 
Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires uses the language of colour by which 
Black people are discriminated. Most of its members are less interested in building 
a racial community than in forming a community of experience – the experience of 
racial discrimination. Conversely, Arabs in France, who also endure racial prejudices, 
usually reject this designation and, significantly, have no social movement based on 
this supposed racial belonging. The contrast between the two minorities emphasizes 
the importance of strategies in the process of recognition. British or South African 
Black movements are interesting from this perspective in the sense that they adopt and 
transform the racial discourse. They define themselves as Blacks, but simultaneously 
re-qualify what it means to be Black by including all non-Whites in this category. 
While they seem to accept their ascription, in reality they subvert it.
The third move is exterior to the racial scene. It is represented by the witness or the 
observer who attempts to give an account of the scene. He or she is neither racializing 
nor racialized; he or she is describing and interpreting what he or she sees and how 
he or she understands it. Description and interpretation can involve testing, ethnic 
statistics, racial questions in censuses, anecdotes reported in the media, commentaries 
by intellectuals and politicians, and of course academic writing. Certainly these 
multiple and heterogeneous procedures align themselves with various logics. Some try 
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to combat racial discrimination (through surveys in private companies, for example), 
others want to produce racial constituency (a black vote, for instance), and others may 
even attempt to delegitimize minorities (by counting the number of players of colour 
on a football team). I indicated that the witness or the observer is not racializing. This 
assertion should certainly be amended. The act of fabricating figures, narratives or 
analyses using racial categories has a performative effect and contributes indeed to 
the existence of what is named. Actually whiteness would never have been recognized 
for what it is if social scientists had not qualified it and demonstrated its relevance. 
More generally, the third person can become a first person (when he or she ascribes a 
racial category) or a second person (when he or she participates in the recognition of 
the racialized group). 
The three dimensions of racialization are of course related. Their articulation 
could be formulated in the following manner. Through ascription, racialization is 
imposed on individuals and they passively become racial subjects. This is a process 
of subjection. Through recognition, racialization becomes self-identification and the 
individuals or community actively become political subjects. This is a process of 
subjectification. Through description and interpretation, racialization is a means of 
deciphering the social world. This intellectual operation produces new objects and is 
a process of objectification. But of course, there is no mechanical linearity between 
the three persons and moreover the positions may change as the second person can 
ascribe in return and the first person can recognize himself or herself in the process, 
just as the third person can contribute to ascription and recognition.
	 Conclusion
By trying to comprehend the social construction of otherness, I have developed a 
sort of multi-layered discussion of my original proposition. The picture may now be 
somewhat clearer, even if it is more complex. 
The social construction of otherness implies the social construction of identities. 
It means imagining borders and boundaries. In recent years the two have tended to 
become more and more entangled as the question of immigration has developed into an 
issue of racialization. This process has involved aliens and their descendants. But it is 
not limited to them. Racialized others presuppose racialized selves. Producing Blacks 
or Arabs or Romani through prejudice and discrimination is also producing “Whites” 
of a certain kind of whiteness – just like photographs are made from negatives. Going 
one step further, racialized others also construct themselves as selves and construct 
their others as others. Minority youth in the underprivileged suburbs of France thus 
use “French” to designate the majority population, which they see as others. By 
employing this formulation, a euphemism for Whites, they reveal that they do not 
recognize themselves as the citizens they legally are. In other words, the racialization 
process is more than the result of an interaction: it is an intersubjectivation. In this 
dynamic, the third party which I characterized earlier as witness or observer is also 
part of the intersubjectivation. He or she is not an impartial judge, but, rather, an actor 
participating in the racialization process.
The European scene initially seemed rather simple. We had nationals and 
foreigners, citizens and aliens. It became more complicated when it appeared that 
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nationals could be seen as foreigners and that citizens still continued to consider 
themselves as aliens, mostly for reasons of colour, origin, culture, or religion. In 
France most specifically, the first reaction to this changing reality has been mere 
denial: this does not exist, it is not true. When it became impossible to ignore the 
evidence, a second reaction was often of denegation: it certainly exists, but it is not 
what you think. The witness or the observer was systematically accused of threatening 
the social order by his or her description or interpretation. As is often the case, the 
messenger was blamed for the bad news he or she delivered. Recent preoccupying 
developments in European countries suggest that it is now definitely time to confront 
these issues with lucidity and serenity and to hold our societies accountable for their 
construction of otherness. 

chapter viii
Ethnic discrimination and minority identity: 
A social psychological perspective
Maykel Verkuyten
Discrimination occurs when members of a group are treated unjustly on the basis 
of their membership to that group, for example rejecting a woman for employment 
simply because she is a female, an elderly person because he is relatively old, or an 
ethnic minority member because she is Turkish Dutch. These examples show that 
discrimination is an inter-group phenomenon. People are treated on the basis of their 
group membership, typically by others who belong to a different social group or 
category. Ethnic minorities can face different kinds of discrimination in various social 
settings and by different others, including co-ethnics. However, in general, they are 
discriminated most often by the more powerful majority group. Their discrimination 
can involve various spheres of life (e.g., the labour market, housing) and can be 
situational and temporary or more structural and systematic. 
Social psychologists examine the subjective meanings and consequences of 
perceived discrimination and the ways in which members of discriminated groups 
cope with unjust treatment and exclusion. Psychologically, being a target of 
discrimination is particularly painful when it involves a valued group membership. 
People are not only individuals but also group members and these memberships can 
have great emotional and value significance (Tajfel, 1981). Ethnic discrimination 
implicates one’s ethnic group membership which often is very important for minority 
group members (Verkuyten, 2005). Ethnic identity is part of a person’s sense of “who 
we are” and discrimination is an ongoing reminder of the rejection and devaluation of 
one’s ethnic minority group in broader society. Thus, even when individuals are not 
discriminated against personally, they have to deal with the negative treatment and 
disadvantaged position of their ethnic group. It is often the more advantaged members 
of disadvantaged groups who engage in actions on behalf of the group, not the most 
disadvantaged (Gurin and Epps, 1975). 
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Research has indicated that ethnic identity plays a complex role in perceptions of and 
experiences with discrimination (see Schmitt and Branscombe, 2002). Theoretically, 
the question is how ethnic identity is involved in these perceptions and experiences. 
Here, I focus on ethnic identification for which there are two main possibilities. 
First, ethnic identification can be an antecedent of perceived discrimination because 
group identification provides a framework or lens to interpret the social world (the 
“group identity lens model”). Second, ethnic identification can be a consequence of 
discrimination because discrimination implicates one’s ethnic self and therefore makes 
ethnic identity more relevant and important (the “group identity reaction model”). The 
first part of this chapter focuses on the former and discusses the social psychological 
reasons why ethnic minority members tend to minimize and underestimate, rather 
than exaggerate, the possibility of discrimination. In the second part, the focus is 
on increased ethnic identification as a result of discrimination. Attachments to one’s 
minority group can be an important buffer to the negative psychological effects that 
discrimination typically implies and forms the psychological basis for collective 
action. Increased ethnic identification resulting from discrimination can also lead to a 
less positive attitude towards the majority group and the host society. This possibility 
will be discussed in terms of the so-called “integration paradox”. 
	 Group	identity	lens	model
This model hypothesizes that ethnic identification is an antecedent of perceived 
discrimination. This model is in line with self-categorization theory (Turner and 
Reynolds, 2001) which posits that when a particular social identity is salient it 
provides a “lens” through which the perceiver sees the world and makes sense of it. 
Group identity functions as a group lens that makes individuals sensitive to anything 
that concerns or could harm their group and themselves as members of that group. 
Thus, increased ethnic identification will lead to increased discrimination perceptions 
and these perceptions will result in coping responses. Different studies have found 
supporting evidence for this model (see Major et al., 2002). Thus, a minority member 
may perceive more discrimination because of the importance or centrality of ethnic 
identity to her sense of self. 
It is often assumed that this association between ethnic identification and 
discrimination perceptions stems from an internal psychological process. People 
who identify more strongly with their group are more concerned about things that 
affect their group negatively and therefore will be more sensitive to and vigilant about 
discrimination, even in cases where there is no discrimination. Accusations of ethnic 
minorities being over-sensitive, complainers and exploiting victimhood are frequently 
heard in public debates. 
Self-categorization theory, however, does not claim that everything is in the 
“eye of the beholder”, but, rather, that there is a social reality to represent and that 
veridical perceptions are possible and sought. Individuals are strongly motivated to 
seek appropriate evidence and arguments for understanding their social world. The 
mechanism of epistemic motivation implies a drive to understand and have a grip 
on the world, and thus to create adequate knowledge (Fischer and Connell, 2003). 
Furthermore, individuals also want to have some sense of control over their social 
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world. Discrimination attributions mean that others determine what happens to you 
and thereby imply a loss of personal control.
Many studies have found that members of minority groups perceive a higher level 
of discrimination directed at their group as a whole than at themselves as individual 
members of that group. Taylor and colleagues (1990) labelled this phenomenon 
the personal/group discrimination discrepancy (PGD). This discrepancy is a robust 
finding within an array of disadvantaged groups who were asked differently phrased 
questions (see Taylor et al., 1993). Several explanations have been offered for this 
phenomenon, such as the minimization or underestimation of personal discrimination 
and the exaggeration of discrimination directed at the group as a whole. The former 
explanation has attracted the most interest. Minimization of personal discrimination 
can be the result of psychological and social processes. 
 Psychological and social costs
Psychologically, blaming outcomes on discrimination acknowledges that one’s 
outcomes are under the control of prejudiced others. A sense of personal control 
is essential, however, for psychological well-being and effective functioning, 
and is typically more important than avoiding self-blame. The minimization or 
underestimation of discrimination allows ethnic minority members to maintain such a 
sense of control. Thus, although an explanation in terms of discrimination attributions 
might protect feelings of self-worth (e.g., “that employer discriminates me and 
therefore it is not my fault that I did not get the job”), it threatens the belief in having 
control over personal outcomes in one’s life (e.g. “not I, but the employer, makes 
decisions about my life”). The result is that ethnic minorities are inclined to minimize 
and underestimate the extent to which they are personally victims of discrimination, 
rather than to exaggerate discrimination experiences (Ruggiero and Taylor, 1997).
Interpretations in terms of discrimination typically also imply accusations and 
thereby have social costs. The negative social costs related to these interpretations 
can be another reason for the minimization of discrimination (Kaiser and Miller, 
2001). In this case it is not psychological minimization but rather social minimization 
because of the perceived social costs of reporting discrimination publicly. Kaiser and 
Miller (2001) demonstrated that individuals who report discrimination are perceived 
negatively by others (e.g., being “complainers”) even when discrimination was the 
clear cause of the event. In addition, Stangor and colleagues (2002) found that in 
the presence of majority group members, ethnic minorities are relatively unwilling 
to report that negative events are the result of discrimination. Thus, minorities tend 
to avoid blaming negative outcomes on discrimination because they fear the social 
costs associated with making such claims. These social costs do not only relate 
to the negative reactions of majority group members. Co-ethnics can also react 
negatively toward individual group members, for example when they fear that they 
themselves or their entire ethnic group will be labelled as complainers who avoid 
outcome responsibility (Garzia et al., 2005). The social disapproval from co-ethnics is 
particularly painful because social support is typically expected from them. The social 
costs involved may prevent discriminated people from reporting and confronting the 
discrimination they face in their daily lives. 
130     the others in europe
 Perceptions and experiences
The discussion of social costs indicates that the perception of discrimination 
can stem from something external to minorities rather than from misperceptions and 
hypersensitivity. This might also be the case for the positive relationship between 
ethnic identification and perceived discrimination. Specifically, it is possible that 
majority group members react more negatively toward strongly identified ethnic 
minorities than to those who weakly identify with their minority group. As a result, 
the former group of minority members may actually face more discrimination than the 
latter one. Native Dutch, French or Belgian people, for example, might discriminate 
more against Moroccan immigrants who identify relatively strongly with their own 
group than against Moroccans who feel less committed to their Moroccan culture 
and community. This can be understood when we realize that ethnic identities (like 
other social identities) are not like private beliefs or convictions that, in principle, 
can be sustained without expression and social recognition. Social identities depend 
crucially on acknowledgement and acceptance by others (see Verkuyten, 2005). 
Anthropologists, for example, have shown how people use particular behaviours 
to form and negotiate their ethnic identity in everyday interactions; and, discourse 
analysts have shown how social identities are maintained in ongoing conversation. 
All of this research indicates that social identities are sustainable to the extent that 
they are expressed and affirmed in acceptable practices. A Moroccan French identity, 
in any real sense, implies, for example, that one is able to claim and express desired 
images, positions, and self-understandings in a variety of contexts and especially in 
public spaces. And being a Moroccan is often a more “problematic” or accountable 
issue in public life than in private life. Compared to low identifiers, minority members 
who identify relatively strongly with their ethnic group will more frequently perform 
or enact their identity in language, dress, posture and so on. This “doing of ethnicity” 
confirms their ethnic identity by expressing the value of the group symbolically. 
Ethnic behaviours communicate one’s distinctive identity. It tells others who you 
are, to which group you belong and what this group membership means to you. The 
wearing, or not wearing, of a headscarf communicates what kind of Muslim you 
consider yourself to be and how you want to be seen and recognized by others. 
The “doing of ethnicity” will, however, elicit more frequent negative and 
discriminatory reactions from the majority. Majority members might react negatively 
toward strongly identified ethnic minorities because these minorities are seen as 
threatening the majority’s cultural identity and as rejecting beliefs that legitimize 
the status hierarchy. Symbolic threats are based on perceived group differences in 
practices and behaviours that express particular values, norms, and beliefs. Ethnic 
minorities that act differently and have a different worldview can be seen as 
threatening the cultural identity of the majority group. New practices, norms, beliefs, 
and symbols can be considered opposite to what one values leading to the fear that 
other cultures will override one’s own way of life. Multiple studies have shown that 
perceived threats by immigrants and minorities to society’s way of life are related to 
more exclusionary reactions towards these groups (e.g. Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 
2007). For example, in her study of 17 European countries, McLaren (2003) found 
that beliefs challenged by immigrants or which undermine national values were the 
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strongest predictor of negative attitudes toward immigrants. The same has been found 
in relation to Muslims in various European countries (e.g. Velasco Gonzalez et al., 
2008). Public discourses in Europe on the “West-Muslim cultural war” (Scroggins, 
2005) and the presumed lack of socio-cultural integration of Muslims appears to 
underlie prejudice towards Muslims. 
This alleged “cultural war”, and, more generally, the discrimination of minorities, 
is not only about dealing with differences but also about the prevailing status 
arrangements in society. Majority members may assume that strongly identified 
minorities endorse status-legitimizing worldviews such as meritocracy and the belief 
in individual mobility to a lesser degree than weakly identified minorities. Research 
has shown that these assumptions are not unfounded (Major et al., 2002; Sellers and 
Shelton, 2003) and, thus, that there are reasons to expect that high ethnic minority 
identifiers challenge the status quo more strongly than low identifiers. For the majority 
group, discrimination is one way to deal with this challenge, thereby making it more 
difficult for high minority identifiers to publicly perform their identity and to enter the 
social system. Across six studies, Kaiser and Pratt-Hyatt (2009) found that majority 
group members actually expressed more negative reactions toward strongly identified 
ethnic minorities than toward weakly identified minorities. This indicates that high 
identified minorities who claim to experience increased levels of discrimination are 
not oversensitive or complainers or wallowing in victimhood. Rather, they actually 
face more discrimination. 
This is not to say that there is no strategic use of victimhood by ethnic minorities. 
There certainly is. Presenting oneself as a victim of discrimination and racism 
creates a sense of guilt within the majority and the status of victim confers a feeling 
of entitlements and the right to remedies and compensations (Moscovici and Pérez, 
2007). Victimhood can have strategic value because it offers the opportunity to make 
others feel guilty and responsible and thereby exculpate oneself.
	 Group	identity	reaction	model
Research has demonstrated that recognizing discrimination against one’s ethnic 
group and oneself as a member of that group has negative consequences for one’s 
psychological well-being (see Pascoe and Richman, 2009). These consequences are 
particularly negative when the discrimination is pervasive and systematic. This raises 
the question of how ethnic minority members cope with the pain of exclusion and 
discrimination. Group identification is one important means of coping. The “group 
identity reaction model” (or “rejection-identification model”) is based on the idea that 
being a target of discrimination leads individuals to identify more strongly with their 
ethnic minority group and that stronger identification is beneficial for psychological 
well-being. People can cope with out-group threats like discrimination by adopting 
group-based strategies that increase identification with their minority group. In turn, 
group identification can attenuate the negative effects of discrimination on well-
being. Some experimental evidence has shown that threats can indeed increase group 
identification or lead to greater emotional attachment to one’s group (Jetten et al., 
2001). Further, survey research among ethnic minority groups shows that increased 
perceptions of discrimination predict increased ethnic group identification. This has 
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been found, for example, in three studies among Turkish-Dutch people (Verkuyten 
and Yildiz, 2007) and in a longitudinal study of immigrants in Finland (Jasinskaje-
Lahti et al., 2009). 
Discrimination presents a threat to one’s ethnic identity, causing minorities to 
turn increasingly toward their minority group. Strong attachment and emotional 
investments in one’s group can be an important buffer to the negative psychological 
effects that exclusion typically implies. Minority group identification is associated 
with less depression and anxiety, more positive self-feelings, and other measures of 
personal adjustment (Pascoe and Richman, 2009). Group identification supports well-
being by providing security and a sense of belonging and acceptance. These feelings 
counter the psychological costs of feeling rejected and excluded by the majority. 
Group identification can also provide greater opportunities for social support from 
co-ethnics. Social support can take various forms including emotional and practical 
support, which are particularly important for emotion-focused coping and problem-
focused coping, respectively. 
	 Collective	action
There is an additional benefit of turning toward one’s ethnic minority group in 
response to discrimination. Group identification does not only counter some of the 
psychological costs of discrimination but also offers a basis for collective action. 
Collective action is defined as any action that aims to improve the status, position 
or influence of an entire group, rather than of one or a few individuals (Wright et al., 
1990). This kind of action occurs when a person’s behaviour is structured by a particular 
group membership with its shared values, norms and goals (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). 
Group identification implies that individuals start to think and act on the basis of what 
the group defines and thereby think and act in concert with other group members. 
Discrimination and other forms of exclusion convey a negative social identity. Social 
identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) argues that group identification can lead to 
two general strategies for constructing a positive social identity despite threatening 
and discriminatory behaviours by the majority. 
Social creativity is the first strategy. This strategy implies that ethnic minorities 
emphasize characteristics and dimensions where their group fares more favourably 
as compared to the majority group. For example, ethnic minority groups often will 
acknowledge that the majority is superior regarding status-defining dimensions such 
as wealth and education but perceive their own group as superior regarding such 
non-status defining dimensions as family integrity and morality. Politically, social 
creativity amounts to differentiation from the mainstream by rejecting the norms and 
standards of the dominant culture and emphasizing separate norms and values that 
define one’s ethnic minority group positively. One example is the development of an 
oppositional identity which implies a process of cultural inversion (Ogbu, 1993). With 
cultural inversion, the norms, values, beliefs and practices that are associated with a 
dominant culture are defined as inappropriate for one’s ethnic minority group and an 
alternative cultural frame of reference is developed. 
Social competition is the second strategy for an ethnic minority group facing 
discrimination and exclusion. Members of discriminated groups can act collectively 
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to actually challenge and try to change the status quo. And because majority members 
may band together to resist change, forms of social conflict and open hostility can 
be the result. Empirical research has shown that group identification is an important 
predictor of willingness to engage in collective action on behalf of the group (see 
Simon, 2004). Group identification has been found to possess a unique mobilizing 
power over and above feelings of relative deprivation and cost-benefit calculations. 
This is particularly likely when there is a strongly developed and politicized sense 
of identification with a social movement (Simon and Klandermans, 2001). Group 
identification also provides an alternative basis for a sense of control that is undermined 
by experiences of discrimination. Acting collectively can bring about a change in the 
social system and thereby provide a sense of collective efficacy. 
 Sociostructural context
The “group identity reaction model” argues that perceptions and experiences 
of discrimination make members of ethnic minority groups increase their group 
identification which can lead to positive psychological and social effects. However, 
social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) proposes that increased group 
identification in response to discrimination is not inevitable but depends on the 
perception of the socio-structural system. SIT specifies three socio-structural variables 
that, interactively, would influence people’s responses to discrimination and – more 
generally – to finding themselves in a disadvantaged social position. Specifically, 
beliefs about the stability and legitimacy of the status system and the nature of group 
boundaries would affect people’s responses and strategies for group differentiation. 
Stability refers to the extent to which group positions are considered to be changeable. 
Legitimacy refers to the extent to which the status structure is accepted as just. 
Permeability (or “openness”) refers to the extent to which individual group members 
can leave one group and join another. Perceived stability, legitimacy, and permeability 
would, interactively, determine group identification of ethnic minority members. 
Membership in disadvantaged groups confers a negative identity and instigates 
identity management strategies. Depending on the nature of the social structure, ethnic 
minority members adopt different strategies to achieve a more positive social identity. 
One way in which this can be done is to follow an individualistic social mobility 
path and dissociate oneself psychologically from one’s devalued ethnic minority 
group (Wright et al., 1990). As Tajfel and Turner (1979, p. 43) argue, “individual 
mobility implies a disidentification with the erstwhile ingroup” and, it can be added, 
an increased identification with the majority group and host society. This strategy 
presupposes that the group boundaries are seen as relatively permeable or open, 
indicating that membership in the high status group can be achieved. Furthermore, 
this individual strategy is especially likely when the status differences are perceived as 
stable and legitimate. Under these conditions, collective strategies to achieve positive 
ethnic identity are more difficult, making individual strategies more likely. 
There is empirical evidence for this reasoning (see Bettencourt et al., 2001). 
For example, in a study among Turkish Dutch people it was found that when the 
inter-ethnic relations were considered as relatively stable and legitimate, perceived 
permeability was associated with lower Turkish identification and higher Dutch 
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identification (Verkuyten and Reijerse, 2008). Hence, in a stable and legitimate 
intergroup structure and when the Turkish-Dutch participants saw opportunities to 
be accepted in the Dutch majority group, they tended to psychologically dissociate 
themselves from their Turkish community and to associate themselves more with 
the Dutch. These results support the claim that in a perceived stable and legitimate 
intergroup structure with permeable group boundaries, ethnic minority group members 
tend not to use strategies of group identification and social competition, but rather 
group disidentification and individual mobility (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Increased 
group identification and collective actions are more likely when the boundaries are 
considered to be rather impermeable or closed such that ethnic minority members 
cannot improve their individual position. In addition, for collective action to occur 
the group’s social position has to be assessed as undeserved or illegitimate and there 
should be a belief that the social structure is not stable but can be changed.
	 The	integration	paradox
“It is precisely minority group members who are initially the most strongly 
focused on social acceptance and mobility in the dominant society who explicitly 
turn away when they experience rejection and seek safety in a defensive, own group 
identity”.
This quote is from a qualitative study on processes of radicalization among ethnic 
minority youth in the Netherlands (Buis et al., 2006, p. 208-209). The researchers use 
the term “integration paradox” to indicate that minority members who are relatively 
successful in their educational pursuits and in the labour market are sensitive to ethnic 
acceptance and equality. Full recognition and inclusion by the majority group are 
particularly meaningful and important because of their structural integration and 
efforts to succeed. Experiences and perceptions of non-acceptance and discrimination, 
despite successful integration into society, push them to turn towards their own 
minority community and away from Dutch society, for example, by developing more 
negative attitudes towards the native population. 
Some of the empirical implications of this “integration paradox” are counter-
intuitive. An example is the proposed relationship between the level of education and 
ethnic attitudes. The literature consistently finds that the higher educated, as compared 
to the lower educated, hold more favourable attitudes towards other ethnic groups. In 
addition, numerous studies have shown that intergroup contact has a positive effect on 
ethnic attitudes (see Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), and higher educated ethnic minorities 
tend to have more voluntary contacts with the native population (e.g., Martinovic 
et al., 2009). The “integration paradox”, however, implies that higher educated 
minorities will be less positive towards the native majority group. This might mean 
that there are two processes. On the one hand, higher educated minorities have more 
frequent voluntary contacts with the native population than lower educated minorities 
and more contact is associated with more positive attitudes towards the majority 
group. On the other hand, higher educated minorities will feel less accepted in the host 
country and perceive more discrimination than lower educated minorities, resulting 
in less positive attitudes towards the majority group. In addition, according to the 
“integration paradox”, feelings and perceptions of non-acceptance and discrimination 
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make minority members identify more strongly with their own ethnic group and this 
higher identification, in turn, would lead to a more negative attitude towards the native 
population. 
We examined these two processes among large samples of the four largest ethnic 
minority groups living in the Netherlands, those of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, 
and Antillean descent (Ten Teije et al., 2010). It turned out that the pattern of 
associations was quite similar for these four minority groups. As regards the first 
process, the findings demonstrated that higher educated ethnic minorities indeed 
had more voluntary contacts with the native Dutch and that contact was associated 
with a more positive attitude towards this group. More importantly, there was also 
empirical evidence for the second process. Higher educated participants perceived less 
acceptance of ethnic minority groups in Dutch society and more group discrimination 
than lower educated participants. These perceptions were related to stronger ethnic 
group identification and, thereby, to a less positive attitude towards the Dutch.
In addition, the acceptance and treatment of co-ethnics rather than personal 
experiences with discrimination were found to be important for the attitude of the higher 
educated. This supports the idea that the more advantaged members of disadvantaged 
groups tend to engage in group comparisons and develop more negative attitudes 
towards the advantaged group. Higher education might increase one’s awareness and 
concern about the vulnerable and relatively marginal position of ethnic minorities in 
society. In addition, when they perceive and experience ethnic discrimination, higher 
status minority members might be more assertive (Baumgartner, 1998). Although 
we did not explicitly test these interpretations, we did find that the higher educated 
perceived more group discrimination than the lower educated, whereas there was 
no difference for personal discrimination. In turn, and independently of personal 
discrimination, higher perceived group discrimination was associated with stronger 
ethnic group identification. Thus, in agreement with the “group identity reaction 
model”, the feeling that one’s ethnic minority group is not accepted or discriminated 
in society was associated with higher ethnic group identification. In turn, higher ethnic 
group identification was related to a less positive attitude towards the Dutch. 
	 Conclusion
Being excluded or treated unfairly is painful, particularly when it is based on a 
group membership that is central to one’s sense of self. Many ethnic minority group 
members attach great importance to their ethnic background (Verkuyten, 2005). They 
derive an ethnic identity from their group membership, and therefore prefer their ethnic 
group to be socially recognized, accepted and valued. This confers a meaningful and 
positive ethnic identity on them that they want to maintain and protect. In contrast, a 
devalued or misrecognized ethnic identity represents an identity threat that is likely to 
lead to the deployment of a wide range of identity-management strategies (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979). Discrimination contains the message that one has lower status and does 
not belong here. It threatens people’s feelings of self-worth and need to belong. It also 
conveys the message that others decide one’s outcomes in life and thereby threatens 
one’s sense of personal control. 
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Ethnic group identification can be an antecedent or a consequence of 
discrimination perceptions and experiences. As an antecedent, ethnic identification 
provides a framework or lens for perceiving and experiencing the social world. That 
means that high identifiers will be more sensitive to the possibility of discrimination. 
But this higher sensitivity does not imply that they are over-sensitive complainers and 
tend to exaggerate discrimination. Exaggeration and the strategic use of victimhood 
do occur, but, in general, ethnic minorities are rather reluctant to attribute outcomes 
to discrimination. 
The perception and experience of ethnic discrimination can also result in 
increased ethnic identification. Being a target of discrimination leads individuals to 
identify more strongly with their ethnic minority group because this is beneficial for 
psychological well-being and forms the psychological basis for collective action. 
When people think in terms of their group membership they will be inclined to act 
on the basis of the shared norms, values and beliefs that define their ethnic group. 
Ethnic minority members are more likely to adopt collective strategies when the 
social system is considered illegitimate and unstable, and there is little opportunity to 
achieve membership in the high status group. 
Often the more advantaged members of discriminated groups are more aware and 
concerned about the relatively vulnerable and marginal position of their ethnic group 
and are more assertive in instigating action and protest. The “integration paradox” 
indicates that full recognition and acceptance by the majority group is more important 
and meaningful for the higher educated than for the lower educated. Experiences of 
discrimination and non-acceptance, despite their efforts and successful integration in 
society, cause the higher educated to emphasize their ethnic identity and turn away 
from the host society. Thus, ethnic minority members who are the most successful can 
become the ones who are most negative towards the native population because they 
are relatively more concerned about the existing group-based rejection, exclusion and 
inequality. 
chapter ix
Why do minorities rarely report experiences 
with discrimination? 
Exploring qualitatively what inhibits or favours claims  
of discrimination 
Alejandra Alarcon-Henriquez and Assaad Azzi
	 Introduction
Ethnic discrimination against immigrants and their descendants is a major 
problem in the labour market. The consequences of such discrimination include higher 
unemployment rates, precarious employment and lower wages for ethnic minorities 
which in turn contribute greatly to existing inequalities between “nationals” and “non 
nationals” (ILO, 2007). Elaboration of anti-discrimination laws by several European 
governments is an important step in the struggle against inequality but only a few 
victims actually utilize these tools. Indeed, a recent large-scale survey on discrimination 
in Europe published by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) revealed that a 
majority of ethnic minority members do not report the discrimination they experience 
(FRA, 2009a). According to Hirschman (1970), if dissatisfied individuals do not 
denounce their dissatisfaction (voice strategy), the structure they live in cannot be 
changed. Opportunities to express one’s discontent are also a means to prevent these 
individuals from leaving the structure (exit strategy). Indeed, one way of coping with 
perceived injustice is to withdraw from broader society (Azzi, 1998), e.g. through 
separation or marginalization (see Berry, 1997). In order to prevent further exclusion 
of immigrants and their children who were born and raised in Europe, it is important to 
tackle the situation and investigate the reasons for reduced reporting of discrimination 
by vulnerable minorities. The FRA study indicated a lack of knowledge on the part 
of minorities about organisations offering advice and support on this issue but this 
is not the only reason. The belief that claims of discrimination would not change the 
situation or that discrimination is insignificant are the other main reasons provided by 
the respondents (FRA, 2009b).
We will explore this question further in the present study. Employing qualitative 
methodology, our main objective is to investigate why minorities will or will not 
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denounce their experiences with discrimination within the framework of the measures 
created by the host society to voice individual dissatisfaction. In the FRA study, 
participant opinion regarding discrimination was sought through closed questions 
including an initial explanation of what discrimination means to the authorities. 
Contrary to the FRA study, we relied on open-ended questions in order to understand 
and utilize the vocabulary and discourses of minorities so as to better understand 
their perception of unequal treatment in Belgium, the host society in this study. How 
do members of ethnic minority groups define “discrimination”? Which unequal 
treatments are defined as just or unjust? According to members of these groups, which 
unequal treatments must be reported to the authorities? We will also investigate the 
impact of knowledge of anti-discrimination laws and organisations on the opinion 
of ethnic minorities. Does awareness of anti-discrimination measures facilitate the 
tendency to denounce discrimination and what other factors either hinder or encourage 
discrimination claims? 
We use theoretical frameworks from social psychology to shed light on the 
various discourses held by the participants in our study. Focusing mainly on collective 
action, social psychologists have investigated the motivations of disadvantaged 
group members in their struggle against inequalities. Collective action appears when 
an individual “is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed 
at improving the condition of the entire group” (Wright et al., 1990). In general, 
collective action is represented as a collective movement, involving more than one 
individual. But following Wright’s definition, filing a complaint of discrimination 
could be considered a form of collective action if the plaintiff seeks to improve 
the status of the group as a whole and not only his personal situation. One plaintiff 
can lead to the creation of case law for example, which in turn can establish – or 
reinforce – the social norm of equality amongst the population. For example, the case 
of Brown v. the Board of Education in the US, whereby the Supreme Court decided 
that racial segregation in schools was unconstitutional, is regarded as a turning point 
that contributed to paving the way to the civil rights movement (e.g. Kluger, 1976). 
Thus the use of legal action in the struggle against inequalities could be considered 
a collective action and a contribution to social change. In this study, we will analyze 
whether the obstacles to and the factors favouring collective action as mentioned in 
social psychology literature can also be applied to legal anti-discrimination actions. 
The use of institutional opportunities to fight inequalities has – to our knowledge – 
not been studied yet in social psychology; nor has the way in which such institutional 
provisions may contribute to social change, for instance by modifying social 
identifications and norms of disadvantaged group members. This qualitative study is 
a first attempt in this direction.
	 Methodology
We conducted interviews with 15 individuals, including seven female participants 
and eight male participants. Our study’s participants were recruited from an association 
for “social and professional integration” in a neighbourhood with high immigration 
rates. The association offers diverse career services including information on training 
opportunities, assistance in writing curriculum vitae and cover letters, advice 
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on defining clear professional goals, etc. All of the participants are immigrants or 
descendants of immigrants and came to the association seeking help in finding a job. 
The study’s participants had different foreign origins: Moroccan (N = 7), Turkish (N = 
4), Guinean (N = 2), Albanian (N = 1) and Italian (N = 1). Most of them were Muslim 
(N = 12). They were asked to participate in a study regarding obstacles encountered 
in their job search. The interviewer did not mention the true objective of the study 
(representations of discrimination) at that moment but only later on so as not to 
influence the participants’ statements. Indeed, we wanted to know if the participants 
would spontaneously mention religious or ethnic discrimination as an obstacle in their 
job search. 
The interviews were semi-structured. We explored the following themes or 
questions:
1. What were the obstacles encountered during their job search?
2. What were their experiences with religious or ethnic discrimination?
3. What is their perception of group discrimination?
4. What knowledge or opinion of anti-discrimination laws and organisations do the 
respondents have?
5. What is their reaction to a real discrimination case? The actual objective of 
the study was also explained at this point. We provided an example of ethnic 
discrimination which appeared recently in the news. A young man of Turkish 
origin had applied for a job in the security sector and had received a negative 
response by e-mail. An earlier e-mail exchange between the secretary and the 
employer was accidently attached to the e-mail in which the latter wrote: “Can 
you get rid of this person? A foreigner for a security job, that’s unheard of”. 
6. What is their opinion of legal action against incidents of discrimination and 
possible outcomes. We explained that the Turkish man later consulted an anti-
discrimination organisation and filed a complaint against the employer for 
discrimination. We mentioned the outcome of the procedure whereby the employer 
was found guilty by the Court and forced to discontinue all discriminatory action.
7. What would they do if they were in the victim’s shoes?
	 Results
 Representations of religious or ethnic discrimination
For most of the participants (N = 10), religious or ethnic discrimination is defined 
as a lack of acceptance, rejection or dislike by the other because of their origins. 
“Everybody knows there is racism. But it will always continue. They will always 
find an excuse to say: we don’t want you” (participant 11).
“They don’t like us because we are Muslim. They will say they prefer a Belgian 
to a foreigner” (participant 12).
Discrimination is sometimes felt as a lack of respect or poor treatment that 
diminishes an individual’s sense of worth (N = 5).
“My brother-in-law is from Morocco and they do not want to give him work 
because he doesn’t speak French very well. They make fun of him. At the town hall too 
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they play with him. They ask him to come another day. They play with words because 
they know he cannot speak French very well. That’s the way it is” (participant 11).
The way individuals are treated by the authorities or by other members of the 
group gives them information about their status in the group, i.e. – in our study – in 
Belgian society. If these individuals feel excluded from the distribution of resources 
(e.g. restricted access to employment) or if they sense a lack of respect, they can 
perceive themselves as marginalized and devalued by the group. Such treatment sends 
the message that he or she is not recognized as a member of the group (Tyler and Lind, 
1992).
One way to deal with status inferiority is re-categorization at a higher level 
(Mummendey et al., 1999). For example, seeing themselves as human beings rather 
than as undesired Belgian immigrants enhances a positive self-image. According 
to Wenzel (2000), self-categorization is a key component in claims for justice. 
Individuals feel entitled to demand being treated equally to other members of a group 
if they perceive themselves as being part of that group. Eight participants perceived 
discrimination as the failure to respect egalitarian principles whereby everyone 
deserves equal treatment as human beings. We note that all participants referred to 
these egalitarian principles after we alluded to anti-discrimination laws, organisations 
and their possible outcomes. For these participants, only one criterion should be used 
to judge whether an applicant is the right person for the job: his abilities.
“It’s unjust. If we have the skills, we have origins that are not suitable for… it 
has nothing to do with it. We are all human beings; we have the same rights as anyone 
else” (participant 9).
One participant evoked the right to be treated as equal to any other Belgian, since 
he has Belgian nationality.
“If we have a Belgian identity card, ok they still can see we are Turkish. But if we 
have an identity card, they have to treat us all the same” (participant 12).
One third of the participants, on the other hand, saw discrimination as normal 
and trivial despite our mentioning the existence of anti-discrimination measures in 
Belgium. They accepted the idea that one cannot be forced to hire or to like someone. 
These were all male participants.
“I had that once with [company X]. I wanted to work with them but he said no 
immediately. I don’t know why. The employer saw my face and he said he didn’t have 
time. I knew it was racism (...) I didn’t care. It’s normal. I’ve had that before, often” 
(participant 11).
“I have the impression that foreigners are discriminated against (…). We cannot 
say anything. If they don’t want them, they don’t want them. What can we say? 
Thanks, bye and we move on” (participant 12).
According to three participants, people that discriminate against ethnic minorities 
are not to blame. For them, discrimination is a result of ignorance or incomprehension 
of cultural differences.
“I don’t blame anybody, not even the person who discriminates. Maybe he is 
victim of an ideology? He was indoctrinated to think that people with other origins 
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are not good. Maybe he didn’t learn otherwise and that’s it. He doesn’t accept others” 
(participant 7).
As for the example of discrimination provided to the participants, one participant 
blamed the victim, not the employer, for having been discriminated against. However, 
this participant changed her opinion once we mentioned the existence of anti-
discrimination laws and organisations in Belgium:
“It depends on how people talk too. There are people who ask things in a polite 
manner and people who are proud and don’t want to be told what to do and get angry. 
Maybe the young Turk had a problem?
Do you know there are laws in Belgium that condemn discrimination?
No.
And that there are organisations in charge of combating discrimination?
No. It’s wrong to say that then?
Well, discrimination in employment is prohibited by law. The young Turkish man 
filed a complaint against the employer and went to Court. The company was found 
guilty. What do you think about this legal option?
It’s not normal to refuse someone on the basis of his nationality. Only his work 
matters. If he does his work correctly, they cannot attack people like that. It’s not kind 
anyway. It hurts nevertheless. It’s wrong to say that. It’s racism” (participant 15).
When individuals are uncertain of their judgements, they turn towards others – 
preferably experts – to seek information and social norms to guide their impressions 
(Sherif, 1980). We do not know if the attitude change seen above reflected a true 
internalization of the given injunctive norms (see Cialdini et al., 1990) – the prohibition 
of discrimination in employment – or merely a sort of public conformity whereby the 
participant was not actually convinced (Kelman, 1958).
 Personal and group discrimination perceptions
 Spontaneous evocation of discrimination experiences
Only four participants mentioned religious or ethnic discrimination as a 
possible obstacle in their job search before the interviewer introduced these issues. 
Two participants spontaneously mentioned their origins as an obstacle to finding 
employment with certitude. For example:
“One obstacle there is my [education] level… sometimes they don’t accept 
blacks. For examples in a restaurant, certain clients don’t like to be served by blacks” 
(participant 2).
The two others mentioned their origin as a possible reason for not being called 
back by the employer:
“I receive negative responses to my letters and they don’t explain why. I don’t 
know. Maybe [because of] my appearance? (While touching his beard) I don’t have a 
Belgian face” (participant 10)
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 Personal experiences with discrimination and perceived group discrimination
When asked directly if they have experienced religious or ethnic discrimination 
in employment or other sectors, only five participants – i.e. a third of all participants 
– answered negatively. We note that most of them were female with little experience 
seeking employment (participants 1, 4 and 9) and/or who sought employment in their 
own neighbourhood with employers of the same origin (participants 1, 8 and 9). The 
four female participants had also never heard of discrimination against other members 
of their ingroup. Two women mentioned the few interactions they experienced with 
non immigrants. The only male participant who had not experienced discrimination 
was the participant with Italian origins. He was nevertheless aware that his fellow 
ingroup members were severely discriminated against in the past and that currently 
other minorities are targets of discrimination in Belgium.
According to relative deprivation theory, disadvantaged group members do not 
always perceive the injustice they face as they are unable to compare themselves 
to members of advantaged groups. They compare themselves to what is accessible 
to them, namely fellow ingroup members living in the same conditions (Taylor and 
Moghaddam, 1994, quoted by Taylor and Smith, 1998). 
Eight of the ten participants reminiscing about a personal experience with 
discrimination evoked it with uncertainty and precaution:
“Once I thought about that [discrimination]. We had a job interview and several 
people had applied. There was a Belgian colleague from my training course. We had 
a technical questionnaire. They told me I had good results. Then during the interview, 
they told me that it was good but that my Dutch skills could be a problem. My Belgian 
colleague succeeded. He didn’t speak Dutch either but he was hired. I don’t accuse 
them. I don’t say that I was discriminated against, but I thought it was strange: we had 
the same level, the same training” (participant 5).
These findings confirm the results of Ruggiero and Taylor (1995) which show 
that disadvantaged group members tend not to attribute their negative outcomes to 
discrimination. Indeed, even when participants in their study were told there was a 
good chance (e.g. 75%) that they had been discriminated against by an evaluator, they 
attributed the failure to their own performance. Only the participants who were told 
they had definitely been discriminated against (100%) attributed the negative outcome 
to discrimination. However, if we consider the studies of Crocker et al. (1998), 
individuals who are aware of their stigma never really discard the possibility of 
having been discriminated against. On the contrary, compared to individuals without 
a devalued social identity, members of disadvantaged groups have the tendency to 
interpret the others’ reactions towards them with ambiguity because they know their 
social identity can have an effect. As a result, stigmatized individuals may experience 
difficulties assessing their own abilities which in turn could have consequences on 
important life choices such as determining their professional career. If, for instance, 
negative outcomes are attributed to their own skills rather than to discrimination, this 
can induce negative self-esteem. Other consequences are the anxiety and rumination 
caused by the analysis of the ambiguous situation and loss of trust in interpersonal 
relations (see Crocker et al., 1998).
Claims of discrimination were perceived as a sign of weakness for two participants.
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“Weak people are the ones who feel discriminated against. They start to think 
about it, get a headache, don’t feel well. Someone who is 18 years old who is 
discriminated against will think: oh I’m not lucky. Someone who is older doesn’t get 
emotional about it” (participant 7).
Previous studies in social psychology show that claims of discrimination have 
social costs. Independent of the certainty of discrimination, disadvantaged group 
members who claim discrimination are less valued by advantaged group members 
(Kaiser and Miller, 2001) and fellow disadvantaged group members (Garcia et al., 
2005) than individuals attributing negative outcomes to any other external cause. 
Indeed, while individuals try to maintain a positive image of their social identity, 
an admission that ingroup members have been discriminated against implies a 
devaluation of the ingroup and the possibility that they could experience the same in 
the future. By rejecting ingroup members whose actions or claims reflect a negative 
image of the ingroup, individuals preserve a positive social identity.
The social costs of claims of discrimination in advantaged and disadvantaged 
groups can also be explained by other factors. According to Katz and Hass (1988), 
certain ideologies influence people’s attitudes towards disadvantaged group members. 
Protestant work ethic (PWE) values for example suggest the belief that anyone who 
is willing and able to work hard has a good chance to succeed in life. This in turn 
strengthens the tendency to blame disadvantaged groups for their unfavourable social 
position. When disadvantaged group members endorse these values too, it can lead 
to decreased perceptions of discrimination and increased endorsement of status 
justifying beliefs (e.g. McCoy and Major, 2007). PWE was evident in the discourses 
of several participants, including the following quotation:
“No, I don’t think so [that there is discrimination]. If you want a job you can find 
one. Sometimes you hear from people that they have been discriminated against, but 
it is rare” (participant 4).
System justification theory (see Jost, 2004 for a review) maintains that individuals 
tend to legitimize the social system they live in, even if the system is not beneficial 
for them at an individual or collective level. In societies where individualism and 
meritocracy are valued, existing social inequalities are deemed justified. From that 
perspective, advantaged and disadvantaged group members assume responsibility for 
their economic status and justify social dominance and its reproduction.
 Reactions to experiences of discrimination
Various feelings were expressed by the participants when reporting their 
experiences with discrimination. Sometimes more than one feeling was expressed by 
the same participant. Eight participants felt powerless when personally confronted 
with discrimination and were also unwilling to undertake any kind of action 
regarding the situation. For example, all of the male participants who had personally 
experienced discrimination employed such expressions as “it’s not worth it”, “it will 
not change anything”, “we cannot say anything” or “it’s a losing battle”. Only one of 
the three female participants personally confronted with discrimination made similar 
statements. The other two felt mainly surprise or hurt (see below).
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If attributing negative outcomes to discrimination rather than to our own skills 
can protect our individual self-esteem, it can undermine self-esteem at the social 
level, as mentioned above. Moreover, attributing outcomes to external causes such 
as discrimination diminishes our sense of control over our actions (Ruggiero and 
Taylor, 1995). Studies in clinical psychology point to the importance of a positive 
view of ourselves and a sense of control over our life in order to maintain mental 
health (e.g. Taylor and Brown, 1988). Experiences with discrimination shatter such 
assumptions of control. The negative effects of such experiences can be minimised 
through downward comparisons with people in worse situations in order to preserve 
positive views of ourselves (Taylor and Smith, 1998).
Six male participants did not wish to recollect or talk about the discrimination they 
had personally experienced for several reasons. One felt it weakened his motivation 
to search for a job:
“Personally, I leave it there. I look somewhere else. I will not start to focus on that 
problem and that’s it. Moreover there is a risk that it is confirmed that it is because of 
that [discrimination]. If employers start to think like that, why search and try to sell 
myself? Because it’s a losing battle. Sincerely, I don’t think it is worth thinking about 
it. Otherwise it will impede me in my continued job search” (participant 5).
Another believed that discrimination can be overcome by persevering and 
doubling his efforts in order to compensate for the stigma, i.e. for the devaluation of 
his social identity:
“Before, I used to act nervously, but now it leaves me cold. I learned one thing: 
if I want to have something, I have to put that aside, work harder and not give up” 
(participant 6).
When combined with feelings of anger or annoyance, some of the participants 
mentioned that they are afraid of what they might do to the perpetrators:
“A lot of things are felt, but we have nothing to say. What are we going to 
say? Otherwise we want to hit this kind of people. You want to slap him, that’s all” 
(participant 12).
Finally, some think that they do not have the right to complain:
“Because when we are not integrated, when we aren’t in our country, we don’t 
have the right to... You don’t know what to think” (participant 13).
Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) assumes that three main factors 
influence an individual’s perceptions and reactions to their (disadvantaged) position in 
the societal structure: perceived stability, permeability and legitimacy. If individuals 
perceive the current situation as stable (that it cannot be changed), they would not 
engage in actions to challenge the status quo. In our study, seven of the ten participants 
that experienced discrimination expressed the feeling that the situation could not be 
changed (see above). The belief that one could move upwards from one (low-status) 
group to another (high-status) or that the social boundaries between the groups are 
“permeable”, facilitates engagement in status enhancement at an individual level, but 
not at a group level. Indeed, improving the status of his group as a whole might not 
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be necessary if for instance an individual believes he or she can succeed socially and 
professionally solely through personal efforts (see e.g. participant 6 above). Finally, 
if differential treatments are perceived as legitimate – e.g. because the individual was 
not integrated as participant 13 mentioned above – consequent group inequalities will 
not be challenged.
Two participants who felt powerless also spoke of a loss of self-confidence in 
their job search:
“I totally lost my self-confidence. I was completely disoriented. With all the 
refusals and rejections I had, I thought I wasn’t capable of anything, thus that I wasn’t 
worth anything. It discouraged me” (participant 2).
When personally confronted with unequal treatment because of foreign origins, 
people do not always have feelings of injustice. While six interviewees clearly felt the 
wrongness of religious or ethnic discrimination, one participant was in doubt whether 
to qualify discrimination as just or unjust:
“Is it just, unjust? I don’t know anymore. If there is an injustice, I’m the only one 
to blame. I’m not going to blame the society or work. I can only blame myself. I didn’t 
prove myself and that’s it. I can understand them” (participant 7).
As mentioned in this quotation, discrimination can increase the victim’s 
comprehension of the perpetrator. Four other participants claimed to understand the 
perpetrator’s perspective:
“I heard people saying they prefer a Belgian but they explain it and I understand” 
(participant 10).
Three participants were shocked or surprised when confronted with discrimination 
for the first time. One states that he grew accustomed to it:
“The first time I was insulted, it shocked me, but afterwards not anymore. The 
second time, third time, fourth, I thought it was normal. We have nothing to say” 
(participant 11).
According to cognitive dissonance theory, when individuals perceive dissonance 
between what they think and what they experience, they can adapt their beliefs in 
order to match reality. Consequently, individuals can justify experiences of deprivation 
and suffering in order to reduce dissonance (Jost et al., 2004), as illustrated in the 
following quotation:
“I was a little bit shocked. Afterwards, I asked myself why he talked to me like 
that. Then I thought that maybe he was right. Maybe someone who wasn’t trustworthy 
had worked with him previously, a foreigner who didn’t do his job well” (participant 
15).
Two participants felt hurt when personally confronted with discrimination. For 
example:
“When I was pregnant I heard my Italian sister-in-law say: what will your baby 
look like? I hope he will not look like an Arab. I was shocked. It surprised me and it 
hurt me. For her it was normal to talk like that. I didn’t think it was possible for people 
to think like that” (participant 14).
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Two other participants of Turkish origin were likewise saddened when thinking 
of incidents of discrimination towards fellow ingroup members such as the young 
Turkish man provided in our example:
“It hurts. They don’t have a brain” (participant 4).
Social identities are definitions of the self in terms of membership in one or more 
social groups. Under certain circumstances, individuals see themselves primarily as 
members of a group and act in line with this social identity. As a result of this sense of 
belonging, events relevant to the ingroup will evoke specific emotions in individuals 
(Mackie et al., 2004).
A sense of common fate is also shared by members of other ethnic minorities 
when hearing the example of discrimination against the Turkish man: 
“All Arabs aren’t thieves  1. They are Belgians too. I don’t like that. I’m against 
that. They blame the others. In the past they blamed the Spanish and the Italians here. 
My grandmother told me. There is always a scapegoat in Belgium” (participant 3).
According to Vollhardt (2009), past group victimizations and shared experiences 
trigger empathy and solidarity with other victimized groups.
Five participants discussed their experiences of discrimination within their social 
circle. Consistent with the social comparison theory of Festinger (1954), individuals 
tend to talk about their experiences with their social circle in order to get comparative 
information that could help them understand their experiences, but also to be 
reassured emotionally. In some cases, this social circle does not favour action against 
discrimination:
“I was told: it’s true. It’s a pity but try to persevere, to find a job and don’t think 
too much about it” (participant 5).
“In your social circle, some will encourage you and others will think you’re crazy 
because you are living in their country so you aren’t at home. Some will say that you 
have the right to be protected and others will say that you are wrong” (participant 2).
 Knowledge of the existence of anti-discrimination laws and organisations
One participant did not answer these questions. Of the fourteen remaining 
participants, seven were unaware of anti-discrimination laws and organisations 
combating discrimination. One participant knew about anti-discrimination laws but 
not about anti-discrimination organisations.
Nine participants would have engaged in legal actions similar to those of the 
victim provided in the example if they had been in his position, mostly because the 
victim was able to prove that the refusal was a result of discrimination. They also 
estimated that anti-discrimination laws may limit discriminatory practices.
“Because when there are no laws, generally people believe that they aren’t 
committing an offence and thus can do just about anything they want. If there is a 
law and it says: don’t cross that line, maybe it will make them think” (participant 5).
1 In Belgium, Turks are often categorized as Arabs even if they are not Arabic-speaking.
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Anti-discrimination laws are also seen as an opportunity to denounce such 
practices and to let everyone know that discrimination exists.
“Nobody has the right to discriminate against people. Discriminated communities 
should be defended. People should be made to speak out and not leave it like that. 
Discrimination should be denounced and prevented from happening again in the 
future” (participant 9).
Anti-discrimination organisations are perceived as offering support to victims of 
discrimination, providing them with protection and advice, and also as institutions 
that can facilitate the integration of foreigners.
“It’s a good initiative. It helps people who really feel rejected to move forward 
and integrate themselves into society. It’s very important. This way victims feel 
supported, reassured. We have someone who defends and protects us. It is comforting” 
(participant 2).
Five participants stated that they would not engage in actions similar to those 
taken by the victim cited in the example. Among the reasons mentioned is the fear 
of negative consequences when dealing with the justice system (participant 2). 
Others did not think these actions would prevent discrimination in everyday life. If 
an employer does not want to hire a foreigner, he can conceal the real reason of his 
refusal by inventing another reason (participants 3, 7, 11). Furthermore, some felt 
that this option required too many resources (money, effort) and would waste their 
time (participants 7, 11, 13). One of the participants believed that, as compared to a 
public demonstration, going to Court is not visible enough to denounce discriminatory 
practices to the public (participant 3). And finally, another participant expressed his 
lack of trust in institutions (participant 11):
“I went to the police headquarters. The policeman in front of me said: dirty Arab. 
It was a policeman, he works for the law. He has to take the deposition. It’s life, one 
has to [assume a submissive stance] and move on”.
According to Mummendey et al. (1999), the extent to which individuals expect 
collective action to be effective, i.e. successful in terms of changing intergroup 
relations, is the most proximal predictor of whether or not they will undertake 
collective efforts to improve the status and resources of the ingroup. FRA reports 
(2009b) state that more than half of North African interviewees in Belgium perceive 
ethnic discrimination when stopped by the police. If these results are representative 
for Belgium, the risk that individuals with stigmatized immigration background will 
lose confidence in the legal authorities looms large.
 Discussion and further directions
Through the discourses mentioned in this study, we distinguished a variety of 
ways to deal with the injustice of religious or ethnic discrimination. Whereas unequal 
treatment in the labour market based on origin or religion is considered unjust within 
the framework of the host society, not all the participants of our study perceive it 
as wrong. Knowledge of social norms seems to influence opinion but not always. 
Indeed, even if some of our participants knew about the prohibition of discrimination, 
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they experienced it so often that they considered it to be trivial and normal. Cialdini 
et al. (1990) make a distinction between “injunctive” and “descriptive” norms. 
Injunctive norms refer to behaviours (dis)approved by society and descriptive norms 
refer to behaviours that actually take place in reality. For a third of our participants, 
discrimination is so pervasive that it becomes a descriptive norm which definitely 
functions as an obstacle in the struggle against discrimination. It would be interesting 
to investigate the conditions under which “injunctive” norms have a higher impact 
than “descriptive” norms.
Nevertheless, the overall majority of respondents perceived the negative dimension 
of religious or ethnic discrimination, seen as the non-acceptance of minority group 
members in Belgium. Not all of the respondents were conscious of the stigmatisation 
of their group of origin, especially women with almost no interaction with outgroup 
members. If most of the participants are aware of discrimination towards their ingroup, 
only two participants were sure of having experienced discrimination personally, 
replicating prior research on this issue. As mentioned in previous studies, we confirm 
the idea that a facilitating factor in the perception of discrimination is the notion of 
egalitarianism, according to which every human being has the right to be treated in an 
equal manner. Reference to the existence of anti-discrimination laws, organisations 
and possible favourable outcomes tends to reinforce identification with the super-
ordinate category, Belgium or humankind, for some of our participants. 
However, it is a huge step between the perception of discrimination and actually 
claiming discrimination. Certain participants are aware of the negative image they 
project when denouncing discrimination. One third of our participants do not see the 
benefits of claiming discrimination. For some of them, the possibility of improving 
their social position on an individual level – the belief in the existence of a meritocracy 
– discourages them from engaging in costly actions aimed at enhancing the status of 
the disadvantaged as a group. For others, on the contrary, nothing can change the 
current situation. On the other hand, most participants do believe that denouncing 
such injustice is important, if only to spread awareness amongst the population to 
prevent future discriminatory practices. Anti-discrimination organisations are seen as 
attempting to integrate immigrants and their descendents into the host society which is 
perceived as a benevolent and reassuring action. Awareness of their existence could be 
a way to favour integration or assimilation into the host society. But institutionalized 
opportunities to voice dissatisfaction regarding a lack of equal treatment are not 
always perceived as having been created for immigrants. Some participants did not 
feel entitled to claim discrimination via the institutions of the host society because they 
don’t have the impression that the same society considers them as being part of the 
group. Indeed, their experiences with discrimination leave them with an impression 
of being disliked and rejected by Belgian society which considers them as outsiders. 
In this context, why would they have the right to claim equality?
We did not ask our participants if they would engage in anti-discriminatory action 
to improve the status of their group as a whole or their personal situation, but several 
spontaneously mentioned that they would do it for collective reasons above all. If this 
is the case, stressing the collective interests of engaging in legal anti-discrimination 
actions rather than the individual benefits, e.g. creating case law and preventing 
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others of being discriminated against in the future, would be a bigger incentive to 
engage in such actions. Following the present qualitative research, we conducted an 
experimental quantitative study to test this assumption and the results illustrated that 
institutional support for collective interests favours legal anti-discrimination actions 
when participants strongly endorse egalitarianism. Institutional support has less 
impact when participants endorse more meritocratic ideologies (Alarcon-Henriquez 
and Azzi, 2010).
In the end, according to our exploratory study, who would engage in legal anti-
discrimination actions? First, a third of our participants did not perceive discrimination 
towards their ethnic or religious ingroup. This was the case mostly because they did 
not have much contact with advantaged group members. Second, of the two thirds 
that perceived discrimination, half of them consider it so pervasive that claiming it 
would not change anything to the current situation. Of the five remaining participants, 
two did not feel entitled, as immigrants, to claim their rights to be treated as equals. 
Three participants who perceived group-based discrimination to a lesser extent and 
were aware of existing opportunities to voice their dissatisfaction provided by the host 
society might engage in legal anti-discrimination actions. None of them were sure of 
having been discriminated against. They only had suspicions. 
The difficulty of proving that one has been discriminated against has been solved 
in the Belgian legislation by reversing the burden of proof: the defending party has to 
prove the non existence of a discriminatory treatment. For the plaintiff, an assumption 
of discrimination is sufficient. But the participants did not have enough knowledge of 
these legal measures. Aside from all the other factors, these following factors stand 
out in our opinion as the main obstacles for immigrants and their descendents to 
challenge inequalities through legal action: lack of intergroup contact, pervasiveness 
of discrimination, lack of categorization at a super-ordinate level (host society 
or humankind) and lack of awareness of anti-discrimination measures. Existing 
institutionalized opportunities to act against inequality fail to achieve their goal of 
reaching the most vulnerable groups in Belgium as mentioned in the FRA reports. 
According to the results of this qualitative study, better informing the public about the 
existence of anti-discrimination legal options, as recommended in the same reports, 
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The concept of African transnational “communities” is now one of the most 
explored ethnoscapes  1 in anthropology and postcolonial studies (Appadurai, 1996). 
Many authors have shown the strength of migratory, economic, religious and political 
networks linking Africans and people of African descent living in different parts 
of the world (Bonacci, 2008; Chivallon, 2008; Gilroy, 1993; Guedj, 2009a, 2009b; 
Hall, 1990; Harris, 1982). Moreover, they have illustrated the increasing importance 
of religious or ethno-nationalist discourses celebrating the unity of an imagined 
community (Anderson, 1983). This paper advocates the necessity of contextualizing 
and “re-territorializing” the analysis of such globalized identities (Capone, 2002). In 
order to avoid cultural essentialism and, on the other side, the fascination for the 
“dance of flux and fragments” (Cooper, 2001), it is crucial to take into account the 
peculiar social and historical contexts in which those identity constructions are taking 
place. This paper thus explores the redefinitions of an African-oriented ideology 
developed mainly from 1900 onwards – Pan-Africanism – by the “new African 
diasporas” (Koser, 2003) within the Belgian context. In particular, using ethnographic 
data collected from African associations  2 based in Brussels, we will depict how the 
term “Pan-African” came to be used by an emergent associational elite in order to 
1 “Ethnoscapes” – or “landscapes of group identity” – is an anthropological concept 
developed by Appadurai (1996) to describe the global circulation of cultural practices and 
representations people in movement are building in order to feel connected with their society 
of origin. 
2 We use the expression “African associations” as it is employed in the associational 
milieu to refer to associations mainly directed by and meant for people of sub-Saharan 
origin. The ethnographic data in this text are based on fieldwork conducted in the African 
associational milieu mainly in Brussels by Nicole Grégoire beginning in 2007. The fieldwork 
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build an “African community” within a context of racial stigmatization. We will 
question the place of agency and structure in this phenomenon and the reason it differs 
so much from Pan-African movements in the New World. 
	 African	diasporas	and	the	emergence	of	African	associations	in	Belgium	
Significant migrations from sub-Saharan Africa began during the 1960s in 
Belgium. At the end of the colonial period, more and more students from former 
colonies and protectorates – Congo, Rwanda and Burundi – came to Belgium to be 
trained as the administrative elite of their newly independent countries. National origins 
and migration trajectories progressively diversified. Student migration gradually 
implied other African countries and family reunification led to the feminization of 
the African presence (Kagné, 2000, p. 4). Degradation of living conditions in African 
countries after their independence and the tumultuous democratization processes of 
the 1990s led to further displacements within the continent and beyond. In Belgium, 
the number of asylum seekers grew significantly during the 1990s (Kagné et al., 
2001, p. 13-14). This situation also discouraged many students from returning to 
their homeland. According to a 2006 census based on nationalities at birth, 93,687 
people of sub-Saharan origin are established in Belgium (i.e., approximately 1% of 
the total Belgian population), most of them from Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Ghana, and 
Cameroon (CECLR, 2008)  3.
Parallel to the evolution of migration trajectories, African associations began 
to develop in the 1960s. Students’ clubs, women’s associations, artistic, religious, 
professional or political groups were created on a national, regional or ethnic basis 
(Kagné & Martiniello, 2001, p. 35-38). Many of these associations remained informal, 
i.e. with no official statutes published in Belgium’s Official Bulletin. A formal African 
associational milieu emerged only in the early 1990s. African associational leaders 
and observers refer to this decade as one of “associational efflorescence” (Gatugu, 
2004; Manço, 2003; Meyers, 2000). Those leaders often deplore the climate of 
competition that opposes associations on the question of subsidies and/or public 
recognition. Many of them share the ideal of building an “organized” and “united 
community” in the present context of subordination and stigmatization  4. During the 
last decade, several small-scale meetings (15 to 50 participants) were organized with 
this goal in mind and they benefited from a certain visibility in the Belgian public 
sphere. These meetings formed the basis for a potential social movement (Werbner, 
1991). An important number of actors involved in these gatherings are leaders or 
founding members of five associations that label themselves “Pan-African”. In this 
context, the term basically refers to those associations’ criterion of membership that 
goes beyond “ethnic” or national origins and reaches a sub-continental level. They are 
not just “Kasaian” or “Congolese” associations, but claim to be open to people of all 
sub-Saharan origins. Before describing them and in order to understand the present 
consisted of participant observation of various activities (charity dinners, festivals, roundtables, 
commemorations, etc.) and biographic interviews.
3 We would like to thank Quentin Schoonvaere for these data which were used for the 
2008 CECLR report.
4 The words put in quotation marks are our informants’ own words.
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meanings of the term “Pan-African” in Belgium, it is necessary to contextualize the 
expression historically.
	 Pan-Africanism:	A	short	historical	overview
The term “Pan-African” is historically linked to a political and cultural movement 
dating back to the beginning of the 19th century  5. Institutionalized in 1900 through the 
first Pan-African Conference, the movement sought to fight discrimination of “Black” 
people around the world. It developed Afrocentrist rhetorics, i.e. promoting the 
seniority and achievements of African antique civilizations and celebrating African 
historical and cultural unity and common destiny, within the continent and beyond. 
It did so in order to advocate and promote the rights of Africans of the diaspora, 
particularly in the US and the Caribbean, on the one hand, and the rights of African 
people under colonial domination, on the other hand. Pan-Africanism advocated for 
the emancipation of African countries and sought their unification into an integrated 
political system. However, after their independence, the hope for a unified Africa 
proved to be in vain and the movement declined, at least as far as its political ambitions 
were concerned. 
However, long after the fall of the colonial regimes, the Pan-African ideal has 
not completely faded. As we will demonstrate, it is kept alive through various kinds 
of cultural nationalism  6 deeply rooted in the American continent. Secondly, in Africa, 
the Pan-African ideal persists through the African Union, a Pan-African political 
institution originating from the 1963 African Union Organization and whose ambitions 
are quite limited compared to the historical Pan-African agenda (Doumbi-Fakoly, 
1997, p. 33; M’bokolo, 2004, p. 52). Pan-African values are also revisited through 
various circles and associations in different parts of the world. As M’bokolo (2004, p. 
25) states it: “As an expression of the solidarity between Africans and African-rooted 
people and as a will to ensure freedom and development to the African continent (…), 
Pan-Africanism keeps on feeding ‘African renaissance’ projects”. 
	 Pan-African	associations	in	Belgium	
What is the legacy of Pan-Africanism in Belgium? Which meanings do people 
currently give to the term “Pan-African” in the Belgian African associational milieu? 
Two orientations can be distinguished.
	 “Homeland	politics”:	the	heirs	of	Pan-African	activism
A first reformulation of Pan-Africanism in Belgium consists of political activism 
focusing on the African continent. It draws its inspiration directly and explicitly 
from the historical Pan-African movement. On the one hand, this Pan-Africanism 
is historically linked with the students of the diaspora, e.g. with the Fédération des 
5 For good historical analyses of Pan-Africanism, see M’bokolo (1995), Holl (1997), 
Killingray (2005), Bonacci (2008), Guedj (2009b).
6 By “cultural nationalism”, we mean social movements that are concerned not so much 
with the creation of an autonomous state but with “identity and the regeneration of the national 
community through the development and the strengthening of a national essence – a distinct 
civilization which is the product of a distinct history and culture” (Ivarsson, 2008, p. 9). 
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Etudiants d’Afrique Noire en France (FEANF). Launched in 1950 in Bordeaux, this 
association sought to mobilize “towards the independence and unity of the African 
states” (M’bokolo, 2004, pp. 41-52). Internationally renowned, this association was 
emulated in Belgium. As a result of the involvement of former students in groups 
inspired by FEANF and who influenced the next generation of students, several 
present-day Pan-African circles continue the tradition of this movement. They usually 
convey Afrocentrist theories and focus their actions on African politics. For example, 
a radio presenter on the African broadcast Sous l’Arbre à Palabre, transmitted each 
Sunday on “Radio Campus” at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, explained that the 
broadcast is led by a circle of Afrocentrists and he explained how he was initiated into 
Pan-African political ideas: 
“There, I’ve been politically trained by (name of an intellectual belonging to the 
1960s student generation). Although it is not an association, ‘Sous l’Arbre à Palabre’ 
works as such. Its editorial line is Afrocentrist and progressive” (11/04/2007).
The continuity of Pan-African activism can also be attributed to intellectuals 
who recently arrived as asylum seekers. These Pan-African activists belong to 
transnational associations that often do not have an official status in Belgium. The 
Cercle Kwame N’Krumah is a good example. It was founded in Lomé University 
(Togo) and then recreated in Belgium. In an interview with a Togolese journalist, one 
of its representatives describes the Cercle as follows: 
“Politically, what we do to heighten our compatriots’ awareness of the Togolese 
issue is certainly known in Belgium, in Togo and other African countries such as 
the Ivory Coast and the DRC. Indeed, since the implacable dictatorship sent us into 
exile in the beginning of the 1990s, we have not sat idly by. We have organized 
our compatriots into associations such as the Cercle Kwame N’Krumah, the ‘F2P’ 
(Pan-African Patriotic Front) etc. (…) The Cercle Kwame N’Krumah was created to 
bring back Dr Kwame N’Krumah’s philosophy and ideas, which remain immortal. 
The solutions for African developmental and emancipation problems are to be found 
in those Pan-African ideas. What is Pan-Africanism exactly? It is African unity 
following the example of the European Union which is presented today as a guarantee 
of development and security”  7. 
As illustrated here, Pan-African activism in Belgium is not solely a phenomenon 
elaborated in migratory situations. It also stems from individuals who have been 
activists in their homeland. Their migration stimulates Pan-African activism revivals 
in the diaspora, in the host country and beyond. Since they focus on homeland political 
situations and following Lafleur’s typology, the activities of these circles can be 
described as “homeland politics”, i.e. “political activities that immigrant communities 
develop in the host country in domains exclusively relevant for their homeland” and 
which “are used to mark immigrant communities’ support or hostility to the homeland 
ruling authorities” (Lafleur, 2005, p. 27). 
7 Mouta Gligli : “Les élections n’ont jamais apporté de vrais changements au Togo”, 
interview by Zeus Aziaduwo in the journal Liberté Hebdo, 198, 02/05/2007, available at http://
www.letogolais.com/article.html?nid=3093 (accessed 23/12/2009). 
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 “Immigrant politics”: a migrants’ federative Pan-Africanism 
Lafleur distinguishes homeland politics from a second type of activism labelled 
“immigrant politics” which focuses instead on improving living conditions for the 
immigrant community. In Belgium, “Pan-African”-labelled associations of this 
type have emerged during the last two decades. With a legal statute, visibility in the 
public sphere, and (for some of them) strong commitment to represent “the African 
community” of Belgium, or even of Europe, they put forward another interpretation 
of Pan-Africanism. Here, “Pan-African” does not refer to current politics in Africa nor 
to the past prowess of African civilizations (although these topics may be discussed). 
Members of these associations rely on the expression in a generic sense to distinguish 
them from other African associations that gather people of a single “ethnic” or 
national origin. The term “Pan-African” here suggests organizations that go beyond 
these particular origins and encompass the entire “Black” sub-continent. Most of their 
active members are first-generation migrants who came to Belgium as students and 
have been living there for an average of twenty-five years. They are usually in regular 
work, sometimes in public service. They have committed themselves to a variety 
of African associations for several years. Thus, they form a social network that can 
be considered as part of an associational elite due to their long-term involvement, 
their intellectual background, their professional status, and the social capital they 
have managed to build within Belgian society, particularly through their political and 
media connections. 
In 1994, the creation of the Council of African Communities in Belgium and 
in Europe (Conseil des Communautés Africaines en Belgique et en Europe / Raad 
van de Afrikaanse Gemeenschappen in België en in Europa – CCAEB/RVDAGEB) 
constituted the first attempt to create an “African community” in the public sphere. It 
was the very first organization with the explicit goal to federate all African associations, 
regardless of their ethnic or national background. It brought together almost eighty 
associations. Interviews with some of its founders have demonstrated a link between 
the federation’s emergence and three important socio-political evolutions of the time  8. 
First, the creation of an imagined European community stimulated the will to establish 
an “African” corollary. As one of the founders explains:
“They were preparing the 1992 Europe (...). There were posters showing white 
people and Europe: “We, Europeans”, etc. You see? (...) And I took it very badly; I felt 
that I had no place. (...) And I said: “It’s a platform for Africa that we need, we need 
a federation of associations, so that we can find a place in this Europe” (18/05/2007).
Secondly, the 1990s were also a decade of strong debates at the European level 
about immigration and integration. Some consultative agencies, such as the European 
Union Migrants’ Forum, were created to involve migrant organizations in these 
discussions. One of the leaders of the CCAEB/RVDAGEB became the General 
Secretary of this Forum.
8 For detailed descriptions of these evolutions, see Guiraudon (2004), Rea (2007), Vinikas 
et al. (1993).
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Thirdly, at the national level, the rise of the far right in Flanders in 1988, and 
the riots that took place in 1991 in some of the so-called immigrant neighbourhoods 
in Brussels focused the attention of federal and regional Belgian governments on 
the question of integration. They released unprecedented funds for the creation of 
intermediary structures between public authorities and people with an immigrant 
background  9. This context stimulated many initiatives and marked the beginning 
of an ethnic associational efflorescence (Manço, 2003, p. 18-19). Another CCAEB/
RVDAGEB founder describes the necessity that was felt at the time of taking up one’s 
position with regards to other ethnic groups present in Belgium:
“That was quite irritating to me: this lack of a Pan-African vision. (…) The sub-
Saharan people were by no means visible here. Others could arrive there [in the public 
space] and claim: ‘We, the Italian community’, ‘We, the Greek community’, ‘We the 
Turkish community’, ‘the Moroccan one’… But no one said ‘the African community’, 
then… ”(24/01/2009).
The CCAEB/RVDAGEB took advantage of this favourable political context to 
attain representation in Belgian and European consultative bodies involving ethnic 
organizations in order to lobby in the name of “African communities”. However, 
this favourable context declined considerably by the end of the 1990s, a process that 
can also be linked to changes in the Belgian policies of integration. In particular, 
the federation was prompted to split so as to follow the Belgian federal system 
which required associations to be part of either the French- or the Flemish-speaking 
community in order to benefit from subsidies. Consequently, a Flemish federation, the 
RVDAGE/Vlaanderen (RVDAGE/VL), was created in 1996. This allowed funds from 
Flemish public institutions to be channelled to affiliated African associations. But the 
division of the federation also meant the creation of two distinct Advisory Boards 
and, consequently, overburdened the organization as increased funding possibilities 
attracted additional associations into the federation. This pressure led to internal 
conflicts that weakened the twin federations and caused them to lose their credibility 
at the end of the 1990s (Grégoire, 2009).
In 2004, the creation of MOJA brought about a new turn in the construction of 
an imagined “African community”. Significantly, MOJA means “one” in Swahili: 
once again, the emphasis is on uniting people from various sub-Saharan countries. 
Thirty-five persons founded MOJA, mainly from the DRC, but also from Cameroon, 
Gabon, Mauritius, Kenya and Rwanda. The consciousness of constituting an elite 
appears very explicitly on MOJA’s website which states that the association has 
gathered “most of the Belgian politicians of African descent and big names of the 
sub-Saharan associations” as well as “business people and academics/researchers”  10. 
Some MOJA administrators are also members of Pan-African activist (homeland 
politics-oriented) and Afrocentrist associations of the type described above; but as 
9 The Belgian State is subdivided into three linguistic Communities (Flemish, French and 
German) and into three Regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels-Capital). Integration has 
been a regional competence since 1994 (Gsir, 2006). For a detailed description of this policy 
and its consequences see Ouali (1992a, 1992b) and Rea and Brion (1992).
10 Our translation. http://www.moja.be (accessed February 2009).
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a broader organization looking for recognition in the Belgian public sphere, MOJA 
does not openly advocate these views. The association emerged in a political context 
marked by the growing concerns of political parties regarding “ethnic votes” and, 
consequently, by their growing interest in Belgian candidates of sub-Saharan origin. 
This constituted a new opportunity for the development of a representative structure 
for the “African community”. In an interview, a founder of MOJA explained how the 
initiative was launched after a conversation he had with an association colleague who 
was also a local councillor:
“He [the colleague] said to me: ‘I’ve got an idea. But I’m a politician. My idea 
is that in a country like this one, where community issues take up a lot of space 
(…), African associations, politicians, and all other people concerned should gather to 
lay the foundations of something representative and firm to face the socio-economic 
reality of this country. (…) You, as an associational leader, are supposed to be more 
neutral. Then I’d like you to conduct this meeting where we are going to discuss the 
possibility of launching something quite credible’” (19/06/2007).
Although it only published official statutes in 2004, MOJA, as a result of its 
political network, was received in 2003 by the Belgian government’s informateur  11 
as a “representative of the African community” after having organized a “Forum of 
the African Community”. The same occurred in 2007 before and after the federal 
elections. However, while the association gathered many members at first, it rapidly 
ended up being managed by a small group of three or four persons. A founder explains:
“When MOJA was created, everybody paid to become a member. We got 6,000 
euros at once! It was just after [Federal deputy] Di Rupo’s appointment to the post of 
government informateur and he received MOJA as the representative of the African 
community. Everybody wanted to become a member because they thought they could 
earn money. At the next General Assembly, 50 percent of the members were already 
missing. At the next one, we did not reach a quorum. Now, we should call for a 
meeting but we don’t manage to do it” (04/04/2007).
These two short portraits shed light on the relation between the development of 
a migrants’ federative Pan-Africanism in the African associational milieu in Belgium 
and the national and European political agendas. Referring to the dialectically linked 
polarities of identity processes, the “African community” was, at the beginning of the 
1990s, more a matter of attribution than of self-definition (Jenkins, 1997, p. 52-73). 
Although people of sub-Saharan origin have always had to deal with being labelled 
by the majority as “African” or “Black” in their daily life, their associations remained 
largely based on national or regional origins. Expressions of Pan-Africanism mostly 
remained limited to individual opinions or political activism aimed at the continent of 
origin. The evolution of the European and Belgian authorities’ concerns can – at least 
partly – explain the transition to Pan-African references in the formal associational 
milieu during the 1990s: their will to take people of foreign origins into account in 
11 In Belgium, the government’s informateur is a political personality named by the King 
after elections. He or she must meet different political actors in order to define a potential 
governmental coalition. He or she also meets members of “civil society” to hear their claims.
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the new political context opened the door to “community” representatives, and was 
instrumental in creating these “communities”.
	 Towards	an	interpretive	community
This political context was the basis for the development of a social process we 
could conceptualize in terms of “interpretive community” – thus focusing our attention 
on the actors’ agency. Paul Gilroy, and, a few years later, Pnina Werbner, proposed to 
consider certain Black British movements in such terms, for they produce and refer 
to a common symbolic repertoire to federate segments of a heterogeneous population 
toward collective action (Gilroy, 2002; Werbner, 1991). For example, Pnina Werbner 
evokes Black activists in Britain who refer to “themes and symbols” drawn from 
“Pan-Africanism, World Islam, Third World anti-colonialism” and so forth in their 
struggle “against racism and material subordination”. She argues that, in doing so, 
they create a common discourse that relates to “the contemporary conditions of the 
group within the larger society” and that can become “a cultural basis for unified 
political action which can encompass the different ethnic and immigrant segments” 
(Werbner, 1991, p. 26). 
We can hereby establish a parallel to the situation we have discussed so far. Despite 
the departure of and dissension amongst members  12, the creation of associations like 
the CCAEB/RVDAGEB and MOJA points to the will of an emergent associational 
elite to build a unified image of people of sub-Saharan origin. This elite forms a 
social network likely to be activated for collective action. It organizes public events 
that denounce racism and discrimination in Belgium as well as the consequences of 
underdevelopment in African countries, and which seek to unify African-rooted people 
as a result of common references, grievances and goals. These events constitute the 
common symbolic repertoire of this nascent interpretive community. Three of them 
are discussed hereafter. 
 Celebrating Black heroes 
The first event aimed to set-up a kind of hagiography revisiting historic 
achievements of Black people. In 2004, the CCAEB/RVDAGEB attained funding 
from the Brussels-Capital Region and from local authorities for a youth delinquency 
prevention project. This allowed the association to rent a hall in Matonge, a reputedly 
“African neighbourhood” in Brussels. By analogy to this toponym, the hall was 
called L’Espace Matonge. Since most African associations do not have a permanent 
12 We have already talked about members’ defections from both associations. It must be 
added that some former CCAEB/RVDAGEB and MOJA leaders founded new Pan-African 
associations with more specific ambitions. Those associations are the Union des Femmes 
Africaines/African Women’s League (UFA/AWL), founded in 1998, and Raffia Synergies, 
founded in 2005. As its name suggests, the former has a specific gender perspective. It 
promotes African women’s associational activities through the organization of charity dinners, 
conferences and a “Women’s Action Award” ceremony that takes place on Pan-African 
Women’s Day during the first week of August. The second organization was founded in 2005. 
Similar to the Rotary or Lions Clubs, it seeks to create networks of African-rooted professionals 
in order to develop mutual help and solidarity with the continent of origin. 
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room at their disposal, the hall has, from its inception, been repeatedly used for 
hosting debates, conferences, charity dinners, shows and festivals organized by 
various African associations. “L’Espace” is often described, in this small milieu, as a 
hyphenated place, a symbolic space where Pan-African ambitions are given concrete 
expression. In 2006, MOJA and the CCAEB/RVDAGEB organized the first “African 
Day of Black Heroes”. Five political “heroes” were celebrated: two representatives 
of the Civil Rights Movement (Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King), one American 
Black nationalist (Malcom X), and two important French figures of anti-colonialism 
(Cheikh Anta Diop, Frantz Fanon). Mixing heroic and victimary rhetorics in order to 
underline and overcome the African-rooted people’s subaltern position in Belgium, 
MOJA explains on its website that the event sought to “tell Black Heroes’ stories in 
order to rebuild a victorious history”. The association justified the necessity of such 
an enterprise as follows: 
“The hero is the one whose life has been a ceaseless struggle for the liberation 
of Black people from the yoke of an image and a false history within which those 
who dominate them try to maintain them. (…) To inform the disillusioned Africans 
about the capacity of their own people, about the life of these heroes, is to give them 
back self-confidence and hope for their future. (…) To tell the story of those heroes 
to the young Africans of Belgium or Europe, is to try to break, at least in their minds, 
the spiral of self-destruction, of the lack of self-confidence and of the society’s 
rejection”  13.
 “Learning a lesson” from recent successes
These Pan-African associations are not only concerned with revisiting the past. 
Their leaders also call upon more recent events in order to “create a community 
consciousness” – these are their words – oriented toward the overcoming of African-
rooted people’s minority status. Barack Obama’s victory in US presidential elections 
was an opportunity to go further in the construction of an interpretive community. 
On the evening of his investiture (20/01/2009), the Pan-African associations’ leaders 
met at L’Espace Matonge with other associational leaders in order to watch the TV 
broadcast of the event. During the debate that followed, Obama’s victory was rebuilt 
as a symbol of the victory of a “community consciousness” within Black movements, 
however divided they have been in the US. For instance, one of the speakers was 
warmly greeted when he said that: 
“the Black Panthers, Martin Luther King: for a while we thought that they were 
working each on their side, but in reality, although they had different positions, they 
were converging toward a similar goal. (…) In reality there was a federation of 
orientation”. 
So, in Belgium, if Pan-African associational leaders and others gathered at 
L’Espace Matonge, it was to “learn a lesson” − that was the title of the evening − from 
the American presidential success in order to elaborate upon future collective action 
that would enhance African-rooted people’s possibilities for social mobility, slowed 
13 http://www.moja.be (accessed February 2009).
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down by the permanence of exclusion and of racially-based social characterisation. 
Indeed, as another speaker put it: 
“Today, there is a glass ceiling. We see what lies beyond. And today, it’s up to 
us to set up the strategy to reach, beyond the ceiling, the point that we wish to reach. 
(…) Fortunately, some of us have reached a certain age. Some of us don’t necessarily 
have this ambition to be the leader who makes things happen any more. This is how 
we all were before. (...) Now, we enter the time when we will realize the goals of a 
group, of a community”.
These words reflect a central goal of this interpretive community, namely that more 
and more people stigmatized as “Black” should acquire positions of responsibility in 
Belgian society. They reject the “Black condition” and strive to overcome the racial 
minority status (Ndiaye, 2008). This also appears clearly in the memoranda sent by 
MOJA to the government informateur. In the 2007 version, the association wrote that 
“the African community of Belgium [is] concerned with the full expression of its 
citizenship and with being fully recognized as part of Belgian society”, which means 
“to be present and visible in the media and in the social, economic and political public 
space”, “to dismantle the schemes that stigmatize and undermine African people” and 
“to chase away people using or willing to use racism in general, and anti-Black racism 
in particular” (MOJA, 2007, p. 2).
 Keeping the link with Africa: Commemorating African victims of 
underdevelopment and migration
For the associational elite, what is at stake is not only the act of “making a 
community” around a minority experience in Europe. A third mode of construction 
of this elite’s symbolic repertoire relates to identifying with the suffering of 
African populations and with the tragedies of those who decided to leave Africa. 
Therefore, each summer in a “platform of Pan-African associations”, they organise a 
commemoration at the national airport in Brussels in memory of Yaguine and Fodé, two 
young clandestine passengers found dead in 1999 in the baggage hold of an airplane 
coming from Guinea-Conakry. The ceremony varies from one year to the next, but 
the integral part of the commemoration remains a French and a Flemish discourse 
given by two associational leaders; the reading of the teenagers’ heart-breaking letter 
to “Excellencies, members and representatives of Europe”; and the placing of a spray 
of flowers with a banner with the names of Yaguine and Fodé with the date they 
were discovered in the airplane. This commemoration is not only a plea to Belgian 
and European authorities and people; it is also a plea to the Africans of Europe to 
remind them of their responsibility for the development of African countries. One of 
the organizers explains:
“It’s the whole issue of migration and its reasons, but it’s also the question of 
European Africans’ reflecting on what they can do for the development of their continent 
of origin. These two children are emblematic of the drama of underdevelopment” 
(19/06/2007).
Here, the “Pan-African” label takes its transnational historical meaning by 
evoking the common destiny the African diaspora has with its continent of origin. 
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 In contrast: African-American cultural nationalism in the US
These migrants’ federative Pan-African associations are also worth considering 
in comparison to what they are precisely not. Taking into account the globalization 
of ethnoscapes mentioned in the introduction, one could expect Belgian Pan-African 
leaders to share common features with the African-American cultural “Black 
nationalism”  14 nowadays in the foreground in the US. While both movements are 
heirs of the same historical Pan-Africanism, they differ greatly on some issues.
First, voluntary associations have always been more powerful in the US and have 
generally benefited from higher membership than in European countries (Dekker et 
al., 1998), although associational involvement in the US diminished during the last 
decades of the 20th century (Putnam, 2000). African-American associations gather 
more people and resort to much more confrontational rhetoric than their Belgian Pan-
African counterparts. They have played a central role in the development of Black 
nationalism. The National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People 
(NAACP), of which William E.B. Du Bois was a founder in 1909, or the United 
Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), founded by Marcus Garvey in 1914, are 
good examples. The latter had millions of members, inside the USA and beyond. In 
Belgium, by contrast, membership of Pan-African associations amounts (at best) to 
less than one hundred. Nowadays, Black nationalism in the US is still supported by a 
dense associative constellation, the leaders of which express their demands very boldly 
in comparison with the Belgian Pan-African associational leaders. For example, the 
National Black United Front (NBUF), founded in 1980, aims “to unify Black people 
from various social/political persuasions, to build a politically conscious, unified, 
committed and effective Black mass movement and to confront white supremacy in 
its various manifestations”   15. Such a fiery speech would not be delivered by Belgian 
Pan-African leaders, who are much more moderate and who would not phrase their 
political agenda in terms of confrontation with “white supremacy” in a context where 
public racial categorizations are taboo and where “Black” is euphemized as “African”.
Second, the question of “cultural identity” is much more salient in the US than in 
Belgium. Belgian federative Pan-Africanism is concerned with access to rights and/
or public funds, not so much with the ontology of “being African” that preoccupies 
many African-American militants. Indeed, after the wane of the highly politicized, 
sometimes revolutionary movement of the Black Power in the 1960s and 1970s, Black 
nationalism in America has gradually turned, in the 1980s, into a mobilization more 
focussed on cultural than political issues. Afrocentrist theories constitute its main 
expression today (Austin, 2009; Fauvelle-Aymar, 2002). Molefi Asante, their most 
famous advocate, follows the thesis developed in the 1950s by Cheikh Anta Diop, a 
Senegalese intellectual. According to the latter, History’s first great civilization was 
born in Africa. Pharaonic Egypt, a racially black civilization, laid the foundations of 
Greek, and consequently of European civilizations in general. It was also responsible 
14 See note 6.
15 http://nbufhouston.blogspot.com/, http://www.assatashakur.org/forum/houston/39570-
12th-annual-sankofa-caravan-ancestors.html (accessed 15/10/2010).
162     the others in europe
for the populating of Africa  16. A substantial identity links all African civilizations – 
including (according to Asante) African-American communities. Through slavery and 
colonization, the Europeans tried to ruin this civilization. Well aware of the political 
stakes of history, Diop and Asante advocate the recognition of Africa’s central role 
in human history and they urge Africans (and African-Americans) to re-appropriate 
their past.
Although these assumptions gave rise to heated debates about the scientific value 
of these theories (Fauvelle-Aymar, 2000), Afrocentrism is also worth considering 
in its historical and social context, i.e. as an identity process. In the US, scholarly 
Afrocentrism has eventually led to an exhortation to “popular afrocentricity” such 
that African descendants should re-learn customs that are in accordance with their 
African “essence” (Asante cited in Guedj, 2009b, p. 15-17). They need to separate 
themselves from the hegemonic White society through distinct daily attitudes and 
folklore including peculiar dance and music, African clothes, specific celebrations 
like kwanzaa (new year’s eve) and revisited religious practices like voodoo, orisha, 
akan, kemet, etc. (Capone, 1999; Guedj, 2004, 2009a). Highly militant movements 
such as the NBUF partake in these Afrocentrist aspirations. “We must remember that 
we are a great people with a culture and civilization which extend to antiquity”  17. The 
NBUF organizes a yearly pilgrimage to places linked to the slave trade during which 
emphasis is on respect of “traditional African religion” including the Ifa ceremony, 
white clothes to respect the egun (ancestors in Yoruba), etc.
As a matter of fact, Black nationalism is also evident in a variety of churches 
and other religious associations, be they neo-traditional, Afrocentrist Christian, 
or Afroasiatic Islamic activist (Guedj, 2003). Furthermore, the movement is 
institutionalized through a variety of schools offering Afrocentrist teaching to African-
American children and through university departments such as Temple University’s 
African-American Studies where Molefi Asante is a professor (Austin, 2009).
In comparison with the effervescence of American Black nationalism with its 
huge capacity of political mobilization and its penetrating power in state institutions, 
Belgian Pan-African associations seem to remain in the background. The situation of 
African-Americans and of “Afropeans” obviously differs in many ways. The former 
have been established from the 16th century onwards, mainly as a consequence of 
the slave trade. They have a long tradition of fighting for fundamental rights in the 
American nation while the latter are first- or second-generation migrants, who, although 
they deplore racial discrimination in the Belgian society, have never had to fight for 
their rights in the same way. Their involvement in Belgian political life seems to be 
geared rather towards recognition by the public institutions or political parties than a 
fierce struggle against “White supremacy”. With regard to Black cultural nationalism, 
the situation is also very different. The Africa of the Afrocentrist African-American, 
including ancient Egyptian glory and cultural and religious unity, has less appeal 
among first-generation African migrants in Belgium and is not expressed so explicitly 
16 See Diop (1959). On Diop’s and Asante’s thoughts see also Fauvelle-Aymar (2000) and 
Guedj (2009b, p. 11-13).
17 See note 15.
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in the public sphere, although it has a certain echo among several associational actors. 
Indeed, most African associations are led by first-generation migrants and remain 
largely based on national, regional or “ethnic” grouping criteria. Just a few African 
association leaders identify themselves with the entire sub-continent. Pan-African 
federative associations are only emerging in Belgium, with a certain elite constituting 
a symbolic repertoire but not (yet) reinventing wide “African” cultural practices. 
Moreover, those who claim to represent “African people” as a whole have adopted an 
accommodating strategy (Myrdal, 1996, p. 720) that prevents them from advocating 
a voluntary political and cultural removal from “white” society which is simply 
inconceivable in a country promoting multiculturalism but wary of institutionalising 
cultural differences in such a divisive way in the public sphere. The idea of Afrocentrist 
schools for black children would seem properly appalling to Belgian authorities and 
“public opinion”. The “multicultural society” of present-day US – which allows the 
very idea of such schools – is to a large extent a consequence of the way the “Black 
and White divide” has shaped American history, especially during the Civil War and 
the Civil Rights struggle. In Belgium, the main division at stake for the last century 
has been the one between French and Flemish speakers which has left little room for 
any other cultural nationalist discourse, especially from groups whose presence has 
long been thought of as temporary.
In sum, the position advocated by the Belgian Pan-African associational elite 
appears to be quite far from African-American nationalism. We have only presented 
here a few aspects of the symbolic repertoire it is gradually constructing. We hope 
to have shown, nevertheless, that the symbolic elaboration of this nascent Belgian 
Pan-African interpretive community, although much more muffled than its overseas 
equivalent, does not come out of nowhere. It also revisits the long history of relations 
between the West and Africa and feeds on a transnational imaginary. Pan-African 
references are well-known among these associational elites, some of whom support 
Afrocentrist views but would not state them in political claims destined to Belgian 
authorities. The migrants’ federative Pan-Africanism came forth in a political 
context that greatly influenced its orientations. The aftermath of the 1990s was, in 
Belgium as in Europe, the result of a decade rich in discussions about European 
citizenship, integration and discrimination. This prompted an unprecedented 
associational dynamism with a concern for the institutional representation of “the 
African community” and for the growing political participation of Belgians of African 
origin. An associational elite emerged and is now striving to constitute a “community 
consciousness” oriented toward collective action. Hence, if one can speak of identity 
politics, it must be underlined that, in its current state, the symbolic repertoire inspiring 
the movement leans toward the option of “making a community” on the basis of a 
“pragmatic black consciousness” – a consciousness founded upon what is defined as 
common interest, rather than upon a cultural essentialism proclaiming the existence 
of a “Black people” (Ndiaye, 2008; Shelby, 2002).

chapter xi
Second generation associations and the Italian 
social construction of Otherness
Bruno Riccio
	 Introduction
Italy is now home to second-generation children of the first wave of migrants into 
Italy. These immigrant youth are organizing themselves politically, socio-culturally 
and religiously through the creation of associations  1. They have reached adulthood 
at a time when Italian society is characterised by a serious “multiculturalism 
backlash” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009). Members of the second generation 
are often depicted as “different” by the majority society, a phenomenon typical 
of contemporary cultural racism which draws absolute boundaries to legitimise 
the incommensurability of cultures and the normalisation of social exclusion and 
discrimination. Nevertheless many second generation associations try to avoid 
culturalism and embrace contemporary diversity by going beyond ethnic and national 
boundaries and by challenging common sense representations. These associations 
are characterised by cosmopolitan ambitions, familiarity with new media, public 
assertiveness, transnational connections and good linguistic skills which facilitate 
communication with Italian institutions. The primary objectives of second generation 
associations are to fight discrimination and to facilitate equal opportunities for social 
mobility for youth of immigrant background. Yet, these youth associations encounter 
various difficulties such as frustration in their inability to ensure active participation, 
avoiding dependency and elitism. 
The reflections presented in this paper result from a study on second generation 
associations in the city of Bologna undertaken together with a post doctoral student 
(Riccio and Russo, 2009). From a methodological point of view, our contribution 
1 I consider “second generation” in a loose sense including children of migrant background 
who grew up in Italy as well as those who were actually born in Italy.
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wanted to avoid metonymic essentialism. We do not pretend that the experiences 
documented by exploring the social lives of both members and leaders of the 
associations constitutes a representative case of the Italian second generation as 
a whole. We wanted to study a burgeoning social phenomenon, that of youth of 
immigrant background organising themselves to enter local public space, with local 
variations being very important in understanding the management of diversity in Italy. 
In addition to 20 interviews and participant observation at public events, we held two 
follow-up group discussions with eight of the interviewees in which we focused on 
the main points emerging from the research  2.
I will provide some context by discussing contemporary multidimensional 
racism in Italy and the delicate issue of citizenship. Then, I will focus on the 
challenges experienced by second generation associations and their struggle against 
discrimination. I will explore their main characteristics, objectives and strategies 
emerging from the experiences of their members, leaders and outsiders’ perspectives. 
I will conclude by reflecting on what this recent social phenomenon teaches us about 
everyday practices of citizenship.
	 Backlash	against	diversity
The contemporary Italian “backlash against diversity” (Grillo, 2005) is exemplified 
by the recent decree on security (July 2009) which, in addition to legalising security 
patrols by non-trained personnel, obliges doctors and health practitioners to denounce 
irregular migrants. This causes a dangerous reduction in access to health services for 
members of ethnic minorities. One month earlier, during the last electoral campaign 
for European and administrative elections, the Ministry of Internal Affairs adopted 
measures aimed at preventing migrant and asylum seeker entry into Italy through 
forced repatriation with no check on potential asylum statuses resulting in a serious 
erosion of humanitarian standards.
All over Europe, during the 1990s and even more so now, there have been various 
attempts to deport or exclude migrants who are regarded as disposable workers but 
seldom as citizens entitled to access social welfare. It is now considered “normal” to 
allow free movement amongst the wealthy countries but it is considered dangerous 
to facilitate migration from countries that combine poverty and, especially after 
9/11, Islam. In Italy illegal migration has become a focus for aggressive campaigns 
from the right. This has contributed to the politicisation of migration issues and has 
2 This study emerges from a broader research project, “Urban Contexts, Migration 
Processes and Young Migrants” (PRIN project 2006-2008) supervised by Professor Matilde 
Callari Galli. The project aimed to explore the socio-cultural experiences of young people of 
migrant background in two urban and multicultural settings: Bologna and Perugia (cf. Callari 
Galli and Scandurra, 2009). Preliminary findings have been discussed at ULB during the 
international workshop “The Others in Europe” in March, 2009. Later, between May and July 
2009, I was a guest at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity 
(MMG) in Göttingen and I gave a longer version of the paper to a seminar organised by the 
Department of Socio-cultural Diversity. I thank all the participants from both events for their 
feedback. Susanne Wessendorf, Ralph Grillo and Saskia Bonjour provided further comments 
on an earlier version of the paper.
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helped increase pressure for migration control and the “representation of migrants as 
problems” (Grillo, 1985). Furthermore, and more relevantly, the situation of ethnic 
minorities of immigrant origin, some of whom may be citizens and members of the 
second generation, has been badly affected by these increased anxieties concerning 
immigration.
There is a dangerous dialectic between government policy and public opinion 
already hostile to immigration. The media increasingly present immigration as a 
threat, contributing to the “moral panic” which negatively affects public opinion. In 
everyday political rhetoric, culture and cultural difference are increasingly politicised 
and opposition to foreigners is cast in terms of common sense themes such as law and 
order and the defence of – sometimes national, sometimes local – economic interests. 
In other words, right-wing (and other) ideologies are increasingly dominated by 
cultural racism. This kind of discourse underlines diversity resulting from cultural 
differences and concludes that, because of these cultural differences, integration is 
impossible. In 2008 for instance, the new Mayor of Rome, talking about the Roma 
minority in the capital, explained that some are good citizens, but others, “also because 
of their culture”, tend to steal and misbehave. 
A “culturalist” reading of difference may result in residential segregation 
of migrants. For instance, explanations such as the devaluation of prices due to a 
supposedly inherited tendency of migrants to live in overcrowded conditions are used 
by property owners to legitimise processes of discrimination in the housing market 
(Riccio, 2002). Furthermore, as Cole suggests when focusing on Italy to explore 
the emergence of a “new racism in Europe”, popular hostility towards migrants is 
legitimised by depicting it as a natural response of people protecting their territories 
(Cole, 1997). More recently, comparing contexts as far apart as Cameroon and Flanders, 
Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005) argued that these discourses of “autochthony”, apart 
from revealing the obsession with belonging and the exclusion of strangers in day-
to-day politics worldwide, seem able to target different groups at different times. The 
Northern League trajectory provides a good example here, since it moved from the 
stigmatisation of the southern Italian in the 1980s to that of international migrants in 
the 1990s. What is missing is a public debate about the legitimisation of exclusionary 
practices in everyday life which is created by this new racist discourse.
As Andall’s work in Milan has shown, “the very notion of the possibility of being 
both black and Italian remains a marginal concept within the broader framework of 
the contemporary immigration debate in Italy”. In other words, “being black and 
being Italian were perceived as mutually exclusive categories. This view was not only 
evident at the institutional level of the police but also amongst employers and by the 
gate-keepers of Italy’s physical borders” (Andall, 2002, p. 400). Therefore it is not 
a matter of mere cultural racism. Phenotypic characteristics have also become more 
and more relevant in fostering Italian internal boundaries. In 2008, a worrying series 
of events occurred. Abdul Gruibe, a young boy who was born in Burkina Faso and 
raised in Italy was beaten to death in Milan in September 2008 by the father-and-son 
proprietors of a bar who suspected him of stealing money. Only later they realised 
that he had only stolen a package of cookies. However, during the attack the two 
shouted “Dirty black”. In another instance, Emmanuel Bonsu, a 22 year old Ghanaian, 
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was injured in Parma in a scuffle with the police. Afterwards, it was discovered that 
police officers had taken pictures of themselves with the young Ghanaian who bore 
visible signs of being beaten. In Rome a Chinese man, Tong Hongsheng, was beaten 
by a group of youngsters, and a Somali woman, Amina Sheikh Said, 51, said she 
was strip-searched and interrogated for hours at Ciampino Airport in Rome. In July, 
six African migrants were gunned down in Castel Volturno, a stronghold of the 
Neapolitan Camorra. All these events, conflating occasional harassment by the police 
and violent attacks by informal as well as highly organised illegal groups, alongside 
more mundane everyday discrimination in the labour market, demonstrate that, in 
addition to the cultural racism mentioned above, there also exists very real everyday 
racialisation as part of contemporary Italian politics of exclusion. Phenotypic 
targeting, racialized aggression, racial hierarchies framed in biological terms (what 
might be called “classic racism” as distinguished from the “new cultural racism”) 
although politically unacceptable, continue to be used by people throughout Europe. 
As Didier Fassin (2000, p. 315) explains when talking about France:
“If racism was previously seen as the rejection of foreigners, the discovery 
of internal boundaries dividing a French community which finds it increasingly 
difficult to perceive itself as national contrasts with the official discourse prevailing 
until the 1990s. Nationality no longer suffices to define the basis for exclusion of 
the Other: the concrete criteria according to which a landlord refuses housing, an 
employer rejects a job application, a policeman decides to check for identity papers 
… must be considered. These are phenomenological criteria that tend primarily 
toward appearance, particularly skin colour, and mainly target people not identified 
as European”.
Contemporary Italian racism rhetorically conflates different kinds of 
stigmatizations in legitimizing social exclusion: cultural and religious difference, soil 
as well as blood, without forgetting racial difference. It works as “background noise” 
(Grillo and Pratt 2002), indirectly fuelling the widespread resistance to granting 
citizenship to migrants and their children.
As Thomson and Crul (2007, p. 1038-1039) admit, citizenship is an important 
tool of inclusion, endowing migrants and their children with rights equal to their 
peers. Yet, “where more restrictive laws on citizenship exist, however, a discourse 
of exclusion is facilitated”. The Italian citizenship law of 1992 made it easier for 
descendants of Italian emigrants to regain citizenship but also much more difficult 
for immigrants to apply for naturalization. The law was also more restrictive with the 
second generation, stipulating that children born of foreign parents in Italy assume 
their parents’ nationality and that they can request Italian citizenship when they are 
eighteen years old only if they have resided in Italy continuously. This means that 
the children of migrants born in Italy do not automatically get Italian citizenship but 
must apply for it and pass through a complicated bureaucratic process. However, 
the most precarious condition is that of young people who came to Italy when they 
were children or even when they had already entered adolescence, who, in addition to 
experiencing problems of exclusion and language acquisition, find out that they are 
“foreigners” once they reach adulthood. The desire to change this state of affairs is 
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the motivation for the creation of many second-generation associations which I will 
discuss in the following section.
	 Second	generation	associations	and	the	challenge	of	representation
Many studies on migrant organisations focus on the receiving states, their policies 
and the political opportunity structure (cf. Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005), sometimes 
running the risk of neglecting individual agency. To avoid this pitfall, we focus on the 
ways in which youth of migrant background respond to, adapt to, or circumvent laws 
as well as integration policies, and how their organisations and participation affect the 
meanings and practices of citizenship. 
Bologna’s economy has been historically characterized by the success of highly 
specialized small and medium-sized enterprises. Global restructuring processes and 
a very severe demographic decline of the local population are important processes 
affecting the city as well as the region (Salih and Riccio, 2010). Migrants are mainly 
employed in small manufacturing industries, in the production of handicrafts, and 
in the metallurgical and mechanical industries. Although the majority are unskilled 
labourers (mechanics or labourers in small and medium-sized firms), one can also find 
an increasing number of skilled migrants working below their skill level. 
In 2007, the Commune of Bologna had approximately 376,000 inhabitants of 
which approximately 35,000 were foreigners including 5,047 Romanians, 4,068 
Filipinos, 3,477 Bangladeshis, 3,014 Moroccans, 2,302 Albanians, 2,220 Moldavians, 
2,198 Chinese, 2,175 Ukrainians, followed by residents coming from Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Senegal, and Eritrea. Foreigners less than 24 years old numbered approximately 
11,000, whereas minors born in Italy and belonging to a family of migrant origin 
numbered around 5,000. The most numerous minors were: Filipinos (694); Chinese 
(592); Moroccans (573); Bangladeshis (540); Serbs (330); Romanians (297) and 
Albanians (220) (Osservatorio demografico comune di Bologna, 2008).
Most of the associations in the city of Bologna were founded in the mid 1990s 
when the left-wing local administration started to promote a “multicultural integration 
policy” (Caponio, 2005). In the 1990s, many of these associations were perceived by 
various migrants as an imposition by the local government rather than as the outcome 
of spontaneous mobilization (Però, 2002). On the other hand, local authorities 
provided facilities to support migrant associational activities. This was important 
because one of the main problems encountered by migrants’ associations is access 
to public contracts and funding. After an encompassing comparative study of local 
policies and migrant associations, Tiziana Caponio concluded that
“The inexperience and structural weakness of immigrants’ associations explains 
the distrust of public institutions, and in turn this distrust has the effect of keeping 
immigrants’ associations even more inexperienced and structurally weak. Breaking 
this vicious circle does not appear to be an easy task” (Caponio, 2005, p. 948).
However, these comments refer to the first experiences of migrant organisations, 
whereas in the last decade there has been a tremendous diversification of associations. 
Multiple organizational actors started to play an important role both in the interface 
with Italian institutions and in maintaining transnational connections with the 
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homeland (Riccio, 2008), including foreign families’, women’ and ethnically mixed 
associations as well as what are normally called second-generation associations.
These associations of youth with an immigrant background are very dynamic and 
enterprising and carry important political weight. While their parents tended to struggle 
for recognition through involvement in social activities based on Italian associational 
structures, as well as through networking with the economic and institutional complex 
within specific localities, members of the second generation tend to tackle the hot 
issue of citizenship directly and to cross local and sometimes national boundaries. 
This kind of strategy proves to be crucial for youth who were schooled and socialized 
in Italian society, but face barriers to social mobility and limited citizenship rights. 
These “new Italians”, as they often define themselves, try to strengthen their social 
position. Their struggle for recognition revolves around representation, both in the 
political and in the symbolic sense of the word. They contest and critique the common 
sense representation, which labels them forever as migrants, in order to enhance 
their access to social resources, political representation, and participation. They rely 
actively on the use of new media, such as the Internet, to achieve this purpose. As 
we shall see, they include both national and local associations, the latter of which 
focus their activities at the municipal or provincial level. Occasionally some local 
associations develop into nationwide organizations and some national associations 
develop local branches in different cities and towns.
Founded in 2001, the first and oldest national association is the Giovani Musulmani 
d’Italia (GMI) association. It now has hundreds of members and several local branches 
in different cities and villages in Italy. The main goal of the organization is to become 
a point of reference for young Muslims born and/or raised in Italy who want to be the 
protagonists of their own lives and in society in general (Frisina, 2008). The association 
maintains good relations with the media and uses its website to circulate information  3. 
The organization itself operates simultaneously at local, national and transnational 
levels. Residing in a specific local context may assume particular importance for it 
is the arena where people’s voices and concerns can be heard and translated into 
new demands of participatory citizenship. However, along with the local context, 
second generation Muslims often emphasise the importance of transnational public 
spheres as a major arena toward which to direct their efforts, discarding as obsolete 
the idea of the national arena as the main or the only political and discursive arena 
where cultural and identity politics should be played out (Salih, 2004). Indeed, the 
nation-state is increasingly understood by second generation Muslims as operating 
through an exclusionary process which not only denies them access to citizenship but 
also fails to acknowledge their complex identities. The state persists in crystallising 
Muslims as permanent and essential “others” or it offers them assimilation to the 
national community through a logic which restricts Muslim politics and identities to 
the private sphere (Salih and Riccio, 2010; cf. Levitt and Waters, 2002).
The most popular organisation in Italy, which is particularly active in the cultural 
and political realm, is the G2 Second Generations Network. Established in 2005, it is 
3  www.giovanimusulmani.it. 
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a national network of young Italians of immigrant background. Thanks to its website  4, 
it provides members with space for discussion and confrontation as well as videos on 
issues such as citizenship rights, identity construction and everyday discrimination 
(Colombo et al., 2009). Another well-connected national association called AssoCina 
was founded in 2005 by children of Chinese migrants  5. It aims to represent young 
Chinese-Italians, provide a bridge between their parents and Italian society and contest 
the dominant stereotypical representation of the Chinese in Italy. As an association 
leader stated in a public event:
“We want to provide counter information. This is why we have created the web 
site, not only to create a place to meet each other. There is a section called “news” 
where members can write their own articles with the goal of responding to stereotypical 
ideas about the Chinese, such as that of the Chinese cooking dogs in their restaurants 
or that of the Chinese who never die. We also have articles on citizenship and simpler 
stories, all told without all the distortions of the mainstream news”.
An activist in the local branch in Bologna of the same association further 
exemplifies:
“We are editing a new video on the electoral participation of naturalised citizens… 
It is an electorate that the media normally do not consider and that people ignore… We 
offer the possibility to let ourselves be known to an interested Italian audience… to 
let our everyday life be known, for example, through a simple act of active citizenship 
such as participation in political elections”.
Deconstructing and reconstructing the public image of Chinese youth means 
facilitating a process of “normalisation” of the presence of the second generation in 
the public sphere, especially at the local level. 
These three national associations represent what Brettel (2008) has recently 
called “netizens” to evoke social actors able to empower their everyday struggle 
to realise citizenship by navigating cyberspace. However, one registers a need for 
“re-territorialisation” (Appadurai, 1996) among these larger associations which 
create several local branches in different cities. Sometimes the trajectory can be the 
opposite, going from local to national and transnational. For instance, Crossing, a 
local laboratory, is an association from Bologna also concerned with the problem of 
representation which later developed a national online television site: CrossingTV  6. 
It is a web-based cosmopolitan web television station originating with an ethnically 
mixed association whose goal is to fight “ethnic labelling and the stereotypical rhetoric 
of Italian media”. The aim to actively create counter-hegemonic representation is 
clear:
“CrossingTV was born to answer to an important need. In the media delirium 
in which white, black and yellow youth are involved, often in an instrumental and 
exploitative way, it is important to create a space which is pure, cannot be labelled 
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“I do not want you to think of crime and decay when you hear my foreign name. 
I do not want you to think of me being on the boats in the middle of the sea when you 
hear that I am Albanian…”
Like Associna and Crossing, other associations also try to combine outward 
communication aimed at challenging stereotypical representations, with internal 
reflections on cultural essentialism and on the need to recognise more complex forms 
of identifications which offer room for reconciliation of their family experiences 
with everyday life in Italian society. In this regard, the Giovani Musulmani d’Italia 
constitutes a crucial example.
“We were established to say that you can be comfortably Italian and Muslim. It is 
not a problem, nor a contradiction; they are not contrasting identities”. 
All these associations look for recognition of youth’s multiple and situational 
identities. Instead of playing on a strategic essentialism where cultural boundaries are 
reified for political purposes of emancipation, they prefer to invoke a cosmopolitan 
self-representation. They publicly question an essentialist rhetoric of autochthony, 
which refers intermittently to blood and to soil. Perhaps because of the context, which 
seems particularly racist, they carefully strive to avoid various forms of culturalism. 
In this respect, their approach seems different from the one adopted by the Swiss 
Secondo Movement (Wessendorf, 2008, p. 196):
“In their discourse, which emphasised economic success and cultural belonging 
to Switzerland, they essentialised “the second generation” as successfully integrated 
members of Swiss society. This discourse was coloured by a culturalist stance, 
celebrating cultural diversity and marketing a cosmopolitan “secondo life-style” as 
an integral part of “being Swiss”, while at the same time emphasising the cultural 
similarities to the Swiss as legitimisation to access to Swiss citizenship. On the one 
hand, this discourse helped to deconstruct the essentialist images of the violent, 
vandalising and jobless secondo. On the other, it did not represent those secondos 
who are structurally less successful and who are repeatedly under attack of right-wing 
populists”.
In contrast, the priority for the Italian associations remains the fight against 
discrimination and the commitment to an ethnically mixed and cosmopolitan 
composition of the associations able to go beyond race and culture (cf. Aparicio, 
2007). For instance, Next Generation, a two year old association, created in the town 
of Imola in the province of Bologna, managed to unite young members of different 
national origin including Italians. However, such cosmopolitan projects may fail 
in their implementation. Arcimondo, a two year old local Bologna association, 
established with the help of Arci (an Italian cultural association of the Left), to 
fight discrimination, explicitly strove for a mixed and balanced membership, but 
nevertheless ended up with an overwhelming majority of Moroccan members. This 
was partially due to the fact that recruitment proceeded through the personal networks 
of the leaders who are themselves of Moroccan background.
Another peculiar characteristic of these experiences is that members of the local 
second generation associations are more interested in realising a practiced citizenship 
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in everyday social life than on paper. They think that discrimination and social 
marginalisation are the crucial issues: 
“Yes, I am a foreigner, this is a fact. If they give me citizenship, that’s a bureaucratic 
thing. I am still a foreigner. If I walk in the street, I am always a Moroccan, no kidding. 
Even if you show the red passport of Italian citizens you are still a Moroccan. Under 
Italian law you are a full citizen, but for the Italian people you remain a foreigner” 
(M., Arcimondo).
While the question of citizenship was the motivation for the birth of many of 
these national associations, especially the G2 network, the local branches and the 
local associations seem to favour a broader objective:
“Among us we talk more about the meaning of citizenship, not about the 
bureaucratic piece of paper. I know that’s important too, but the priority remains your 
recognition… The campaign for the change of citizenship law is important, don’t get 
me wrong. But if and when this will be granted, what will you do? Do you cease the 
associational life? I think the second generation should go beyond formal citizenship 
and work on the sense of belonging to a territory and on the meaning of participating 
in life” (member of GMI).
Clearly, citizenship is not merely about legal status because formal citizenship 
may not coincide with active and equal participation. For instance Portes and 
Rumbaut (2001) have shown that, whatever one’s legal status, educational attainment 
or economic advancement in the US labour market and society can become measures 
of a sort of second-class citizenship (cf. Kasinitz et al., 2008). In other words, as 
Bloemraad and colleagues explained (2008, p. 162), participation and activities that 
“make people an integral part of their local communities and institutions can 
be understood as a form of participatory citizenship that allows immigrants to make 
citizenship-like claims on the state and others, even in the absence of legal citizenship 
status, and perhaps even in the absence of legal residence”.
The main objectives of second generation associations are the struggle against 
discrimination and the enhancement of equal opportunities for social mobility for 
youth of immigrant background. Clearly, the experience of these associations is 
somehow different from that of their parents, whom these youth often accuse of being 
unable to understand the main characteristics of Italian society on the one hand, and, 
on the other, of begging for just a bit of space and recognition. Members of the second 
generation feel Italian and want to be more assertive, making their priorities “loud and 
clear” (Zinn, 2008). 
However, they too experience various problems of participation, mobilisation 
and networking with the institutional complex shaping local contexts. For instance, 
there have been some public funds targeting the second generation in recent years, 
but most of the people we have interviewed displayed a certain degree of suspicion 
and ambivalence. On the one hand the majority feel the need to shape a stronger 
organisational identity: 
“Before diving in we need to reach a better understanding of who we really are. 
We need to strengthen our structure and our credibility at the local level” (member 
of GMI). 
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“We are not ready yet. We need a better organisation with more members; we 
cannot be only a small group of people” (member of Arcimondo).
On the other hand, the fear of being instrumentalised and exploited is a common 
refrain among these youth associations:
“The first steps are to let ourselves be known and gain a bit of visibility… The 
issue about the second generation is becoming fashionable and we do not want to be 
used. We need to learn to relate to the different institutions” (Leader of Arcimondo).
“I do not like it when the personnel of the municipality has already organised 
everything and only then call us to participate. If you have done everything, what do 
you need me for? I say no, thank you! Either you call me at the beginning and you take 
me as a serious interlocutor or you only want to use me to play big with your potential 
electorate” (Member GMI, Arcimondo).
“We do not want to be instrumentalised. We want to play an active part not just 
help them to achieve merits for some question” (Member Associna).
“We do not want them to do things ‘in our name’. We are sick and tired of 
being beneficiaries of local policies and we want to be partners” (Member of Next 
Generation).
An additional significant problem faced by these associations is the lack of 
capacity to ensure participation of members in common activities. Consequently, they 
run the risk of not reaching the financial autonomy which would ensure their role as 
partners instead of beneficiaries. It is a complex and vicious cycle.
Another problem is characterised by just how “representative” an association’s 
leader can afford to be. As with the Secondo Movement in Switzerland (Wessendorf, 
2008), the leadership consists of politically aware, well-educated youth of immigrant 
background, mainly students, who engage in local cultural and social politics. This 
feature translates into problems of trust towards the leaders and recruitment of 
members. According to some activists the worst problem is the fact that most of 
the young workers of migrant background do not have time to participate in the 
associations’ activities. Furthermore the difficulties of everyday life (resident permits, 
work relations, salaries, rent, etc.) make the issues debated within the associations 
seem insignificant. These are problems typical of associational life in general, not 
only of the second generation, as a member of Arcimondo explains:
“In all associations one finds ‘intellectuals’, people with a better educational 
standard than those who go to work early and often confront serious problems, at work 
or with permits… They do not see associational participation as worth the effort”.
However, at high school or university one develops different expectations of 
social mobility and, consequently, is better disposed to contest diffuse discrimination. 
This elite may constitute “a vanguard” able to create a strategic place within Italian 
public space which can reveal itself crucial for youth of immigrant background more 
generally (Colombo, 2007). We are dealing with a very recent phenomenon and most 
of the young persons we have worked with have shown sharp awareness of all these 
problems and a readiness to engage. They are thus endowed with a promising critical 
and sophisticated reflexivity.
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	 Concluding	reflections
The second generation members of associations discussed here are interested in 
engaging in the society they have grown up in which is no longer perceived as a 
“host” but as their own. They feel Italian and they do not seek to be “accepted” by 
Italian society but to be considered full members and granted equal opportunities for 
social mobility. Their objective of participation in social life has been translated into 
an idea of “practiced” citizenship. 
Marshall stressed the need to take socio-economic inclusion into account as 
a background facilitating actually existing citizenship. He defined citizenship as a 
“status bestowed on those who are full members of the community” (Marshall, 1950, 
p. 14) which includes civil, political and social rights and obligations. However, the 
community Marshall implicitly referred to was, un-problematically, the ‘nation’, 
conceived as a homogeneous cultural entity. Various scholars argue instead that a 
central question in the present debates about citizenship is the extent to which 
“difference” can provide grounds for discrimination amongst citizens; whether, rather 
than all citizens being bearers of equal rights, their ability to exercise their full rights 
is affected by discrepancies in gender, culture and ethnicity. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, citizenship does not concern merely the legal 
dimension; but, active participation in society is also often required in order to give 
substance to an otherwise formal status. The experience of various members and 
leaders of second generation associations taught us about the need to go beyond the 
formal dimension of citizenship and consider also the everyday practiced dimensions 
of citizenship. Some of these witnesses connect well with an emergent tendency in 
anthropology of broadening analytically the conception of citizenship to include its 
participatory dimension, which depends also on practices and discourses of social 
everyday inclusion (Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Ong, 2003; Reed-Danahay and 
Brettell, 2008). 
Institutional discourses tend to reify complex and ambivalent social and cultural 
processes affected by negotiation between individuals and groups. Such negotiation 
is influenced in multiple ways by the representation (symbolic as well as political) of 
migrants and their descendants. In this regard, the second generation associations’ aim 
of fostering a more cosmopolitan understanding of “being Italian” becomes indirectly 
relevant for the realisation of citizenship rights. The ongoing socio-political trajectory 
of these associations leads us to think of citizenship as a negotiated and contested 
process of everyday inclusionary and exclusionary practices.
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